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Abstract 
 
Several years have passed since the relationship between the laws governing foreign 
investment and environmental protection started to receive well-deserved attention. 
Despite a vast quantity of recommended methods and emphasis on the importance of 
environmental considerations, recent awards have proved that the outcomes can still be 
surprising. Within this context, and as a possible response to this fear of unsettled 
conflict, this study explores the possibility of application of one particular principle of 
international environmental law, namely the Precautionary Principle. The overarching 
aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the content and the function 
of the precautionary principle. This will to provide an interpretative tool for investment 
tribunals.  
To this end, this thesis adopts a two-pronged approach. The first approach will analyse 
environment-related investment disputes to find the current state of play and 
understand the existing patterns. This analysis will demonstrate that when interpreting 
treaty provisions in disputes with environmental components, tribunals need to take 
into account the peculiarities of environmental regulation and the different mechanisms 
in the field.  
Having concluded the current state of play in environment-related investment dispute 
settlement. The second part of this thesis, which consists of two chapters, will explore 
the evolution of environmental policing, and will identify the different mechanisms that 
have been established to ensure effective protection. It will examine the precautionary 
principle as one of the crucial methods for responding to the limitations of previous 
mechanisms. It will also discuss the principle’s core elements and different functions 
(procedural and substantive) under the international law. Following a comprehensive 
analysis of different international environmental instruments, a precautionary test will be 
introduced, for application by investment tribunals.  
This study is first and foremost an attempt to contribute to the current dialogue by 
providing a conceptual framework for the precautionary principle. Despite some 
piecemeal studies on the role that the principle could play in investment treaty 
arbitration, no systemic research has yet been conducted to provide a conceptual 
framework for its application under an investment treaty. Moreover, while touching 
upon controversies regarding the status of the principle, this research will suggest 
different paths to apply the principle as a soft law instrument, capable of guiding the 
interpretation of treaty provisions. Most importantly, by providing a benchmark 
through the elements of the precautionary principle, this research will suggest that the 
principle could function as a double-edged sword by suggesting an objective test, which 
is a set of questions that could inform the tribunals’ decision.  
‘Solutions come through asking the right questions, because the answers pre-exist. It is the question that we must 
define and discover. You do not invent the answer, you reveal the answer.’ 
 Jonas Salk 
 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1  Background:  nature  o f  the  l ega l  problem 
The relationship between foreign investment and environmental protection1 is complex 
and has a dual nature.2 Foreign investment regime and environmental protection are 
compatible terms and therefore are not necessarily in conflict with each other.3 They can 
even be mutually supportive which is central to the concept of sustainable development. 
In fact, environmental concerns have already been integrated into many international 
investment agreements, and the space devoted to environmental considerations has 
been significantly expanded since the mid 1990s.4 However, the potential for conflicts to 
arise between the two should not be underestimated. It is, for instance, not clear what 
would happen with investments in environmentally-sensitive sectors, such as water 
distribution, waste treatment, chemical safety or energy production, if the host State’s 
environmental regulations were to become more rigid during the investor’s operations. 
The discussion regarding the potential tension between investment and the environment 
started when foreign investors began to dispute the measures adopted by host states for 
environmental purposes. In fact, this issue has been debated for the past two decades. 
Therefore, the legal debate arising from the interaction between foreign investment and 
environmental protection is not new, and has received well-deserved attention.5  
                                                
1 In this thesis reference to the environment means the sum of substances and forces external to the 
organism in such a way that it affects the organism’s existence. In relation to man, the environment 
constitutes of air, land, water, flora and fauna because these regulates the man’s life. Environment is not 
only our immediate surrounding but also a variety of issues connected with human activity, productivity, 
basic living and its impact on natural resources such as land, water, atmosphere, forests, dams, habitat, 
health, energy resources, wildlife etc. Arvind Kumar, A Textbook of Environmental Science (New Delhi: APH 
Publishing Corporation, 2011), p. 1. 
2 See Jorge E. Vinuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: An Ambiguous 
Relationship’, British Yearbook of International Law, 80 (2010). 
3 See Magnus Jesko Langer and Jorge E. Vinuales, ‘Managing Conflicts Between Environmental and 
Investment Norms in International Law’, in The Transformation of International Environmental Law, ed. by 
Yann Kerbrat and Sandrine Maljean-Dubois (Paris, Pedone/Hart, 2011), pp. 171–93. 
4 Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, ‘Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: 
A Survey’ (2011) OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2011/1 (‘OECD Report’), p. 8.  
5 For book-length treatments see Jorge E. Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental 
Protection Incentives and Safeguards, ed. by Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales (USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); Markus W. Gehring, Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Andrew Newcombe, 
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands  : Frederick, MD: 
Kluwer Law International, 2010); Saverio Di Benedetto, International Investment Law and the Environment 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013); Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment 
and the Safeguarding of Capital (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of 
Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public Policy, 1st edn (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). There are, in addition, many articles and chapters. 
  
 
2 
Moreover, as a result of increased awareness of environmental concerns in the last few 
decades, there has been a shift from resource-inefficient and polluting socio-economic 
business models to those with lower environmental footprints; this has been taking an 
increasingly recognizable shape. This shift, above all, requires significant regulatory 
change to enable sufficient supervision and control over potentially harmful activities. 
Unfortunately, this cannot always be achieved without affecting economic operators.6 
This research focuses on these adverse impacts on the operation of foreign investors, 
which can lead to an investor-state dispute under the so-called international investment 
regime.  
The investment protection regime was established to guarantee the investment of 
foreign investors in the receiving country. Although, each investment treaty creates a 
formally autonomous regime and vastly fragmented, scholars are increasingly referring 
to international investment law as a unified concept or a true legal regime.7  Advocates 
of this approach depend on the similar features that most of the treaties share and also 
the fact that arbitrators tend to interpret investment treaties in similar was.8 Moreover, 
interpretation of those common features and principle has established a ‘jurisprudence 
constante’, which supports the role of the investment treaties as a universal law on 
investment, which is evolving as a regime.9some even have argued that the treaty rules 
and interpretation have become customary international law and hence constitute as 
part of global regime.10 
Investment treaties, including Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), were brought to developing countries as ‘tools that promote 
investment flows’. They were not intended as legal instruments solely designed to 
guarantee the protection of investments from the other treaty party.11 As a matter of 
                                                
6 Jorge E. Vinuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: The Current State of 
Play’, in Research Handbook on Environment and Investment Law, Kate Miles (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2016), Chapter 2. 
7 Saverio	   Di	   Benedetto,	   International	   Investment	   Law	   and	   the	   Environment	   (Edward	   Elgar	  Publishing,	  2013),	  p.	  10. 
8 Id.  
9 Muthucumaraswamy	   Sornarajah,	   ‘The	   Case	   Against	   A	   Regime	   on	   International	   Investment	  Law’,	   in	  Regionalism	  in	  International	  Investment	  Law,	   ed.	  by	  Leon	  Trakman	  and	  Nicola	  Ranieri	  (Oxford	  University	   Press,	   2013),	   p.	   486. There are also other justifications to support the argument 
for considering the evolution of  foreign investment as a regime; the need for good governance of 
standard of treatment requires globally uniform rules on foreign investment, the rule of law requires 
stability of norms of investment protection justifying the evolution of a regime of foreign investment 
protection and also that international investment law is a part of global administrative law. 
10 Id. 
11 Mahnaz Malik, ‘South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Same Old Story?’, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development, 2011, p. 2 <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1425>.  
  
 
3 
fact, BITs are one of the most popular policy initiatives undertaken by low and middle-
income countries in the race to attract a larger share of global foreign direct 
investment. 12  Investment treaties are primarily concerned with attracting foreign 
investment by offering substantive protection to foreign investors. Namely, they 
guarantee a fair and equitable treatment (FET) for the covered investment, a 
commitment to pay compensation in the case of expropriation, the full protection and 
security and the prohibition of unreasonable or discriminatory measures.13 Tied to these 
obligations is the right of individual investors to initiate an international arbitration 
proceeding against the host state; this can be triggered if the investor is of the view that 
one of the obligations has been breached. The incorporation of the investor-state 
dispute resolution mechanism distinguishes BITs from domestic policy instruments, and 
makes them a potentially effective obligation device.14 
On the other hand, environmental considerations are playing a growing role within the 
field of investment law by being referenced in investment treaties. There are different 
categories of environmental provisions in investment agreements. Although these 
references do not always carry the same weight, they demonstrate the fact that players in 
the investment regime are increasingly taking into account the importance of 
environmental protection. The clauses vary in their position in the instrument and also 
in the message that they convey, such as: being only a general language in the preamble 
establishing concerns over the environmental protection in the document15, reserving 
policy space for environmental regulation, discouraging the loosening of environmental 
regulation to attract investment, clarifying that environmental regulation does not 
                                                
12 Id. 
13Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy and Interpretation (Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 57. 
14 Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation, Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive, 2007, p. 2.<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2255/>. 
15 For instance the US Model BIT 2004 states “Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner 
consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of 
internationally recognized labor rights”; the Australia-Chile FTA states the following: “Implement this 
Agreement in a manner consistent with sustainable development and environmental protection and 
conservation”; The NAFTA preamble states: “Undertake each of the preceding in a manner consistent 
with environmental protection and conservation; ... strengthen the development and enforcement of 
environmental regulation”; The Energy Charter Treaty also refers to environmental concerns more 
extensively and explicitly. It also lists multilateral environmental agreements: “Recognizing the necessity 
for the most efficient exploration, production, conversion, storage, transport, distribution and use of 
energy…Recalling the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, and other international environmental 
agreements with energy-related aspects…and Recognizing the increasingly urgent need for measures to 
protect the environment, including the decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and 
for internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for these purposes”.  
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constitute indirect expropriation or encouraging the strengthening of the environmental 
regulation and cooperation. 16 
Overall, the fact that investment treaties are becoming more sensitive to environmental 
protection, together with the growing reference to these considerations in the treaties by 
investors and host states, indicate that environmental concerns are playing a growing 
role within the realm of investment law.17 However, the inclusion of broad provisions to 
mention environmental considerations is not sufficient. By itself this cannot contribute 
to the achievement of sustainable development objectives unless governments become 
mindful of the need to provide appropriate interpretative guidance for the investment 
tribunals, who are charged with applying those provisions in the treaties.18 
Additionally, investment protection provisions have the potential to interact with the 
non-investment obligations of the states. The tension between a state’s environmental 
obligation and its investment obligation is one of the diverse types of tensions that may 
arise in this particular branch of international law.19 The areas of state practice that have 
been overlapped by their investment obligations are human rights, environment 
protection and labour. In particular, when it comes to environment-related measures, 
among the investment protection provisions existing in most of the BITs, foreign 
investors have mostly invoked the FET provision and expropriation.20  
Another important investment protection that is included in most modern BITs is non-
discrimination which itself is composed of most favoured nations and national 
treatment.21 This provision requires signatory states to provide foreign investors and 
their investment with treatment that is not less favourable than they accord to their own 
investors in like circumstances. With respect to the subject matter of this thesis, non-
discrimination could become relevant where an investor claims that a similar activity by 
another investor was not targeted by the host state for environment-related measure. 
                                                
16Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, ‘Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: 
A Survey’, OECD Publishing, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2011/01, 2011, p. 11 < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9mq7scrjh-en>.; see also Jorge E. Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the 
Environment in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 16. 
17 Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, p. 17. 
18  Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, ‘Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable Development and 
Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey’, OECD Publishing, OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment, 2014/01, 2014, p. 6 <http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvgx1zlt-
en>. 
19 Magnus Jesko Langer and Jorge E. Vinuales, ‘Managing Conflicts Between Environmental and 
Investment Norms in International Law’, in International Law Faced with Environmental Problems, Y. Kerbrat 
and S. Maljean-Dubois (Oxford, Hart Publishing, Forthcoming, 2010). 
20 See Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ as a Cause of Action Under the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ (2007) 10 International Arbitration Law Review, p. 104. 
21 Di Benedetto, p. 15. 
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Therefore tribunal should assess whether those two investments are in fact in like 
circumstances. However, compared with the FET and expropriation this provision has 
been less referred to in environment-related cases and therefore in this research the 
focus would be more on FET and expropriation provisions. This is not to say that other 
provisions are irrelevant, but to sharpen the focus, the analysis in this research is 
confined to FET and indirect expropriation, as these are the most claimed provisions. 
Inconsistency in the interpretation of investment provisions becomes more noticeable 
in environment-related investment disputes since the tribunals have taken different 
approaches towards environmental protection. This ‘scope for inconsistent decisions in 
regard to essentially the same issues’, which has been acknowledged among scholars and 
also by the Secretary General of ICSID, is obvious. Different tribunals under the same 
treaty can come to different conclusions regarding the same standard; the best example 
of this is the awards under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
where tribunals have come to different conclusions about the meaning of the same 
standard.22 Another scenario involves different tribunals that are established under 
different treaties but feature similar commercial situations and similar investment 
rights.23 This inconsistency is partly due to the increasing number of investment treaties 
and broadly defined provisions. There are various issues in environment-related 
investment disputes that reflect inconsistencies in arbitral decisions.24 As stated above, 
this study focuses on the area that has attracted the most attention and generated the 
most concern in this filed, namely regulatory expropriation and FET.  
1.2  Expropr iat ion  
Among different investment disciplines, protection against direct expropriation is a 
principal cause of action for investors, and is also the major motivating factor to 
establish the investment protection regime.25 Therefore, the BITs universally include a 
provision that limits the states’ right to expropriate without compensation.26 Customary 
international law does not prevent states from expropriating foreign investment if they 
fulfil its requirements, which are to achieve public purpose as provided by the law in a 
                                                
22 For instance the definition of FET and legitimate expectation in Metalclad v. Mexico and Methanex v. 
USA and Chemtura v. Canada. 
23 Susan D. Franck, 2005, p. 1541.There is a third scenario in which different tribunal under different 
treaty but the same facts come to different conclusions. This happens for instance where investment is 
structured in a way to take advantage of more than one investment treaties.  
24 Compensation, national treatment, …. 
25 Tienhaara, supra note 5, p. 8.  
26  Vandevelde, supra note 14, p. 271. 
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non-discriminatory manner and upon payment of compensation.27 However, the direct 
expropriation mainly related to nationalization, has been substituted by ‘indirect 
expropriation’, i.e. disputes over the regulations or measures adopted by the host 
states.28 This was envisaged at the time to become the dominant issue in international 
investment law, which now appears to be true.29 Therefore, concerns have turned to the 
possibility of drawing the line between non-compensable regulatory measures and other 
measures amounting to an indirect expropriation (and therefore require 
compensation).30 
Technically, governmental measures could be justified under the sovereign right of the 
states to act for the public interest.31 As Brownlie stated: ‘state measures, prima facie a 
lawful exercise of powers of governments, may affect foreign interests considerably 
without amounting to expropriation’32. This is also true when the measure is ‘necessary 
for its [states] recognized obligation’, 33 since it is regarded as ‘essential to the efficient 
functioning of the state’.34 This element was also acknowledged by the 3rd restatement of 
foreign relation law of the US, which recognized the ‘bona fide’ and ‘non discriminatory’ 
regulation adopted within the ‘police power’ as non-compensable.35 Moreover, in the 
Harvard Draft Convention on the state responsibility, an uncompensated taking will not be 
regarded as wrongful if the measure was motivated to regulate ‘maintenance of public 
order, health or morality’.36 In these circumstances, compensation cannot be required, 
since states ‘cannot be held responsible for economic consequences resulting from their 
                                                
27OECD, ‘‘Indirect Expropriation’ and the ‘Right to  Regulate’ in International Investment Law”’, in 
OECD Working  Papers on International Investment (OECD  Publishing., 2004) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321>. 
28 Id. 
29  Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments Regulatory Expropriations in 
International Law: Colloquium Articles’, New York University Environmental Law Journal, 11 (2002), 64 (p. 
64). 
30 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (New York: OUP 
Oxford, 2008), p. 93. 
31 CME (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), partial award, 13 September 2001. para 591, p. 
166. Tribunal defined regulatory measures as aimed to “avoid use of private property contrary to the 
general welfare of the host State”. 
32 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6 edition (Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), p. 509. 
33 George Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?’, Brit. Y.B. Int’l L., 
38 (1962), 307–38. 
34 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 
263. 
35 Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute, 1987), vol I. 
Section 712, Comment g. 
36 Louis B. Sohn, Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 
(Harvard Law School, 1961), 10 (5). 
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adoption of general regulatory measures, taken in good faith, in the pursuit of a 
legitimate interest and in a non- discriminatory manner’.37  
Some investment tribunals adopted the same approach to decide on disputed regulatory 
measures. For instance, the tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico excluded the qualified 
regulation from being compensated even if the investor’s investment was adversely 
affected. The tribunal took the view that states must be: 
Free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the 
environment…since, reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be 
achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensation.38 
Likewise, the tribunal in Sedco v Iran announced that the state is ‘not liable for economic 
injury’ having occurred as a result of ‘bona fide regulation within the accepted police 
power of the state.’39 Some tribunals have even taken one step further by considering 
the regulation as a consequence of the ‘normal exercise of their regulatory powers…. in 
a bona fide …non-discriminatory manner…that are aimed at the general welfare’,40 as 
part of the customary international law.41 
These criteria correspond to the leading ‘doctrines’, but no consensus or coherence has 
been reached in the jurisprudential results. As the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada 
indicated, ‘regulations can indeed be exercised in a way that would constitute creeping 
expropriation’. They specified that ‘a blanket exception for regulatory measures would 
create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation’.42 This would 
suggest that even if a tribunal is willing to recognize the state’s exercise of police power, 
there is still no clear line between regulation and expropriation. As one commentator 
has suggested, the application of this ‘indisputable’ principle is anything but clear.43 
Police power cannot, by itself, be the benchmark to determine whether a measure is 
genuine or protectionist, particularly in those investment disputes where the 
                                                
37 Brigitte Stern, ‘In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation’, in Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2007, Arthur W. Rovine (Leiden: BRILL, 2008), pp. 45–46. 
38 Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 16 
December 2002, pp. 39-67 at 59. 
39 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., award n. ITL 59-129-3, 28 
October 1985, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, Vol. 9, 1985, p. 275 
40 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), partial award, 17 March 
2006, para. 257. 
41 Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) v. United Mexican States Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (also known as Marvin Feldman v. Mexico); Sedco v Iran, supra 
40. ; Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech, supra 41. 
42 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, (UNCITRAL/NAFTA), interim award, 26 June 2000, para. 
96. 
43 Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, ICSID Review, 
20.1 (2005), 1–57. 
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environmental measures are being challenged by the investors. However, one should 
bear in mind that compared with other investment protection provisions, expropriation 
has a relative consistency in general based on the criteria that is developed by the case 
law. A more specific test, however, could bring more consistency to decision-making 
and to determine whether an environmental measure adopted by the host state is in 
breach of treaty provisions. 
1.3  Fair and Equitable  Treatment  
The next principle that investors have widely employed to challenge the measures taken 
by states is the FET standard. This standard is extremely vague, and to apply it some 
tribunals have had to review the ordinary meaning of ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ to clarify the 
terms’ potential meaning.44 FET does not have the same formulation in all of the BITs, 
which could clarify if the standard was intended to be an independent treaty language or 
as established customary international law concept.45 For instance, some treaties refer to 
treatment ‘in accordance with principles of international law’,46 while in some other 
treaties the clause expressly forbids certain types of state behaviours, such as ‘arbitrary’, 
‘discriminatory’, or ‘unreasonable conduct’.47 
The standard has its origin in the international minimum standard of treatment (MST), a 
customary international law regarding the treatment of aliens in general. Therefore, 
investment tribunals have traditionally looked into international law decisions 
addressing the MST for guidance. This was particularly true in the Neer case, which 
required the claimant to establish a high threshold of wrongfulness of the states.48 
However, some tribunals and scholars now treat the FET standard as a customary norm 
of international law, which has evolved autonomously from the MST.49 Such a shift was 
                                                
44 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 86, May 25, 
2004, “[i]n their ordinary meaning, the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ . . . mean ‘just’, ‘even-handed’, 
‘unbiased’, ‘legitimate’”. 
45 Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment (New 
York: OUP Oxford, 2008), p. 25; Rahim Moloo and Justin Jacinto, ‘Environmental and Health 
Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 29.1 (2011), 
p. 138. 
46 Id. p. 25. 
47 Id. p. 28 
48 L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer v. United Mexican States, 1926, 3ILR, 213, 1926, at 4 (“[T]he treatment of an 
alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to 
willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international 
standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”).  
49 See R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer, Principles Of International Investment Law 92-96 (2008); Mann, F. A. 
British treaties for the promotion and protection of investments, B.Y.I.L. vol. 52 ,1981, p. 241,at 244; R. Dolzer &M.. 
Stevens, Bilteral Investment Treaties , Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 60. 
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predicted at the time to become an additional source of inconsistency in the future.50 
Tribunals have developed a number of vaguely defined sub-categories, or ‘components’ 
of the standard, rather than completely interpreting it 51 . Some aspects that are 
particularly pertinent to claims relating to environmental measures are legitimate 
expectation52, stability and predictability of the legal framework53, transparency54and 
reasonableness55.  
In almost all environment-related investment cases, the claimant has included the FET 
claim. The following review of some of the more important cases demonstrates the 
tribunals’ attempts to interpret and apply the standard in the context of environmental 
regulation by the host states. 
For instance, in Metalclad v. Mexico, the tribunal focused on the lack of ‘transparency’ and 
‘predictability’ of the respondent’s conduct. 56 The tribunal also highlighted Mexico’s 
failure to ensure a predictable legal framework, and indicated that the investor was 
‘entitled to rely on the representations of federal officials’57 because it was ‘led to 
                                                
50 Rahim Moloo and Justin M. Jacinto, ‘Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards: Public Interest 
Regulation in International Investment Law’, in Yearbook of International Investment Law and Policy, ed. by 
Karl P. sauvant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 140. 
51 See, e.g., Biwater Gauff Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, (July 24, 
2008), para. 602. (explaining that the standard “comprises a number of different components, which have 
been elaborated and developed in previous arbitrations in response to specific fact situations”); Bayindir 
Insaat  Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, (Aug. 27, 2009), para. 
178. (“The Tribunal agrees with Bayindir when it identifies the different factors which emerge from 
decisions of investment tribunals as forming part of the FET standard.”). 
52Biwater Gauff Ltd v. Tanzania, supra 51. para. 602, (“the purpose of the [FET] standard is to provide to 
international investments treatment that does not affect the  bas i c  expec ta t ions  that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment, as long as these expectations are reasonable and 
legitimate and have been relied upon by the investor to make the investment.”)(emphasis added). 
53 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, LCIA, UN3467, Final Award, (July 1, 2004), para. 
183. (According to the Occidental tribunal, “[t]he s tab i l i t y  o f  the  l ega l  and bus iness  f ramework  is . . . an 
essential element of fair and equitable treatment.”)(emphasis added). 
54 Metalclad Corp. v. the United Mexican States, NAFTA, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, (Aug. 30, 
2000), para. 76. (“all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully 
operating investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement should be capable of being 
readily known to all affected investors of another Party.”) 
55 See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. the United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL,(June 8, 2009), para. 24. (In 
the award the reasonableness has been defined as “manifestly without reasons,”) 
56  Metalclad Award, supra.55., Investor’s Memorial (Oct. 13, 1997), paras. 162-65, available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com. Para. 76 (“The Tribunal understands this to include the idea that all 
relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully operating 
investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement should be capable of being readily known to 
all affected investors of another Party.  There should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such 
matters.”). 
56 Id. Para. 89 
57 Id. Para. 89 
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believe, and did believe, that the federal and state permits allowed for the construction 
and operation of the landfill.’58 
In SDMI v. Canada, although the tribunal asserted the importance of the regulatory 
choices of the state, it found in favour of the investor. 59 Claimant argued that Canada’s 
export ban on a toxic chemical waste60 violated the FET because it was ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘discriminatory’, 61  ‘procedurally unfair’62  and a ‘deliberate and domestically unlawful 
attempt to cause injury [which] violated the obligation of good faith.’63The tribunal 
concluded that having a protectionist intention in implementing the measure is 
sufficient to establish a breach of the FET64, and deemed it unnecessary to review other 
arguments relating to the provision.65 The tribunal, therefore, was satisfied that the 
claimant had proven a sufficient degree of discriminatory intent by showing that 
Canada’s policy was ‘intended primarily to protect the Canadian chemical waste disposal 
industry from US competition.’ 66  One commentator has called this approach 
problematic, which raises the question of how to deal with compound governmental 
motives.67 Nevertheless, the tribunal did not dispute the legitimacy of the regulation but 
stated that the environmental concerns over chemical waste export were not 
scientifically justified.68 
In Tecmed v. Mexico, the claimant argued that the FET standard was violated by the 
Mexican government, which managed the renewal of the landfill permit in a non-
transparent and inconsistent manner.69The tribunal’s decision in this part is notable, 
since it considered a higher threshold of conduct for the states by the way it included 
transparency and legitimate expectation as the components of the FET standard. The 
                                                
58 Id. Para. 85. 
59 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Memorial on the Merits, (July 20, 1999), 
pt. II, sec. I, para. 140. 
60  Polychlorinated biphenyl is a synthetic organic chemical that was banned for its toxicity and 
classification as a persistent organic pollutant 
61S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada , supra60., Memorial on the Merits, pt. II, sec. I, para. 140   
62 Id. pt. II, sec. I, para. 141.  
63 Id. pt. II, sec. I,para.  142. 
64 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada award, para. 265 
65 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada award, para. 268 
66 Id. Para. 194 (emphasis added) 
67  Marcos A. Orellana, ‘Science, Risk and Uncertainty: Public Health Measures and Investment 
Disciplines’, in New Aspects of International Investment Law, Thomas Wälde, Philippe Kahn (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007), p. 789. 
68 See S.D. Myers v. Canada. Para. 176 (highlighting a contemporaneous government memorandum which 
found that an interim order to ban PCB exports “is not a viable option because it cannot be demonstrated 
that closing the border is required to deal with a significant danger to the environment or to human 
health”) 
69 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, (May 29, 
2003). 
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tribunal described the transparency component of the standard in particularly robust 
terms:  
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from 
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it 
may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, 
as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to 
be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.70 
Despite being criticized for holding the state to an unrealistically high standard71, the 
award was cited by subsequent tribunals.72 Moreover, with regard to the legitimate 
expectation, the tribunal notably established an interpretation for FET by assenting that 
an inappropriate purpose for the regulation could be regarded as a violation of the 
standard: 
The fair expectations of the Claimant were that the Mexican laws applicable to such 
investment, as well as the supervision, control, prevention and punitive powers granted 
to the authorities in charge of managing such system, would be used for the purpose of 
assuring compliance with environmental protection, human health and ecological 
balance goals underlying such laws.73 
The tribunal concluded that the purpose of the regulation was not to preserve the 
environment but rather to overcome the ‘social and political difficulties’74 that were 
raised by the local group opposing the landfill. 
In Methanex v. USA, the investor claimed that the MTBE75 ban was intentionally 
discriminatory.76 The tribunal rejected the claim by confirming that article 1105 NAFTA 
was not intended to include a non-discrimination norm.77 It also accepted that the 
University of California Report (UC Report) ‘reflected a serious, objective and scientific 
approach to a complex problem in California’.78 This shows that the tribunal was willing 
to consider the purpose of the regulatory response. 
In Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. the USA the investor argued that the initial denial of the project 
violated its reasonable expectation, and that the overall delay in the project review was 
unreasonable. The tribunal rejected the claim by concluding that ‘to violate the 
                                                
70 Id. 154 
71 Zachary Douglas, ‘Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex’, Arbitration International, 22.1 (2006), 27–52 (p. 28). 
72 See, e.g., MTD Award, supra 44, para. 114. 
73 TECMED Award, supra 69, para. 157. (Emphasis added) 
74 Id.163. 
75Methyl Tert-Butyl Ether (MTBE) is a gasoline additive used as an oxygenate and to raise the octane 
number. Its use has declined in the in response to environmental and health concerns. 
76 Methanex v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, (Aug. 9, 2005), para. 6. 
77 Methanex award, Pt.IV, ch. C, para 14-16. 
78 Id. Pt III, Ch. A, para. 101. 
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customary international law minimum standard of treatment codified in article 1105 of 
the NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently ‘egregious’ and ‘shocking’, a ‘gross denial of 
justice’, ‘manifest arbitrariness’, a ‘complete lack of due process’, ‘evident 
discrimination’, or a ‘manifest lack of reasons’- so as to fall below accepted international 
standards.’79 The case is remarkable for stating that the claimant must establish a high 
level of wrongfulness for the state’s conduct to constitute a breach of the FET standard. 
The same approach was taken by the Chemtura tribunal,  who rejected the investors claim 
on the breach of FET standard by  constituting the measure as a ‘valid exercise of the 
police power’.80 
Similar to the tribunals’ approach with respect to regulatory expropriation, there is no 
coherence as to what constitutes a violation of fair and equitable treatment. Tribunals 
seem to have taken polarized approaches. This, as a result, leaves the states without 
clarity when deciding whether a measure to protect the environment might be regarded 
as a violation, or instead would be legitimately expected by the investor and therefore 
not in breach of FET. 
There are cases in which tribunals have rejected the claim for expropriation, according 
to the police power of the host states to take action for its public interest. However, 
there is no objective and well-defined method that can be applied by subsequent 
tribunals or by the host state to identify what constitutes public interest. This matter is 
highly case sensitive, and tribunals have so far granted deference to allow the states to 
make decisions without having to pay compensation. According to Douglas, where the 
provisions do not provide an answer to the questions arising from investment treaties, 
tribunals should not refer to the abstract policies such as ‘promotion of foreign 
investment or respect for sovereign authority’, but rather allow fairness and justice to 
inform their interpretation.81 This is due to the fact that: 
The notion that investment treaty obligations should be interpreted restrictively in 
deference to the sovereignty of the state party has long been discredited. And rightly so. 
Equally fallacious, however, is the notion that has come to replace it; i.e., that 
investment treaty obligations should be interpreted broadly so as to assist in the 
promotion of foreign investment.82 
                                                
79 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. the United States of America, supra56, para. 22. 
80 Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, (Aug. 2, 2010), paras. 92-96  
81 Zachary Douglas, ‘Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex’, supra77, p. 51. 
82 Id. 
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This issue would become problematic for the purposes of consistency and predictability. 
Also, if every action by the host state to protect the environment is regarded an act in 
the public’s interest, then economic development would be completely stopped. This is 
not consistent with the objectives of sustainable development, in which all elements 
should work in an integrated manner instead of one becoming the focus and the other 
being undermined. Thus, it is of crucial importance for the tribunals to balance the 
interests of both parties of the investment agreement by the appropriate interpretation 
of its provisions. 
This chapter of the thesis introduces the nature of, and legal background to, the 
relationship between investment law and environmental law. It also explains how the 
latter has been considered by investment tribunals when deciding if investment 
obligations have been breached. This chapter then identifies the research problems, 
which comprise one main research question together with two subsidiary ones. 
Furthermore, it explains the justification for this research, the analytical framework, the 
methodology and the expected contribution of the research.  
1.4  Signi f i cance  o f  the  problem 
With respect to environment-related investment decisions, it appeared that tribunals in 
many cases attempted to protect foreign investors’ rights, while also recognising the 
right to protect the environment. As a result, they rejected the claim for expropriation 
and violation of FET. However, some other tribunals acknowledged the state’s right to 
take environmental measures and the importance of environmental protection, yet 
disregarded these motives while interpreting the investment treaties. Simply put, they 
admitted that environmental protection is important, but when a measure that is 
intended for protection causes economic damages to the investors, environmental 
concerns become inferior and states either have to compensate for the actions taken or 
invoke their decision. Tribunals have not been consistent in their approaches in this 
regard and also have not supplied precise reasons to support their decisions.  
The central issue is that to overcome this tension, something more than mere praise of 
environmental protection is required. It is argued that environmental issues have such a 
global and prevalent impact that they should not be regarded as a ‘branch’ of law but 
rather a ‘perspective’ that should be taken into account in every aspect of decision-
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making.83  Therefore, tribunals who acknowledge the significance of environmental 
protection should go further by understanding its peculiarities while looking at the 
states’ behaviour against investors. The goal of this study is not to argue that tribunals 
should allow any measure that states adopt to protect the environment no matter what. 
Instead, the study intends to find a way to anchor dispute settlement in objective 
criteria. This way, not all environmental measures allow the host state to violate its 
obligations under investment treaties. Additionally, not all of the damages that are 
imposed on the investors, as a result of an environmental measure, are considered as a 
breach. A debatable question arising from this tension is how investment tribunals 
could, objectively, take into account environmental considerations while interpreting 
investment provisions. The significance of this problem regarding environment-related 
investment disputes is twofold: first, the inconsistency of the tribunals’ decision and 
second, the peculiarities of environmental issues. 
1.4.1 Inconsistency  
The brief study of environment-investment cases demonstrates that there is 
inconsistency and incoherence in case law with regard to the interpretation of the 
fundamental investment provisions. 84  The principles that are evolving from the 
investment tribunals’ jurisprudence do not create comprehensive criteria to clarify the 
relationship between protection of foreign investment and environmental 
considerations. The scattered treatment from the tribunals regarding this issue may 
prevent states from making accurate assessments of the outcomes of attempts to 
protect the environment.85  
There is a heated debate among scholars over whether the investor-state dispute 
settlement system is undergoing a legitimacy crisis. Some stakeholders have even shown 
their dissatisfaction either by denouncing the system or by amending their BITs to 
exclude this mechanism. 86 The bottom-line is that there are ‘legitimate areas for 
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meaningful debate’.87 One of the factors responsible for this alleged legitimacy crisis is 
the inconsistency and lack of predictability of the system.88 It might be fair and true to 
argue that some level of inconsistency should be tolerated89 and is common to every 
legal system in the quest for order and certainty. 90  However, the scale of 
unpredictability, especially in the field of the environment, could produce adverse 
consequences, such as discouraging states from responding to their environmental 
concerns.  
Several tools have been discussed by the commentators to overcome this predicament, 
which include drafting a multilateral treaty and, as Schill calls it, ‘Multilateralization’91, 
establishing an appellate body, increasing transparency or even promoting a public law 
approach to the investment dispute settlement mechanism.92 Nonetheless, referring to 
the efforts that have been made through the years to achieve a consensus, the idea of a 
universal treaty proves to be a long-term, if not unattainable, goal. Also, the idea of 
appellate body has raised controversy for the potential of adding to the politicization of 
the system and also increasing the costs.93 
Another important method to alleviate the tension between environmental protection 
and investment protection is the use of general exceptions based on WTO Model 
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according to the GATT Art. XX. This article allows member state to maintain some 
rights that would otherwise be affected by the strict trade obligations. Under the 
framework of general exception and as developed under WTO case law, member states 
have the right to maintain their own level of environmental protection provided that 
they are necessary for the desired level of protection.94 Although this method is of 
paramount importance in the integration of environmental concerns  into investment 
treaties, it is a tool in the hand of treaty makers to include a closed list of exceptions in 
the subsequent investment treaties. 
Nevertheless, an immediate and more pragmatic solution could be reached at the other 
side of the process, namely, the dispute settlement phase. The role of the dispute 
settlement in this system has proved to be influential, although it is also partly to blame 
for the inconsistency in the field. Investment tribunals have contributed, to a great 
extent, to what we have now in the investment regime by interpreting and developing 
the vague provisions of the investment treaties. Although the decisions have not been 
very consistent, the instrumental role of the tribunals in defining the framework for the 
investment regime has been incontestable. They have claimed to be a ‘fact of life’ in 
investment treaty law.95The question remains as to how the investment tribunals could 
curtail inconsistency, and how this matter relates to the present research.  
Kingsbury and Schill suggested that investment tribunals contribute to ‘a body of global 
administrative law that guides state behaviour’.96If this is true, then it could be safe to 
argue that the function of investment tribunals is to increase the predictability of the 
regime by providing a platform where ‘the rules are applied in a cognitively reliable way 
through competent and impartial adjudication’.97 In particular, states, as the primary 
users and litigants in every case, have actual interest in the consistent interpretation of 
investment law. As potential respondents, they need to judge their exposure in 
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formulating policies, as inconsistent rules make the review (and a proper cost-benefit 
analysis) of the measure to protect the environment difficult, if not discouraging. As a 
result, states have sought to renegotiate the treaties for further legal certainty.98 
In general, making coherent normative commands will lead to consistency, and 
consequently will create predictability in the system and thus strengthen a legal regime.99 
The ideas of coherence, consistency and ultimately predictability are at the heart of the 
concept of the rule of law that, as one of the ‘least objectionable political ideals’, should 
govern any legal regime.100 There is a very close relationship between these two as the 
way to promote, further or sustain predictability of a normative regime, and the rule of 
law by way of providing ‘dependable guideposts for self-directed actions’.101 In Schultz’s 
words, ‘a normative regime has to be sufficiently predictable to deserve the label of law’.  
The advantage of the rule of law (and thus the predictability of a legal system) is that the 
addressees of that system ‘rationally predict the consequences of their action’, which is 
evidence of a morally positive effect.102 In other words:  
A settled rule is more likely to be a live factor in the practical reasoning of its addressees 
than an unsettled rule: if you know with greater certainty that you are an addressee and 
what the rule commands you to do, then the rule is likely to figure more prominently in 
your conscious or unconscious decision-making.103 
In theory, the direct function of the tribunals is related to their consequential function. 
Direct function, from a black-letter lawyer point of view, requires the tribunals to settle 
the dispute before it and safeguard its decision against annulment, with the aim being to 
move the case along and maximize the satisfaction of the parties.104 In the context of the 
investment regime and dispute settlement system, aiming for party satisfaction means 
‘to impartially and competently apply the proper legal rules to the relevant facts, to take 
into consideration all the particulars of the case and to grant the parties appropriate due 
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process’.105In this sense, it is in the legitimate interest of the parties to receive the fairest 
possible decision. The second function of the tribunals/courts goes beyond the 
satisfaction of the parties, and takes into account the objective of having a particular 
dispute settlement mechanism.  This function concerns the ‘broader moral-political 
value of a given tribunal for society’, and aims to answer the question of what is being 
achieved with the resolution of the dispute in hand.106 This function is called the 
consequential function, as apposed to the direct function of the tribunals. This is the 
provision of justice ‘whose purpose is not to maximize the ends of private parties, but 
to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts [and] to 
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them’.107 In other words, the 
final aim is to ‘bring reality closer to chosen ideals’.108 According to the consequential 
function, ‘it is not about the parties doing their thing in the corner, oblivious to the rest 
of the world’.109 Dispute resolution also exists to ‘give concrete meaning and expression 
to the public values embodied in the law and to protect those values’, and to ‘apply and 
protect the norms of the community’.110 
To summarize, the purpose and function of the tribunal is not only to settle the dispute 
between the parties, but also to go beyond the case and address the overarching 
objective of the dispute. This is not compulsory, but is expected. Thus, by preventing 
inconsistent decisions from arising, the predictability of the system can be improved.111 
To achieve this goal, mechanisms must be implemented to promote greater sensitivity 
to the environmental concerns. Otherwise, investment arbitration ‘may fall prey to 
public pressure arising from a backlash’.112 As Franck pointed out:  
Given that issues of legitimacy cut to the heart of the utility of using arbitration, the 
literature must address the concerns underlying the legitimacy crisis in a meaningful way. 
Otherwise, conflicting awards based upon identical facts and/or identically worded 
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investment treaty provisions will be a threat to the international legal order and the 
continued existence of investment treaties113 
1.4.2 Unique Characteristics of the Environment 
As elaborated in the first section, the need to protect the environment has been 
increasingly recognized in recent BITs.114 Even so, despite moves to recognise a wider 
discretion for states in the new generation of BIT’s, the interaction between investment 
law and environmental law remains a contentious relationship. On the other hand, the 
characteristics of environmental issues per se require a special focus. The irreversibility of 
harm and the uncertainty of risk are common characteristics of environmental issues, 
and are recognized in international and national environmental instruments. 
Many environmental problems have an element of irreversibility. For instance, if a 
species is lost or if a pristine area is ruined, the damage is probably permanent. Also, 
toxic chemicals and substances might lead to irreversible ecological harm.115It is true 
that all losses are irreversible in the strictest sense, and the precise structure of the world 
cannot once again come into being.116 Nevertheless, the concept of irreversibility is in 
the first place associated with the scale of time. As a matter of fact, ‘we live in a finite 
planet, where the time is not a healer’.117 Many long-term environmental damages are 
not stricto senso irreversible, but are so unlikely to be undone that they may be considered 
virtually and practically irreversible,118 or not reversible over a reasonable time.119 
On the other hand, the current generation of environmental problems involve a high 
degree of scientific uncertainty.120 The undeniable fact is that without science, there 
would be little public concern over the wide range of environmental issues.121 They 
include, but not limited to, climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, acid rain 
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and exposure to radon and various toxic chemicals. Nevertheless, despite its crucial role 
in addressing these problems, science has been relatively ineffective at providing 
solutions. 122 Uncertainty could be the consequence of different elements. As the 
European Commission comments in its Communication on the precautionary principle: 
Scientific uncertainty results usually from five characteristics of the scientific method: 
the variable chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the models used and 
the causal relationships employed. Scientific uncertainty may also arise from a 
controversy on existing data or lack of some relevant data. Uncertainty may relate to 
qualitative or quantitative elements of the analysis.123 
A more convenient distinction is the one between epistemological (due to the lack of 
knowledge) and ontological (due complexity and variability) uncertainty.124 While the 
first category includes the lack of techniques for measurement and analysis, limitation of 
available tools, etc. 125, the second is caused by the quality of nature itself. By way of 
explanation, everything in nature is interrelated. The signatories to the Rio Declaration 
acknowledged the ‘integral and interdependent nature of the earth’ 126and the existence 
of the ‘earth ecosystem’.127 This complexity affects human comprehension of the natural 
system, and the ability of science to predict it.128 This type of uncertainty is not only 
caused by complexity of nature and the lack of knowledge, but also by nature’s innate 
variability. In fact, the elements of the natural world are mostly dynamic and 
unpredictable, rather than being regular and periodical.129 Consequently, the combined 
forces of these elements prevent scientists from absolutely ensuring conclusive scientific 
evidence.  
Moreover, threats to the environment are dynamic, and current concerns have never 
had the importance that they currently do.  Recent well-known studies highlight that the 
global earth system is at a critical condition due to human activities.130 Accordingly, 
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suggestions have been made for governments to shift their policies from being reactive 
and minimizing externalities, to a more proactive approach towards environmental 
problems. This also entails the estimation of the safe space for human development.131 
There are two main difficulties regarding the management of environmental issues, 
namely: the global nature of environmental concerns and the science-law relationship. 
Environmental concerns are by their very essence global, and reach beyond the territory 
of each state. They inevitably interact with other regulatory fields, which reflect the 
politically hard choices that must be made by states. These concerns have gained such 
magnitude that they must not be perceived as a branch of international law, but rather 
as a ‘dimension’ inherent to each specific human activity.132 Ecology is by definition the 
‘science of interdependence’ and international environmental law is ‘no longer defined 
by the approximate laying out, or interaction, of state sovereignties on a planet that has 
become too small and cramped. More than a right of joint ownership, international 
environmental law has become the responsibility of the whole.’133 
Another important factor in this field is the growing complexity of adjudicating 
environmental disputes. While scientific uncertainty is inherent in environmental issues, 
the usual perception of adjudication and the main concern is the proof of facts. This 
leads to the argument on inherent cultural differences between the scientific and legal 
worlds. Most environment-related claims are concerned with a measure that the host 
state had adopted to prevent a future risk to the environment. Not all of those concerns 
can be supported with conclusive scientific evidence. Facing these types of claims, in 
general, international tribunals/judges prefer to rely on an estimation of the actual 
damage, instead of depending on the assessment of future potential risks from the 
disputed activity.134 Therefore, having a scientific approach to the assessment of the 
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potential environmental risks, merely based on statistical methods and focusing on the 
actual occurrence of a quantified damage, is evidence of the sensitivity of the topic, and 
demonstrates the complexity of environment-related disputes.135Hence, uncertainties 
surrounding harm to the environment have frequently been used to push the protection 
of the environment lower on the priority list.136 In Foster’s words: 
The challenge is for tribunals to make reasoned decisions that pay due attention to the 
harm that is threatened in every dispute, despite the absence of the perfect knowledge 
or conclusive scientific evidence.137 
This section demonstrated the potential tension with regard to environment-related 
investment disputes. The significance of this problem for both investors and host states 
was explained to be the unpredictable investment regime and its impact on decision-
making, regarding the pressing issue of global environmental protection. The initial 
motive for this research is to determine the extent to which investment tribunals give 
weight to the environmental concerns that trigger measures, which, as a result, impose 
economical damages on investors’ activities.   
The lens through which this question is approached is the precautionary principle. It is 
one of the crucial environmental law principles, and is highly relevant to most of the 
environment-related investment disputes. If the potential risk is serious, or if there is 
evidence that concerns about potential risks have been proven valid in factually similar 
situations, the precautionary principle suggests that regulation may be appropriate. This 
is due to the fact that the available science may not conclusively affirm or deny the 
presence of a risk that merits regulation. This crucial issue forms the main question of 
this research, together with two subsidiary questions, namely:  
How could investment tribunals, in deciding an environment-related investment 
dispute, objectively identify a violation of the investor's treaty rights, taking into 
account the host state's regulatory autonomy in environmental matters? 
a. What criteria/benchmarks should/do tribunals use in deciding 
environment-related investment disputes in the absence of conclusive scientific 
evidence? 
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b. What is the legal and functional justification for applying sources of 
international law, other than/outside of the BITs? 
1 .5  Objec t ives  
Several methods and mechanisms have been proposed to overcome the potentially 
conflicting dimensions of the relationship between investment law and environmental 
law. They include methods such as limiting the scope of investment protection clauses, 
the role of non-disputing parties, the operation of emergency or necessity clauses138, the 
state’s regulatory power139, recognition of responsibility for investors140, the possibility of 
states bringing a counter argument141, contractualization of environmental protection142 
and so on. Despite various proposals and emphasis related to the importance of 
environmental considerations, recent awards have proved that the outcome could still 
be unpredictable. In this context, the purpose of the present study is to build on the 
existing literature to assess the possibility of applying one particular principle of 
international environmental law, namely the precautionary principle. The goal is to 
provide a conceptual framework for its application, which will act as a tool to inform 
the interpretation of the investment provisions. 
The main contention of this study is that the precautionary principle, as developed by 
international environmental law and as one of its leading principles, could provide a 
useful guide for interpretation of relevant investment provisions in an environment-
related dispute. The principle is broadly understood as a tool for public authorities to 
intervene in advance, and thus prevent potential or uncertain threats of environmental 
harm. The cardinal point is that a lack of evidence of harm should not provide a basis 
for reaching the conclusion that there is no threat of harm. The principle is recognized 
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as a departure from the primacy of scientific proof, rather than a denial of the role of 
science. Interestingly, many of the disputed environmental measures in investment 
disputes fall under this category, as the states took action based on their concerns about 
the potential harm that a specific activity might impose on the environment. 
1.6  Just i f i cat ion 
The justification for this approach is twofold. First of all, the present controversial 
question, according to recent awards,143 is less about whether environmental protection 
is important, but rather about how much it could influence the interpretation of the 
investment obligation and the detection of treaty violations. Hence, in this study, the 
inconsistency in dispute settlement is addressed from this point of view. In other words, 
the current dynamic of the investment-environment relationship requires a more 
practical evaluation. This should focus on to what extent investment tribunals should 
take into account the environmental consideration for its actual impact, and not only an 
abstract praise of its significance. 
The second element of this study concerns environmental risks and their peculiarities. 
In brief, the irreversibility of the harm and the uncertainty of the risks are the common 
characteristics of environmental problems. Therefore, providing a conceptual 
framework for the application of the precautionary principle, which is the result of the 
futility of looking exclusively to science to justify environmental protection, is relevant 
and warranted. This will enable investment tribunals to take into account the current 
and future challenges facing the governments. For instance, recent environmental 
incidents caused by human, such as the catastrophic oil spills, the chemical and nuclear 
leak, biodiversity disasters and loss of many species, etc., have triggered new discourses 
among states to take further steps for supervision and control. Moreover, further 
research and findings have increased global awareness about certain products or future 
damages that might occur to the environment such as climate change. Most of the 
actions resulting from this awareness are based on available data, and not necessarily on 
conclusive science. Hence, the precautionary principle has become more significant in 
the field of environmental protection to allow action if the threat of serious harm is 
established. In the unsettled and fluctuating context of environmental law and 
regulation, it is crucial for states to be clear about which moves would expose them to a 
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breach of investment obligation. States also need to understand the costs of their 
actions to make informed manoeuvres.  
Moreover, as the environmental concerns increase, states would become more active in 
providing solutions and mechanisms to alleviate those concerns in national and 
international level. These measures will mainly have anticipatory nature in order to 
identify potential threats and stop them. This means more scrutiny, more control, more 
supervision, more requirements form developers and so on. In fact there are many 
pending investment disputes in which, mostly these types of anticipatory measures have 
been questioned by foreign investors. For instance, in Pac Rim v. El Salvador, after a 
lengthy review, the government requested the claimant to conduct a water treatment 
plan.144 Residents of Cabañas, where the mine is located, have already reported negative 
environmental impacts from the approximately 660 exploratory wells that Pac Rim has 
drilled in the region, ranging from reduced access to fresh water, polluted water, impacts 
to livestock and adverse health impacts.145 What is more, the impact of full exploitation 
would be dramatic.146Moreover, in March 2008 the then president announced his 
disagreement with granting mining permits and the policy that the mining law should be 
revised.147 While this statement does not mean that the government denied any of the 
company’s applications, the claimant argues that the government cannot and “has no 
legal basis to do so” and prevent the company to continue its operation.148 Another 
example is Vattenfall v. Germany, which is the second dispute by the same investor 
against the changes in environmental policies of the country.149 Investor requested for 
arbitration against Germany at relying on its rights under the Energy Charter Treaty, 
seeking enormous damages relating to the country’s new policy on the phasing out of 
nuclear power.150 In a week after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011151, the 
federal government commissioned the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 
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(RSK) to conduct a comprehensive safety review of all the nuclear power plants in 
Germany.152 The new Atomic Energy Act announced that permission for the operation 
of a nuclear power station expires at the latest on a legally specified date for each 
respective plant, which prevents the companies to request a lifetime extension.153 The 
settlement of a previous case makes it difficult to speculate on the tribunal’s decision 
since both disputes were based on the ECT, which has relatively stronger provisions for 
environmental protection. These are some instances in which a forward-looking 
approach by the government, which is hugely encouraged under international 
environmental law, could expose them to multi-billion investment disputes. Therefore, 
conducting this research would be necessary to address these issues and provide a 
solution that could address these concerns and at the same time ensure that the fears of 
future harm passes a certain test to be qualified as a trigger for action and defendable 
before investment tribunals.  
Various scholars have addressed the topic of environmental concerns in investment 
dispute settlement and many suggestions have been put forward. Nevertheless, there is a 
gap in the literature on application of environmental principles, in particular, 
precautionary principle in a systematic way. By building on previous and valuable 
studies, the goal of this study is to go beyond theoretical justification for the importance 
of environmental concerns and provide a test for the investment tribunals to assess the 
environmental measures against the investment treaty provisions. 
Hence, it is important for the tribunals to find a way to merge and integrate the need to 
protect the environment and the duty to protect foreign investors, using legal tools such 
as treaty interpretation, instead of addressing the issue as a conflicting interests that only 
one of them would prevail at the expense of the other. 
1.7  Analyt i ca l  Framework 
The main contention of this thesis is that the precautionary principle, as one of the 
leading principles developed by international environmental law, could provide a useful 
tool for analysing most environment-related investment disputes. While the preventive 
                                                
152 H. Schneider , Residual Risks of the 13th Amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act. < 
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principle involves intervention prior to the occurrence of known risks, the precautionary 
principle is broadly understood as a tool for public authorities to intervene in advance 
and prevent potential or uncertain threats of environmental harm.154 In other words, the 
preventive principle is concerned with the prevention of harm and risks which are 
known, scientifically proven and can be reasonably avoided, whereas the precautionary 
principle runs in advance of prevention (but is not completely separate from it).155 The 
cardinal point is that a lack of evidence of harm should not provide a basis for reaching 
the conclusion that there is no threat of harm.156 Thus, the precautionary principle is 
recognized as a departure from the ‘primacy of scientific proof’.157  
The principle emerged, about three decades ago, in the context of the marine pollution 
sector at the North Sea Inter-ministerial Conference.158 This step marked the beginning of a 
swift development. It took less than five years for the principle to become practically 
universally accepted as one of the most important principles of international 
environmental law. Thus, its acceptance, which was sealed at the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, was considered to be an international 
breakthrough for the principle.159  
It also has received a vast attention in the international arena. In the environmental 
field, there is practically no multilateral treaty or intergovernmental declaration from the 
last twenty years in which the principle is lacking. At present, the precautionary principle 
can be found in (or under) some 60 multilateral treaties, and has been applied to the 
whole gamut of environmental and natural resource exploitation issues. These range 
from migratory birds to persistent organic pollutants, and from fisheries and 
biodiversity conservation to climate change and the transport of hazardous wastes. The 
influence of the principle is well recognised at the EU level, where it is powerfully 
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established as a binding principle in European law.160 Notwithstanding the controversy 
regarding its legal status, it could be argued that the precautionary principle is a widely 
accepted principle amongst states, and has been used by several international courts and 
tribunals in adjudicating environment related disputes.161 In this section, the definition, 
status and application of the principle are briefly discussed to set the analytical 
framework of this research. However, according to the peculiarities of the principle, and 
the central role that it plays in this research, the third chapter of the thesis is devoted to 
explore the principle in detail.  
In attempt to answer the research questions, this study will develop an analytical 
framework based on the precautionary principle to provide a judicial guide for 
investment tribunals. This is particularly aimed at those disputes where the basis for the 
challenged environmental measure is to prevent a potential threat from materialising, 
and is therefore not necessarily anchored in conclusive scientific evidence. These 
disputes occur mostly because such measures are not adopted in a straightforward 
decision making process. As will be explained in the third chapter, though scientific 
studies can inform the decisions, they cannot prescribe solutions, as most of those 
decisions are choices that states make to decide their level of protection. 
The following examples show the complexity of the concerns that result in 
environmental measures, and also demonstrate that science cannot be the only basis to 
justify the decisions made. In situations such as the fear of water contamination, 
authorities might deny a construction permit for a waste landfill facility,162 or replace a 
permanent license with an annually renewable one, to closely monitor a hazardous waste 
landfill facility due to their history of soil or other contaminations163; In another 
instance, to ensure the safety of the production of the chemical products, authorities 
might ask the investor to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA);164 Due 
to the concerns over significant risks resulting from the chemical contamination of 
surface water and groundwater, a state might decide to regulate the chemical and phase 
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(C360) 1, art 191(2);  Communication Of The Commission, 2 February 2000, On The Precautionary 
Principle, COM (2000)1 supra 123.  
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it out from gasoline;165 A protected zone might be created on a beach where female 
Leatherback Turtles lay their eggs in, to protect the endangered status of these animals 
and their nesting habitat;166 Or a proposal for a parking project next to a historical venue 
may be rejected for historical preservation.167  
These examples are only a few scenarios where the states’ interference (to protect a 
potential environmental damage) was disputed. Almost every action by the state for the 
purpose of, or as a result of, monitoring environmental efficiency would impose some 
economic impact on the operators. Thus, every action is a potential investor-state 
dispute, if the activity belongs to a foreign investor. Moreover, although the subject 
matter of the disputes is vastly different, there is one common element in most of the 
environment-related investment disputes: the investor’s activity poses a potential risk to 
the environment that has not yet materialised. This situation is where the precautionary 
principle comes to the fore, since according to international instruments and state 
practices, the principle allows states to take action when they can establish the threat of 
environmental harm. This could be achieved by the available data, which is at least to 
some extent based on science, but is not completely justified by science. 
1.7.1 Why use the precautionary principle? 
The reason for specifically selecting the precautionary principle as the analytical 
framework to address the issues under the environment-related investment dispute in 
this research is multi-fold. First and foremost, as one of the most efficient 
environmental decision-making methods to protect the environment from future harm, 
the principle allows states to take actions before waiting for conclusive scientific 
evidence (once they could establish a serious or irreversible harm to the environment). 
This function is close to the intention behind most of the environment-related 
investment disputes. Hence, analysing the element and function of the principle could 
help to provide a benchmark, against which tribunals could assess whether the disputed 
environmental measure is rooted in a legitimate concern, or whether it is instead a 
protectionist or unreasonable measure, and should be considered a breach of an 
investment treaty provision. 
In line with the previous point, the second justification is that the precautionary 
principle has some core elements that are widely referred to and repeated in most 
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international environmental instruments. To provide a benchmark for assessment of 
states’ environmental measures, these elements will be studied and used to facilitate an 
objective evaluation of environmental measures. Therefore, this research is not an 
attempt to argue that the principle by itself is the answer to the unsettled relationship 
between environment and investment, but rather suggests that it could play a role as a 
guiding tool. This would give tribunals a better perspective with regards to the 
environmental concerns that urge states to take action. 
Moreover, as will be argued later under this section, compared with binding norms, 
precautionary principle as a soft law instrument has more flexibility to be applied. It 
could guide and inform the interpretation of investment provisions where the subject 
matter is an environmental measure that lacks conclusive science. Therefore, the lack of 
normative element could be perceived as an advantage, since it will not conflict with 
investment obligations to be settled by the investment tribunals. Rather, it suggests a 
holistic approach with a potential to integrate environmental concerns in the context of 
investment law. Perhaps, the principle helps in the interpretation of some of the 
imprecise and vague provisions in investment treaties such as FET in the context 
conflicting obligations of the host state. 
Last but not least, the principle could operate as a double-edged sword.168 This means 
that its application is not necessarily in favour of the host state’s environmental 
measures, nor does it justify any environmental concern as an exception to investment 
treaty obligations. Rather, the precautionary principle, through a well-defined 
framework, could provide a benchmark against which investment tribunals could assess 
the environmental measures that are adopted, particularly for concerns over potential 
environmental harm. In other words, if the disputed measure does not reach to the level 
that the precautionary principle requires, it is likely that the claimed environmental 
concerns are not serious enough to justify a precautionary measure. As a result, a 
measure that, according to the host state, was adopted to prevent future environmental 
harm, but is not a serious concern under environmental law and regulations, cannot 
justify the economic losses that were imposed on the investor.  
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1.7.2 Definition  
It is frequently said that the precautionary principle has not yet received a uniformly 
applicable and authoritative definition.169 Admittedly, many instruments that name the 
principle do not define it at all, however they have often referred to Principle 15 of the 
1992 Rio Declaration170, which states that: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation171  
Furthermore, a substantial number of instruments containing unspecified reference to 
the principle indicate at least some common understanding of its fundamental 
elements.172  These common elements are the threat of harm, scientific uncertainty and 
taking action. In other words, when there is a threat of environmental harm, scientific 
uncertainty should not prevent states from taking action to protect the environment. 
These elements are not only described in the literature; in fact most environmental 
instruments display evidence of a certain threshold for each element. This will be 
discussed extensively in chapter three.  
1.7.3 Status 
The disagreement on the status of the precautionary principle under international law is 
one of the most controversial aspects that has interrupted the principle’s wider 
application. The principle has been addressed in the numerous instruments, relevant 
treaties, declarations, resolutions, national legislation, executive decisions and 
jurisprudence- as well as in international judicial decisions and academic writings. 
Nevertheless, there is no consensus regarding the status of the principle under 
international law. In fact, this matter is the main point of departure among scholars 
regarding the applicability of the principle. Therefore, the question remains as to 
whether the inclusion of the principle in various international instruments indicates the 
existence of a universal principle of customary international law. Doctrine is largely 
divided in this respect. However, it is generally accepted that the precautionary principle 
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is in a process of crystallization, and it appears that it is only a matter of time before a 
customary rule to this effect is established.173 
Some commentators have argued that its adoption in a wide variety of more recent 
international instruments, and its elaboration in the Rio Declaration as a general guiding 
principle for taking action to protect the environment, lend weight to the argument that 
it has crystallized into a principle of customary international law.174 This argument, in 
practice, suggests that there is an international obligation on states to take precautionary 
measures if the potential for damage reaches a certain level of gravity and probability.175  
The other side of the spectrum is represented by those critics who believe that 
precaution is not even a principle, but is merely an approach that has only political 
application. Furthermore, the principle is vague, and its application prevents 
technological development. Opponents strongly claim that precautionary principle is 
not mentioned in any binding instrument and has not even got a unified definition. 
Therefore, they view it as being inapplicable. 
Be that as it may, this research argues that the precautionary principle is a nonbinding     
instrument under international law with normative character. However, as the main 
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focus of this research, being nonbinding does not prevent it from guiding interpretation. 
It is argued that the principle indicates the direction of decision-making without 
indicating its parameters.176 Chapter three and four will examine these parameters by 
looking at international instruments and jurisprudence. The outcome of these chapters 
provides a benchmark consisted of several questions to be asked by the tribunals. The 
statement of this thesis is that by asking these questions through the medium of treaty 
interpretation, the subject matter of the dispute (i.e. the environmental measure) will 
inevitably be put in perspective. This will bring the core elements of environmental 
supervision to the attention of the tribunals. 
1.7.4 Application 
Having overviewed the definition and status of the precautionary principle, this section 
will move to the question of how the preferred analytical framework corresponds with 
the research question. In other words, this section examines the scope and legal 
framework under which the precautionary principle could be operationalized in the 
context of investment law. 
 
BITs are typically limited to a short list of primary rules of investment protection, 
together with the provision for investor-state dispute resolution through arbitration.177It 
is argued that an approach that chiefly considers the economic interests of the investors 
probably cannot secure the states’ regulatory room to manoeuvre.178 Therefore, the 
investment treaties should not operate in a vacuum, but rather should be interpreted 
according to other applicable rules of international law.179 As the annulment committee 
in MTD v. Chile declared, ‘international law applies as a whole and BIT should not be 
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regarded in isolation’.180In other words, tribunals need to look beyond the ‘four corners 
of the treaty’ obligations. 181   
It is hard to disagree with ICJ judge Ad Hoc Vinuesa’s recent assertion in his dissenting 
opinion on the Pulp Mills decision that ‘the precautionary principle is not an abstraction 
or an academic component of desirable soft law, but a rule of law within general 
international law as it stands today’.182 This notion was also made in a separate opinion 
by Judge Trindade on the same case, arguing that the principle: 
Has indeed taken shape, in our days, moved above all by human conscience, the 
universal juridical conscience, which is, …the ultimate material ‘source’ of all Law, and 
of the new jus gentium of our times. Be that as it may, the fact that the Court has not 
expressly acknowledged the existence of this general principle of International 
Environmental Law does not mean that it does not exist.183 
 
Thus, as a relevant and applicable principle of international law, the precautionary 
principle could play a role in the field of international investment law.184 On the other 
hand, the precautionary principle has been argued to be a guiding standard for states 
and tribunals, and not a customary rule. This means that it is not binding for the 
states.185  Bodansky has differentiated between ‘rule’ and ‘standard’, arguing that while 
the former defines exactly ‘the permissible and impermissible’, the latter is open ended; 
its application is defined by judgment and discretion.186 This argument, however, does 
not contradict with the attempt to apply the precautionary principle under international 
law, in that an investment tribunal could still apply the principle as an interpretive tool.  
Nevertheless, simply identifying the law as being applicable to an obligation of 
international law will not allow the tribunal to implement the principle into the 
investment context. Instead, the process of treaty interpretation should be followed to 
determine the extent and manner in which a principle, rule or standard is applied in the 
context of investment treaties.187 
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This study will analyse two possible tracks that would enable tribunals to apply the 
precautionary principle. The first suggested path is through the evolutionary 
interpretation of the investment treaty and its ‘object and purpose’. This allows tribunals 
to take into account current concerns with respect to environmental protection, and in 
particular the precautionary principle, for the interpretation of the investment treaty 
provisions. The second method is the application of article 31.3.c VCLT (systemic 
integration). As provided under article 42(1) ICSID Convention, tribunals are required to 
decide investment disputes, in accordance with ‘applicable rules of international 
law.’188In any event, article 31(3)(c) VCLT requires that treaties be interpreted in light of 
the ‘relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties’. 189  Hence, 
interpreting the obligation of a host state under an investment treaty may require a 
consideration of other applicable rules of international law.190 In Chapter five, it will be 
explained why the precautionary principle could be considered as relevant and 
applicable rule in terms of interpreting the investment provisions.  
In addition to examining the applicability of the principle as a nonbinding principle 
under the article 31.3.c, it is argued that precautionary principle could be applied as one 
of the elements of the obligation of due diligence. The study proposes that the 
obligation of due diligence, containing a duty to apply precautionary principle as 
suggested by International Law Commission (ILC) and also offered by the ICJ in Pulp 
Mills case and ITLOS in Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International Seabed 
Mining, could be an appropriate platform for the application of the principle. As will be 
explained in chapter five, one should be careful when making this argument in the 
context of investment regime, since under international law there is no general duty of 
environmental protection. Therefore, technically, obligation of due diligence could only 
be applied where the host state, under a separate treaty has an obligation to protect 
specific aspect of the environment. This situation allows the argument that wherever 
state has an obligation to protect (a specific aspect of the environment) it means it has 
an obligation of due diligence to ensure protection. 
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The main proposition of this thesis is that the tool of treaty interpretation will provide a 
channel through which the tribunals can implement the precautionary principle. This 
will allow them to interpret the regulatory function of the states within their police 
power when not supported by conclusive scientific evidence. This could perhaps ensure 
a harmonious interaction between investment and environmental obligations, enhance 
the legitimacy of investment law, and assure more certainty and predictability in 
investment law. 
Thus, to sum up, this research will employ the precautionary principle as an analytical 
framework to understand and balance the interests of host states and foreign investors. 
This will address questions concerning the assessment of the environmental measures 
by tribunals. It is expected that the lessons learned from the case law on the principle 
could be utilized into the investment context that may help to protect investors’ rights, 
minimize abuse by host states and also ensures effective environmental protection. This 
analytical framework, including the criteria and a corollary element in form of questions, 
will be discussed in detail in chapters three and four. 
1.8  Methodology  
When addressing issues concerning the current approaches by investment tribunals in 
environment related cases, this research will focus on primary sources. These include 
BITs, Free Trade Agreements and the decisions of arbitral tribunals. As for secondary 
sources, this research will focus on books, reports and other academic work and 
commentaries. Two important research methodologies are employed to achieve the 
objectives of the study and find a way to suggest a legal method for objective 
assessment of the disputed environmental measures; these are doctrinal and 
comparative study approaches. The study of the precautionary principle and its 
application by the investment tribunals is a matter concerning fundamental legal 
concepts in public international law. As a result, the methodology for this research is 
primarily doctrinal and comparative.  
The main objective of this research is to find a method to interpret investment 
provisions according to the environmental concerns. The relevant investment 
provisions therefore need to be examined, an interpretation of which is recommended 
under this study. These provisions are FET and expropriation. However, the standards 
are poorly and incoherently defined and evolved through cases concerning these 
obligations. Therefore, to better understand those obligations in the context of 
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environmental issues, the approaches of investment tribunals will be deduced from 
various environment-related investment disputes. This research will employ a deductive 
method to explore and understand the principles of law relating to the research.  
Some of the important environment-related investment cases will be analysed to assess 
the approaches taken by tribunals. However, ‘environmental’ or ‘environment-related’ 
investment disputes are terms that should be used very carefully. Not all environmental 
elements in these disputes qualify them for such classification.191 This research will focus 
mainly on those cases for which the application of domestic or international 
environmental law is at stake, or where the impact on the environment resulted in a 
measure by the host state as a response. This selection will therefore exclude cases that 
arose from the operation of investors in the environmental market.192 In addition, cases 
will not be considered if the harm has already occurred and the dispute regards the 
sates’ treatment of investors with respect to liability for causing environmental damage. 
In other words, since the lens through which the tension between environment 
protection and investment consideration will be approached is the precautionary 
principle, this research will only discuss cases that adopted the measure to protect the 
environment from a potential threat. This is not to say that no conclusion can be 
extracted from those awards as to the approach towards environmental concerns, 
however. 
Later, a comprehensive study of this principle will be conducted to better understand 
the elements and content of the analytical framework, being grounded in fundamental 
doctrines of law. The doctrinal methodology will allow the fundamental concept of the 
elements and the thresholds of the principle to be crystallised. The final chapter will 
then discuss the fundamentals of the principle of interpretation in applying the 
precautionary principle. 
It is anticipated that the outcome of this research will supply a very useful legal 
mechanism for international investment law. The crucial benefit from analysing the 
precautionary principle will be the answering of the question of whether it will be 
eligible to inform the interpretation of investment provisions. In addition, this doctrinal 
research will observe to what extent/how the precautionary principle can be transposed 
into international investment law. 
                                                
191 Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, p. 17. 
192 Renewable cases under the Energy Charter Treaty. 
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Furthermore, the methodology applied for comprehensively studying ways to justify 
environmental considerations in the interpretation of investment treaties includes case 
law and comparative methods. For the purpose of this study, case law from the ICJ, 
ITLOS, ECHR, ECJ and WTO will help to understand the invocation of the 
precautionary principle. As will be explained in chapter three, some new mechanisms 
have been developed in the field of environmental law in response to current concerns 
for the environment and understanding the limitations of science. One of those 
mechanisms is precautionary decision making. Highlighting the developments in the 
field of environment, and the current threats that have been acknowledged globally, it is 
argued in this study that investment law (and tribunals in particular) do not seem to give 
this crucial matter the attention it deserves. Therefore, to some extent, this method will 
serve as a useful guide to international investment tribunals. It will indicate to them to 
what extent the precautionary principle, or states’ concerns regarding the potential harm 
to the environment, has been used to inform the decisions when environmental 
concerns have interrupted economic benefits. It will also draw on the lessons learned 
about how other courts or tribunals have applied or mentioned the precautionary 
principle to allow states environmental measures.  
For this reason, this research will practically demonstrate the meaning of taking into 
account the environmental concerns, and will help tribunals to make more informed 
decisions. In the meantime, a comparative study will lead to a comprehensive study. 
This will determine the extent to which a principle from environmental law can inform 
addressing similar issues in the field of investment law. This comparative study will thus 
examine the interdependence between international investment and environmental laws. 
In other words, it will explain to what extent a principle from a different field of 
international law can then be employed in an international investment context.  
1.9  Contr ibut ion 
This research, as explained, aims to comprehensively examine the invocation of the 
precautionary principle as a guide to inform the interpretation of the investment 
provisions. This is expected to contribute to the knowledge in this field in the following 
inclusive ways:   
First and foremost, by putting forward a comprehensive study to provide a conceptual 
framework for the precautionary principle. Despite some piecemeal studies on the role 
that the principle could play in the investment treaty arbitration, no systemic research 
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has been conducted to provide a conceptual framework for its application under an 
investment treaty. Moreover, while touching upon the controversies on the status of the 
principle, the research suggests a way to apply the principle as a soft law instrument, 
capable of guiding the interpretation of treaty provisions.  
Secondly, most studies provide a theoretical basis for environmental consideration by 
providing the legal basis such as arguments for police power, proportionality, systemic 
integration, contractual mechanisms, counterclaims, etc. This research however, in 
addition to providing a legal basis for the application of the precautionary principle, 
recommends some criteria to be applied by the tribunal. This should extend objectivity 
of the tribunals and predictability for the players in future cases.  
In addition, the outcomes of this research will not impose on the tribunals to settle a 
tension between two conflicting norms, and it does not prescribe any one formula to 
resolve this tension. Rather, it suggests that as a soft law principle and highly relevant to 
the disputed matters, precautionary principle could guide the tribunals in their 
interpretation of the treaty standards. 
Most importantly, by providing a benchmark through the elements of the precautionary 
principle, the research suggests that the principle could function as a double-edged 
sword by suggesting certain criteria. Assuming its successful application, the framework 
would allow investors to question the appropriateness of a measure. The framework 
would also provide a benchmark for the host states to assess their environmental 
measures, which would prevent them from being questioned by the investors, or would 
at least aid in their defence. This way, states could have a clearer idea of what constitutes 
a genuine measure when they are required to protect the environment from a potential 
future harm. 
1.10  Structure  
This research examines the challenges concerning the relationship between investment 
obligations and environmental protection, and studies how investment tribunals could 
practically integrate these two interests. It aims to provide a comprehensive framework 
for the tribunals to enable an objective assessment of the disputed environmental 
measures. This goal is achieved by learning how the precautionary principle allows states 
to take action where ‘scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential negative 
impact of the activity in question is insufficient but where there are plausible indications 
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of potential risks’.193 It will also examine whether, and to what extent, such application is 
possible, according to international law and the rules of interpretation. Thus, the 
proposed thesis is structured into chapters that form a logical chain to answer the main 
and subsidiary research questions.  
Chapter Two (as the first substantive chapter) will examine matters relating to 
environmental protection in the context of investment dispute settlement. It will also 
explore to what extent investment tribunals have considered environmental issues when 
assessing whether states have violated their obligations under investment treaties. In 
particular, this chapter will mainly highlight the different approaches that tribunals have 
adopted so far, and the inconsistency with respect to allowing environmental concerns 
into the context of the investment treaties. Furthermore, this chapter will examine how 
these inconsistent approaches could jeopardise the predictability of the investment 
regime for its addressees. Finally, it will conclude by detailing certain assumptions that 
tribunals have made with respect to environmental regulation, and will explain how 
those assumptions might have influenced the outcome of the disputes. 
 
Chapter Three is dedicated to the conceptual background of the principle of precaution, 
its elements, and its status under international law. By analysing criticism of the 
principle, the chapter will respond to the alleged flaws of the principle that might 
constrain its application. The chapter also discusses different versions of the principle, 
and explains the potential role that it could play in both the procedural and substantive 
phases of dispute settlement. It will conclude with a clear framework on its element, 
which will be further complemented by a comparative study of the jurisprudence on the 
principle. 
Chapter Four is a comparative study to complement the previous chapter on the 
analytical framework. It will analyse the application of, or references to, the 
precautionary principle by international tribunals such as International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and World Trade Organization (WTO). Although the contexts of the disputes 
and the mode of obligations that engaged the precautionary principle are completely 
different under these systems, they share the same essence. In most of those disputes, 
there is a tension between an economic interests and the protection of the environment 
                                                
193 ITLOS Ad seabed, infra 767, para 131.  
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against potential damages, for which conclusive scientific evidence is lacking. Therefore, 
the study of these cases, considering their dissimilar context, will provide a practical 
basis to further justify the applicability and relevance of the precautionary principle. This 
chapter will conclude with a finalised framework for the precautionary principle for 
tribunals as a guiding tool for interpretation, under the investment law.  
Chapter Five is dedicated to the synthesis of this research, addressing the tension 
between environmental concerns and provisions under investment treaties. This chapter 
will examine the application of the criteria mentioned to address the problem of 
environmental consideration under investment regimes. As indicated earlier in the 
current chapter as introductory remarks, a framework will be provided to justify the 
efficacy of the precautionary principle and its elements. This chapter will then examine 
how this framework could be transposed into the investment regime and be operated by 
investment tribunals to interpret the investment provisions. Two different paths are 
suggested to answer this fundamental question, providing different legal methods under 
international law for tribunals to apply the principle. The lessons learned from other 
jurisprudence can be very valuable for investment tribunals, in terms of exercising the 
available methods to operationalize the principle as a means to interpret the investment 
treaty provisions. This will allow them to consider environmental concerns into their 
assessment. 
Chapter Six is the last chapter of this research, and will present the conclusions of the 
study. 
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2 Current Approaches 
 
What is The Current State of Play in the Environment-Related Investment Dispute 
Settlement? 
 
2.1  Introduct ion 
The environmental component of investment disputes can be comprised of a wide 
range of environmental measures, based on the claims made by investors. They vary 
from a total ban on a product or phasing out an activity, to revocation of permit, 
performance requirements such as EIA and backfilling, delays in reviewing the project 
or issuing a permit.194 These few examples demonstrate how every aspect of a state’s 
initiation towards environmental protection has the potential to be challenged by 
investors as a violation of an investment provision. This can result in the state’s 
environmental supervision being assessed by the investment tribunals, based on their 
legitimacy and compliance with treaty obligations.  
Today, tribunals hardly consider an environmental measure to be expropriatory unless it 
proves to be a ‘substantial deprivation’ of the investment. 195  However, while the 
recognition of environmental concerns is improving, the triggers for claiming violation 
are also now changing. Claims regarding environmental related measures are now 
penetrating into the very delicate layers of environmental management and supervision.  
The underlying argument of this study is that if the environmental motives behind the 
measures are not taken into account by investment tribunals, it will cause hesitation, and 
will discourage efficient supervision in achieving the ultimate goal of sustainable 
development (through giving ample attention to the environment as well as economic 
                                                
194 For instance revoking permit in Metalclad supra 49 and Parkerings infra 295; Refused to renewal in 
TecMed, supra 64; Conditional permit in Luccetti infra; Total ban and phase out in Methanex, supra 71, 
Vatenfall II, supra 145;T zoning decisions in Santa Elena infra 199 and Marion Unglaube infra 291; 
Ecological Decree in Metalclad supra 49; Performance requirement and Mandatory backfilling, Glamis, 
supra 50; costly Environmental Impact Assessment in Maffezini infra 279; Pollution Clean up in Palma, 
infra; Possessing the project by the host state to prevent future damages in Burlington; Rejected EIA in 
Bilcon, infra 251. 
195 Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and “Regulatory 
Taking” in International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50.4 (2001), 811–48 (p. 848). 
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development). Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to explore whether the 
investment tribunals, whose task is to clarify and apply the relevant laws and provisions 
of the investment treaties, have been following a pattern when facing environmental 
motives. This task will include looking at the claims made by investors, and also the 
responses provided by host states as their defence, to elaborate on the motives behind 
disputed measures. In particular, this chapter will focus on tribunals’ decisions to 
understand patterns. It will also investigate whether (and how) tribunals have taken 
environmental considerations into account. 
This argument is not per se novel, and has been justified on various grounds. In fact, the 
topic has been analysed from various perspectives.196 However, considering the specific 
characteristics of the analytical framework of this thesis, i.e. the precautionary principle, 
the only cases that will be examined are those in which the environmental harm has not 
yet materialized. This means that disputes such as Chevron v. Ecuador197 and Perenco v. 
Ecuador198 will not be discussed, as in these cases the environmental harm had already 
taken place. In addition, the main arguments focused on the treatment of the host state 
in recognising liability and remediation for the damages.199 Therefore, analysis will focus 
only on cases where the basis of the argument concerns the conduct of states in 
protecting the environment from future harm. 
The cases will be studied under two main categories. The first category concerns cases 
that have been concluded with an award on merits, since they demonstrate tribunals’ 
attitudes towards environmental components of the disputes. The second category 
includes cases that did not reach the merit phase for different reasons, namely, lack of 
jurisdiction, being settled or being pending. Although the latter category does not 
                                                
196  Langer and Vinuales, ‘Managing Conflicts Between Environmental and Investment Norms in 
International Law’; Vinuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law’; Vinuales, 
‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: The Current State of Play’; Di 
Benedetto, International Investment Law and the Environment.. 
197  Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877 
(UNCITRAL Rules), Partial Award on the Merits (30 March 2010), Final Award (31 August 2011). 
198 Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on remaining issues of jurisdiction and on liability (12 September 2014); 
Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (11 August 2015). 
199 Also, some studies on environment-investment disputes have included the recent cluster of disputes 
under the Energy Charter Treaty regarding the EU renewable energy policy and the removal of feed in 
tariffs from renewables is not considered. Since, this research looking at the environmental principles to 
interpret the investment obligations and those cases are more about the economic aspects rather than 
environmental, they are excluded from this study. 
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contribute to finding a pattern as such, it will help to demonstrate the potential claims 
against state actions concerning the environment.200 
2.2  Current  Approaches  
As mentioned in the introduction, the main focus of this chapter is to find a pattern in 
the mind-set of investment tribunals. Hence, the subject matter will only include cases 
that have reached the merit phase and are able to represent tribunals’ approaches 
towards the environmental element in the disputes. Thus, the decisions are divided into 
three categories.201 The first category features decisions in which investment provisions 
were treated in isolation and environmental motives were regarded as being irrelevant 
(the first image in figure1). The second category concerns cases where the tribunal 
acknowledged the significance of environmental protection and recognised the 
regulatory space for the host states, but subordinated these motives to economic 
concerns and instead focused on the effect of the measures (the second image in 
figure1). The final category focuses on decisions in which the tribunals not only 
recognised the environmental protection, but also made more space in the investment 
treaties for environmental considerations (the last image in figure1). The tribunals in this 
category also interpreted these provisions in a way that accommodated and took into 
account the environmental protection as a legitimate motive, and thus raised the bar for 
violation of the investment treaty provisions. 
 
                                                
200  To review the cases, particular attention is given to whether and how tribunals assess the 
environmental measures. For instance, how the tribunals assess the state’s “intent” and the measure’s 
proportionality, effectiveness, and scientific soundness. However, not all the cases are publically available 
and most of them have only made the award publicly available and not the statements of claims and 
defense.200 Therefore, examining those cases is confined to the information highlighted and summarized 
by the tribunals. This makes a difference since some of the arguments and evidence that was provided by 
the responding states is crucial or sometimes game changing which the tribunals might have overlooked 
or considered unnecessary.  
201 Vinuales studies the decisions under three different categories: traditional, progressive and upgraded 
traditional approach. He argued that while the upgraded approach which allows more room to 
accommodate environmental consideration is better than traditional approach, this view has to change 
and a new mindset to look at the environmental concerns not as an exception but, through means of 
interpretation and an evolutionary interpretation, to be considered as part of the object and purpose and 
not an exception to the purpose. See: Vinuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in 
International Law: The Current State of Play’, supra 6.  
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Figure 1: Approaches Towards Environmental Concerns by Investment Tribunals 
2.2.1 Investment in Isolation 
The most renowned instance under this category occurred in Compania del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, a 22-year dispute involving the expropriation by 
the Government of Costa Rica of a property known as ‘Santa Elena’. The case focused 
on the determination of compensation as a result of the expropriation, following a 
decree for Santa Elena to convert the investor’s property into a national park without 
taking permanent possession of the land or receiving title to it.202 The expropriation was 
argued to be protecting a dry forest containing flora and fauna, which were valuable for 
scientific, educational and touristic purposes, and also protected beaches of particular 
importance for nesting sea turtles. These concerns resulted in a decision to extend the 
national park to preserve its biodiversity.203 The tribunal held Costa Rica liable for the 
expropriation. 204  Although the main argument focused on the determination of 
compensation, and although both parties agreed on the occurrence of expropriation, the 
tribunal took a rather radical approach. They stated that: 
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a 
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking.”…“the purpose of protecting the 
11environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of 
the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid”...“the international source 
of the (Respondent’s) obligation to protect the environment makes no 
                                                
202 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 
17 2000). (Herein after Santa Elena Award). 
203 Expropriation decree, quoted in Id. para 18. 
204 Id. para. 281. 
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difference.”...“the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains…no matter how 
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole.205 
Although the tribunal’s opinion was merely shaped by the characteristics of this 
particular case, it demonstrates that the approach towards the investment obligations 
worked against the other concerns of the host states. Therefore, the question remains as 
to how the tribunal, with the same mind-set, would have reacted if they had considered 
an indirect expropriation? Hypothetically, if the government of Costa Rica had adopted 
a regulation by which any tourism activities were banned, or licenses were not renewed 
in the country and the property was not directly taken, would the tribunal have 
considered the environmental purposes irrelevant? Or, would they have ignored the 
international concerns over that particular species? These questions can be answered by 
looking at more cases in the field. 
The Metalclad Corp. v. the United Mexican States dispute, which was brought under the 
NAFTA, is Another example of this category. The dispute was triggered by the 
Municipality denying a construction permit for a landfill facility that the investor had 
purchased. This occurred despite the fact that the investor had obtained a federal 
permit. 206 Metalclad purchased a landfill facility from a local company, which had a 
history of contaminating local groundwater, with the obligation to clean up pre-existing 
contaminants. After a series of challenges with the municipality and the federal 
government, the local company obtained a federal permit to construct the landfill. 207 
However, the Municipality rejected the local company’s application to expand. It also 
refused to allow Metalclad to reopen the facility as a landfill due to community 
opposition and environmental hazards, since the company had failed to remedy existing 
onsite contamination.208 It was later argued that neither the local company nor Metalclad 
had ever obtained any permit from the Municipality.209 In a subsequent public meeting 
their permit was rejected again,210 for the reason that the company had proceeded 
without a permit, failed to remedy the previous contamination, because of the 
                                                
205 Id. para. 72. Emphasis added. 
206 Metalclad Corp. v. the United Mexican States, supra 55. 
207 Petitioners Reply, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Can.) (No. 
L002904). Para 8. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 This rejection was after and despite the negotiations that Metalclad had with the SEMARNAP (the 
Federal agency) and later, an Agreement (the Convenio) whereby Metalclad were authorized to operate 
the landfill for five years. The requirements for Metalclad were first to remediate the site for previous 
actions; secondly, to pay two Pesos for every ton of hazardous waste received and finally to employ local 
residents to perform manual labor at the site.210( Investor’s Memorial, para 47). 
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community opposition, and because of the adverse environmental impact of the landfill 
operation.211  This event made Metalclad file the dispute for violation of NAFTA 
provisions.  After the dispute was filed, the Governor of SLP issued an “Ecological 
Decree”, allegedly to protect an endangered cacti species. 212 Although the decree 
preserved the existing permits that were granted prior to its enactment, and the new 
establishment was allowed as long as the sustainability of natural resources was ensured, 
the tribunal found that the decree had the effect of barring forever the operation of the 
landfill.213 
Regarding the obligation for FET, the tribunal decided that it had been breached in two 
ways. Firstly, the Municipality lacked the legal authority to issue a hazardous waste 
landfill construction permit; this was within the federal government’s 
authority. 214 Secondly, even if the municipality had the authority, the action was 
“improper”, and it should not have rejected the permit based on its environmental 
impact on the surrounding community.215 It could only do so based on concerns about 
the soundness of the “physical construction”.216 The tribunal also held that the Mexican 
government had “failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for 
Metalclad’s business planning and investment”.217  
The importance of Metalclad was the authority of the Municipality, which was 
overlooked by NAFTA, the additional facility’s tribunals and other commentators. 
According to the facts presented in this case, the extent of the Municipal authority could 
be considered a game-changing element. Mexico, in its petition to the award, elaborated 
on this vital issue by providing two expert reviews on Mexican law. The expert reports 
confirmed that in addition to the construction and operation permits, the Municipality 
was entitled to “review the project’s impact on the local environment, health and safety 
concerns, previous unauthorized conduct of the applicant, and the social interests of the 
                                                
211 Id. 
212 Id. 434. 
213 Id. para. 31. 
214 Id. para. 86; also:  In Mexico, “Jurisdiction over waste management issues is divided among federal, 
state and municipal authorities. At the federal level, the Secretariat of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (SEMARNAT) has exclusive jurisdiction over all hazardous waste management. States and 
municipalities are responsible for the regulation, management, authorization and enforcement of solid and 
non-hazardous waste standards.” Summery of Environmental law in Mexico, available at: < 
http://www.cec.org/lawdatabase/mx12.cfm?varlan=english >. Accessed: 25/03/2015. 
215 Id. Paras. 86,92,106. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. para. 9. 
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Municipality as evidenced by residents’ opposition”.218  This statement, however, was 
unnoticed by the tribunal in its decision. 
This type of legislation does not appear out of thin air. The root of the problem 
therefore, is not the environmental legislation, or merely the denial of permit. As with 
most environment-related measures, it was the result of sustained local community 
struggle and opposition. The local community’s opposition started well before Metalclad 
acquired the company. When the local company, from which Metalclad bought its toxic 
dump, refused to obey federal orders to close down in 1991, the residents started to 
enforce the order themselves by preventing tractor trailers from unloading more toxic 
waste.219 Therefore, Metalclad was completely aware of the tension while negotiating to 
buy the facility. This was argued to be the reason that Metalclad had finalized the 
purchase, provided that the local company secured a municipal construction permit for 
the landfill.220 
Considering the main question of this chapter, three points can be extracted from this 
case: the community opposition, the assurances given by the federal government and 
the denial of a permit by the Municipality. First and foremost, it is important to consider 
all of the elements that the decision makers should be mindful of. As will be explained 
in Chapter three, environmental concerns are multi-layered, and protection might be 
triggered by different combinations of events. The local community is one of the most 
common triggers of a government’s action with regard to industrial activity. This is 
because the community tends to bear a disproportionate share of the negative impacts 
of the industrial activities. Their legitimate concern about the adverse environmental 
impacts of an activity, if approved by the authorities, could motivate the government to 
oppose it. In this case, the tribunal applied the “effect” test, and argued that considering 
the impact on the investment, the purpose was simply not relevant221.  
Secondly, the expectation that there would be no disruptions to investment arose due to 
assurances that the investor had received from the Federal government. The tribunal did 
not take into consideration that the contested agreement was not a final approval for the 
activity. It instead was conditional, and to benefit from its provisions, the investor had 
to meet certain requirements. In environmentally sensitive activities, investors should 
                                                
218 Id. Petitioners outline of argument, supra 207. para. 28.  
219 Gerard Greenfield, “Metalclad vs. Mexico, Toxic Waste and NAFTA”, Solidarity, April 2001. < 
http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/977 >. 
220 Id. para 15. 
221 Metalclad Award. Supra 55, para. 111. 
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expect that an assurance or pledge from the authorities that has been solicited through 
different means, other than official authorizations, does not represent final approval. 
The investors still have to receive the environmental permits to be formally authorized.  
The last point concerns the permit that was denied by the Municipality. The investors 
never acquired a “construction and operation” permit from the Municipality. They also 
blamed the latter for not having the authority to object to the environmental impact on 
the community, which it indeed had. Therefore, Metalclad started its activity without 
having the required permits. Although this could also have been triggered by 
miscommunication between the federal and the Municipality. In fact, one could 
question the validity of this investment, which had started without fulfilling the official 
requirements. Overall, the main conclusion derived from these points is that the tribunal 
did not take into account the very basic concepts of environmental supervision elements 
when ruling on whether there had been a violation of FET or expropriation,. This could 
render most of the supervising function of states (towards foreign investors) unfair and 
inadequate. Deciding on the fairness of the actions, as will be discussed later in chapter 
five, does still allow room for states to ensure environmental compliance for potentially 
harmful activities. By adopting this approach to the Metalclad case, it could be argued 
that the tribunal ‘established a precedent that could be interpreted as broadly limiting a 
state’s authority to engage in environmental protection'.222  
Tecmed v. United Mexican States is the third instance in which a tribunal adopted an 
approach to block any other concerns that could influence the interpretation of the 
investment treaty provisions.223 After purchasing a hazardous landfill site from a local 
company (through its subsidiaries, Tecmed and Cytrar), the investor requested a transfer 
of licences, as the new owners, from the authorities. However, instead of this transfer, 
the authorities issued a new license that was set to expire in three years, and had to be 
renewed annually after.224 This policy was part of a general regulatory change, which 
allowed the government to control the compliance of the landfill sites. 225  Later, 
opposition against the Landfill operation from the local population increased, who 
demonstrated against the impact of the project.226 As a result, the municipal government 
                                                
222  Howard Mann and Monica Araya, ‘An Investment Regime for the Americas: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Sustainability’, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, New Haven, 2001, p. 171. 
223  Tecmed award, supra 69, para. 36. 
224 Id. Para. 38. 
225 Andrew Newcombe, ‘Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law’, Journal of World Investment 
& Trade, 8.3 (2007), p. 408. 
226 Tecmed award, supra 70, para. 110. 
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and the company instigated negotiations to relocate the landfill.227 In the meantime, the 
Sonora Human Rights Academy filed a criminal complaint against Cytrar for 
environmental crimes, based on irregularities and traces of transportation of 
contaminated soil.228In a later resolution, the authorities denied the renewal of the 
license for Cytrar, and requested that the company closed the landfill. This request was 
based on three factors. Firstly, the investor was only authorized to store agrochemicals 
and pesticides at the site, but they were also disposing biological and infectious waste. 
Secondly, the volume of waste confined at the site far exceeded the limit of one of the 
landfill’s active cells, and thirdly, the landfill had operated as a transfer centre, for which 
it did not have the required authorization.229 
In dealing with the expectation of the investor, the tribunal did not take into account 
the inherent purpose of changing the long-term permission to an annually renewable 
licence. This was an ex-ante measure that aimed to achieve efficient supervision over the 
environmentally sensitive projects. The tribunal stated that: 
There is no doubt that, even if Cytrar did not have an indefinite permit but a permit 
renewable every year, the Claimant’s expectation was that of a long-term investment 
relying on the recovery of its investment and the estimated return through the operation 
of the Landfill during its entire useful life.230 
In addition to the application of the effect-based test to determine the expropriation,231 
the tribunal also applied the proportionality test. They did this to understand if there 
was a reasonable proportionality between the charge and the weight imposed on the 
foreign investor; they sought to be realize this aim by any expropriatory measure.232 The 
tribunal finally found that the government’s action was not proportional to its actual 
purpose of addressing community pressure against the landfill,233 which was decided 
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using the political circumstances as the basis for the measure.  Even though there were 
minor violations of the permit’s terms, the tribunal found the actions of the Mexican 
government to be expropriatory, and hence found that the investor required 
compensation.234 It held that: 
It would be excessively formalistic . . . to understand that the Resolution is proportional 
to such violations when such infringements do not pose a present or imminent risk to the 
ecological balance or to people’s health, and the Resolution, without providing for the payment 
of compensation as required by Article 5 of the Agreement, leads to the neutralization 
of the investment’s economic and business value and the Claimant’s return on 
investment and profitability expectations upon making the investment.235 
The facts of the case and the reasoning of the tribunal demonstrate some critical aspects 
of the tribunal’s approach, with respect to the environmental regulations and the state’s 
room for manoeuvre. Firstly, when applying the FET standard the tribunal stated that it 
is the basic expectation of the investor that states should act in a consistent manner.  It 
stated that: 
The claimant’s expectation was that of a long-term investment relying on the recovery 
of its investment and the estimated return through the operation of the landfill during 
its entire useful life.236 
On the one hand, the tribunal focused on the investors and their expectation, without 
considering how could they not expect interruption from the government, given that 
they were infringing on the environmental laws of those states. This was also was 
approved by the court. On the other hand, in the field of environmental protection it is 
almost impossible for a state to act in a consistent manner when the subject matter is a 
long-term industrial project. The only exceptions to this are situations were the state has 
specifically made assurances to the investor. The legitimate expectation, therefore, 
should not have been determined based on the assumptions of the investors. They 
should instead have been based on facts of the case, the history of the state’s measure, 
the situation in which the investor has started the business, the general understanding of 
the type of regulation, and in this case, the peculiarities of environmental concerns 
regarding hazardous waste landfill sites. 
Secondly, the tribunal applied the principle of proportionality to analyse whether the act 
of the state had been expropriatory. This allowed them to determine whether the 
actions or measures were proportionate to protect the public interest, to judge the 
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protections that were granted to the foreign investors under the treaty and to take into 
account the significance of the impact of those measures on the investment. The 
tribunal concluded that it would have been “excessively formalistic” to determine 
whether the measure had been proportionate, when such infringements by the investor 
“do not pose a present or imminent risk to the ecological balance or to people’s 
health” 237 . The fact that the investor had lost its investment made the measure 
expropriatory. This statement is extremely controversial in the context of environmental 
regulation. Using the words “present” or “imminent” when describing risks has a 
particular meaning in this context, and environmental protection is not only limited to 
these kind of risks.238 Moreover, the tribunal failed to consider the context when 
determining whether the measure was proportionate to the risks, without which the 
concept would have been an abstract term. 
2.2.2 Environment within Investment 
This section will consider decisions in which environmental motives were acknowledged, 
but were subordinated to investment agreements and their provisions. In S.D. Myer v. 
Canada, for instance, the tribunal stated that the determination of a FET violation must 
be made in light of the high measure of deference that international law generally 
extends to the right of domestic authorities when regulating matters within their own 
borders.239 However, the tribunal considered article 1114(1) of NAFTA, a provision on 
environmental concern, merely “hortatory”.240 The tribunal did not consider that the 
Basel Convention, which Canada used to justify the measure with respect to the 
international obligation, had any merits. The tribunal acknowledged the state’s right to 
regulate, and that acknowledges that it was not its place to second-guess the 
government’s decisions. However, it held the Canadian government responsible for the 
violation of the FET standard.241 The tribunal referred to the WTO/GATT precedent, 
and held that states, in achieving their chosen level of environmental protection, are 
obliged to choose an alternative that is “most consistent with open trade”. 242 
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By ruling in this way, the tribunal overlooked many reasons that proved Canada’s 
legitimate concerns. Among these motives were the Basel Convention, the criminal lawsuit 
filed by the Syria club, and last but not least, the US bans on unnecessary transportation, 
which demonstrated that it shared the same concerns over this matter. The parties 
shared their understanding of the adverse environmental and health impacts of PCBs,243 
and their high toxicity. Canada, as a signatory to the Basel Convention, and also as a 
prudent decision maker, was concerned about the transportation of the material when 
exported without appropriate assurances of safe transportation and destruction.244  
In Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, the investor suspended the operation of 
its project (two blocks under production sharing contract with Ecuador), and Ecuador 
intervened in these two blocks. Allegedly the state intervened to prevent significant risks 
threatening the sites.245 The risk of environmental damages caused by leaks and spills 
was one of several risks mentioned by Ecuador when triggering the intervention.246 
When investigation whether Ecuador’s actions were expropriatory, the tribunal started 
by asking whether Ecuador's measure was justified under the police power doctrine.247 It 
then relied on the expert report provided by the review panel, and held that the panel 
did not conclude that there was a significant risk. The report only identified a 
"potentially" significant risk of damage, which means that the panel’s decision was based 
on incomplete information. 248  Therefore, the tribunal was not convinced that the 
suspension posed such a significant risk of damage.249 According to the tribunal, the 
measure was not an act of police power, since the evidence did not justify immediate 
intervention necessary to prevent serious and significant damage to the blocks.250 
Therefore, it ruled for an unlawful expropriation.251 By focusing on the claims made by 
investors and their perception of the investment treaties, tribunals put the investor in a 
superior position to undermine environmental concerns. 252  The tribunals do not 
therefore make reference to the defence statement, or the environmental practice of the 
state (to a level as basic as what is ‘significant’ or ‘potentially significant’). 
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The last example under this category, Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of 
Canada, is a recent and highly controversial dispute that relates to a quarry and shipping 
project in the province of Nova Scotia,.253 The alleged inappropriate treatment was 
argued to be a breach of the NAFTA “Minimum Standard of Treatment” and “National 
Treatment”.254 The investor presented inter alia a number of claims against the review 
panel. These included a lack of jurisdiction, delays in the process, biased panel 
arrangements and improper methodology. 255 Since the core argument for the breach of 
NAFTA investment provisions is closely relevant to this study, the next few paragraphs 
will explore the decision in more detail. 
The initial proposal was based on a 3.9-hectare quarry within a 154-hectare area of land. 
It later became apparent that the ultimate plan was to expand to 124 hectares.256 
According to Canadian law, the Environment Impact Study (EIS) for projects above 
four hectares should be approved by a Joint Panel Review (JPR). This review should 
consist of both federal and state experts and authorities. The following paragraphs will 
explain some of the relevant claims, and will also explore the tribunal’s analysis. 
One of the crucial arguments made by the claimant was that the JRP requested “perfect 
certainty”, which it claimed to be impossible. Canada responded by stating that the 
burden of providing evidence that the proposed project would not cause significant 
adverse environmental harm was on the investors, as the EIS required. Canada also 
denied asking for “perfect certainty”, and claimed that the problem was that “the 
proponent failed to provide complete and sufficient information” on the safety of the 
project, which is different from perfect certainty.257 Moreover, it stated that the Panel, 
according to its experience in previous decisions, was well aware that “the predictive 
nature of an EIA is not an excuse for a proponent to provide incomplete and deficient 
information, as the Claimants provided here”. 258 Canada further explained the criteria 
for EIA: 
Requires sufficient detail about the project to predict the “likelihood” that there will or 
will not be “significant, adverse” environmental effects. It also requires sufficiently 
detailed information to assess whether or not, or to what extent, the mitigative 
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measures the proponent proposes will work”…. “The JRP recognized that EA is a 
future-looking predictive process that cannot achieve perfect certainty.259  
The claimant also alleged that there was a lack of transparency in the process and 
methodology, since the project was referred to the JPR without notice being given to 
the investors.260 Canada, however, responded that sufficient advance notice was given to 
the claimant via EIS Guidelines, which included the factors that the JPR intended to 
consider during its review of the project.261  Among these factors were some concepts 
that the panel would focus on, such as “traditional knowledge, the precautionary 
principle, and the project’s socio-economic effects, such as the effects on core 
community values.”262 These elements were all mentioned in the EIS guidelines, and 
were made available to the investors, to which they did not make any objections.263  
Most importantly, the main argument by the investor, was the problematic “core 
community value”. The panel relied on this concept when recommending the rejection 
of the project, and according to the investor it “ignored relevant facts and relied upon 
arbitrary, biased, capricious, and irrelevant considerations.”264 This argument was central 
to the tribunal’s findings on treaty violation. The investor argued that the concept of 
“community’s core value” was not defined anywhere in Canadian law, and so Canada 
should not have been able to reject the project based on a new concept that it made up 
itself. In this respect, Canada responded that “community core values” were merely a 
restatement of the company’s requirement to show the project did not unduly affect the 
“human environment” in the area. Moreover, the Nova Scotia Environment Act 
(NSEA) expressly required considerations of socio-economic effects of the projects, 
which were the same effects featured in “community core values”, according to the 
investor’s expert witness. 265  Canada stressed that the potential for significant adverse 
environmental effects of the project dictated that the project should be subjected to the 
most vigorous form of review, under applicable environmental assessment laws.266 
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Indeed, Canada’s Statement of defence devoted several pages to discuss the sensitive 
ecological environment in which the proposed project was to be sited, and where 
blasting, quarrying and shipping would take place. Canada noted that the coastal site was 
an important breeding ground for several species of whales, including “the world’s most 
endangered large whale, the North Atlantic right whale”. Other endangered species 
included Leatherback Turtles, as well as other “species of concern”.267 The review panel 
was convened to review the project in light of sixteen specific factors, including its 
environmental and “socio-economic” effects.268  
The conclusion by the tribunal, in a nutshell, was that the investors had an expectation 
to be treated according to Canadian laws. However, the rejection of the project based 
on the JPR report, which adopted the concept of “Community Core Value”, occurred 
without prior notice, and that the concept was not included in the law. Also, the tribunal 
concluded that the panel exceeded its mandate by making the decision instead of 
identifying the adverse effect of the project after the mitigation. The end result was a 
breach of the duty of FET, being arbitrary, lacking due process, and not fulfilling the 
expectation of the claimant.  
The tribunal recognised the regulatory power of the host state, and acknowledged that 
economic development and environmental integrity are not necessarily conflicting and 
can be mutually reinforcing.269 It also emphasised the discretion of the host state; they 
are free under NAFTA to determine the level of protection and environmental 
standards.270 For instance, even if the laws in place at the time of investment require the 
project to be approved by a public referendum, this is not against NAFTA provisions.271 
The tribunal therefore explicitly stated that it is not conducting its own environmental 
assessment in substitution of the review panel, and asserted its role would be to examine 
if the measure had been consistent with the laws of Canada in place at the time of 
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investment.272 The tribunal even went further by declaring that states are allowed to vest 
in any institution, by law, a mandate to evaluate the project.273 More importantly, they 
recognised the margin of appreciation by stating that: 
Errors, even substantial errors, in applying national laws do not generally, let alone 
automatically, rise to the level of international responsibility vis-à-vis foreign investors. 
The trigger for international responsibility in this particular case was the very specific 
set of facts that were presented, tested and established through an extensive litigation 
process.274 
Ultimately, the tribunal seemed to be relying merely on the statement made by the 
claimant, instead of investigating the JRP report to find the breach of obligations,. For 
instance, the main claim in the dispute was the concept of “community core value”, 
which allegedly was made up by the panel and did not exist in Canadian law. Instead of 
looking at the whole circumstances, or at least the review report and the guidelines, the 
tribunal took the claim at its face value. They attempted to interpret the meaning of the 
concept completely out of context, and speculated on its meaning. Therefore, instead of 
looking at the context in which the phrase was used,275 the tribunal assumed what the 
JPR might have meant when writing the report, and concluded that none of the 
interpretations were acceptable as an excuse to use that approach.276 The tribunal could 
have understood what the ‘community core value’ meant by looking at the 
comprehensive amended guideline provided by the JPR after consulting with the local 
community and identifying the concerns based on their mandate to include socio-
economic study.277 This, combined with the emphasis that the JPR placed on the 
community, could easily have shown the tribunal why the JPR recommended the 
rejection of the proposal. This factor alone could have changed the way the tribunal 
looked at the report and the measure. This example demonstrates the main statement 
that this research is tending to make: that a tribunal’s approach towards the 
environment –based on current concerns and practices- could be a game changer in the 
outcome of environment-related investment disputes.  
2.2.3 Investment and Environment within International law 
The last set of cases described a much broader approach by the tribunals in 
accommodating environmental protection. In a way they viewed both environmental 
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law and investment law within the bigger framework of international law. Therefore, 
this sub-section focuses mainly on the aspects of tribunals’ reasoning in which 
environmental protection was factored into the interpretation of treaty provisions (to 
determine whether a disputed measure was a violation of a treaty provision). 278 
However, this has not been achieved through general rules of treaty interpretation, but 
rather through indirectly raising the bar for finding violations of treaty provisions, for 
the benefit of a state’s regulatory power and space.  
In the decisions featured under this category, the tribunals looked at the issue from a 
much wider perspective. They achieved this by decreasing the magnification of 
investment provision, and looking at the dispute from the point of view of international 
law, Therefore, the evolution of the nature of environmental concerns and protection 
methods was used to justify the necessity to accommodate them in their interpretation 
of treaty provisions. In the previous section, environmental law seemed to be taken into 
account as an exception to the investment provisions, and was therefore interpreted 
narrowly. In the following decisions, the tribunals made room for environmental 
concerns in investment law.279  
For instance, in Chemtura v. Canada, the tribunal referred to and quoted the Mondev case 
to determine the claimed violation of the FET,: 
Both the substantive and procedural rights of the individual in international law have 
undergone considerable development. In the light of these developments it is 
unconvincing to confine the meaning of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full 
protection and security” of foreign investments to what those terms – had they been 
current at the time – might have meant in the 1920s when applied to the physical 
security of an alien. To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate 
with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign investment 
unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.280 
In Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, the claimant had invested in the 
production and distribution of chemical products. They claimed that Spain was 
responsible for the additional costs that resulted from the EIA.281 This was because the 
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company continued with the project before the EIA was finalized and the 
environmental effects of the project were known.282 This additional cost allegedly made 
the investor stop the construction work. When deciding whether Spain’s request for an 
EIA was legitimate, the tribunal made an important statement acknowledging the 
importance of the EIA to prevent environmental damage: 
The Tribunal has carefully examined these contentions, since the Environmental 
Impact Assessment procedure is basic for the adequate protection of the environment 
and the application of appropriate preventive measures. This is true, not only under 
Spanish and EEC law, but also increasingly so under international law.283 
In addition to the requirement of an EIA under International law, the tribunal 
considered that environmental protection was not an exception to the investment 
protection. It was Spain’s duty to ensure that the environment was well protected, 
regardless of imposing economic loss on the investor: 
the public authorities, relying on the necessary public solidarity, shall ensure that all 
natural resources are used rationally, with a view to safeguarding and improving the 
quality of life and protecting and restoring the environment.284  
It also emphasized that under the EEC Directive, the EIA has to be conducted before 
the approval of any project that is ‘considered to have significant environmental implications’. 
They stated that under Spanish law the project could even have been suspended if the 
work had begun before the approval of the EIA.285 Finally, the tribunal held that Spain 
could not be held responsible for the additional costs that were imposed on the investor 
by conducting an EIA study.286 In making their decision they considered the relevant 
BIT, which “calls for the promotion of investment in compliance with national 
legislation”, and also states that Spain only “insist on the strict observance of the EEC 
and Spanish law applicable to the industry in question”. This holistic attitude of the 
tribunals was maintained and exercised throughout the whole process of attending each 
claim of violation, and influenced their application of the investment law.  
Legitimate expectation is one of the main triggers that investors draw on to justify 
violation of FET. In Methanex v. United States for instance, an executive order was issued 
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to regulate MTBE,287 which resulted in its phase out in Californian gasoline. This order 
was triggered due to concerns over significant risks resulting from the contamination of 
surface water and groundwater by MTBE.288 To determine whether the measure had 
been a breach of FET by not fulfilling the expectations of the investor, the tribunal 
noted that: 
Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not notorious, 
that governmental environmental and health protection institutions at the federal and 
state level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, interested corporations, non- 
governmental organizations and a politically active electorate, continuously monitored 
the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or restricted the 
use of some of those compounds for environmental and/or health reasons.289 
In understanding the expectation of the investor, the tribunal also considered the role of 
stakeholders in environmental regulation in the host state. They asserted that “the 
process of regulation in the United States involved [the] wide participation of industry 
groups, non-governmental organizations, academics and other individuals, many of 
these actors deploying lobbyists.”290 
To further dismiss the claims brought forward, the tribunal in Chemtura also referred to 
the investor as a “sophisticated registrant experienced in a highly-regulated industry” 
that should have been familiar with the review process and the PMRA practice.291 
In several instances the investors also claimed that the treatment of the host state had 
not been fair and equitable due to the delays in processing their applications. The 
tribunal excluded the delay by the decision maker from the scope of the FET by stating 
that: 
Tribunal must take into account the obvious fact that the operation of complex 
administrations is not always optimal in practice and that the mere existence of delays is 
not sufficient for a breach of the international minimum standard of treatment.292 
In Marion Unglaube And Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic Of Costa Rica, the tribunal defined a 
high threshold for violating the legitimate expectation by stating that: 
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To satisfy such requirements the claimants must demonstrate reliance on specific and 
unambiguous State conduct, through definitive, unambiguous and repeated assurances, 
and targeted at a specific person or identifiable group.293 
Playa Grande is a beach on Costa Rica’s Pacific coast, and is also an important site 
where female Leatherback Turtles lay their eggs. Given the endangered status of these 
turtles, and Costa Rica’s well-known reputation as an eco-tourism destination, the 
Government of Costa Rica has taken steps intended to protect this nesting habitat.294 
Referring to the measures and administrative processes, and their impact on both 
phases of properties, the tribunal commented that “an intelligent and experienced 
investor” claimant is required to become familiar with the host state’s law and 
administrative process as part of their due diligence.295 The tribunal acknowledged that 
the process might be different from what the investor expected, but governments are 
granted a “considerable degree of deference” with respect to their regulation and 
administration, and their actions cannot be considered unfair and inequitable. The 
tribunal further affirmed that: 
Unless they involve or condone arbitrariness, discriminatory behaviour, lack of due 
process or other characteristics that shock the conscience, are clearly improper or 
discreditable or which otherwise blatantly defy logic or elemental fairness.296 
In Parkerings, the tribunal referred to the decision by MTD v. Chile when concluding on a 
measure to refuse the investment proposal for making a parking project next to a 
historical venue. This referral emphasised that the “state is not responsible for the 
consequences on unwise decisions or for the lack of diligence of the unwise investors. 
Their responsibility is limited to the consequences of its own action to the extent they 
breached the obligation to treat the claimant fairly and equitably”.297 
In Palma v. Bulgaria, the investor was charged for the pre-acquisition pollution clean-up 
costs.298 The tribunal rejected the claimant’s argument to hold a host state reliable for 
the change in its law, and thus liable under the ECT. The tribunal held that the investor 
has to demonstrate that reasonable and justifiable expectations were created in that regard, 
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and in this case it did not appear to the tribunal that Bulgaria had made any presentation 
to freeze its legislation on environmental law.299 
A balanced approach could also influence the standard of review, which defines the 
level of scrutiny into a state’s measures. In Methanex v. USA, the investor alleged that the 
environmental protection had been a sham and a pretext for political concerns. The 
tribunal took into account all of the expert evidence from both parties, and concluded 
that the US report was reflecting a “serious”, “objective” and “scientific” approach, and 
was “subjected at the time to public hearings, testimony and peer-review”. It added that 
“a serious scientific work from such an open and informed debate” proved that the ban 
was not a political sham.300 In addition, the tribunal acknowledged that it was not 
scientifically incorrect, and was “impressed by the scientific expert witnesses presented 
by the USA and tested under cross-examination by Methanex”.301 The tribunal did not 
use Methanex’s scientific report (which contested the finding by state agency) to reject 
the US Study. They instead stated that other scientific reports and opinions may 
disagree with the analysis and the conclusion with good faith, but “the fact of such 
disagreement, even if correct, does not warrant this Tribunal in treating the University of 
California Report (UC Report) as part of a political sham by California.”302  
In the same vein, the Glamis tribunal specified that the review was valid and evidence of 
state’s legitimate concerns since it was: 
Undertaken by qualified professionals who provided their reasoned and substantiated 
opinions upon which respondent was justified in relying, and was not harmed by bias or 
prejudice. In addition, the conclusion of the cultural review culminating in direct 
recommendation to the secretary of Interior was not manifestly arbitrary, a gross denial 
of justice, or exhibiting a manifest lack of reasons.303  
In 2001, after six years of study, the Interior Department formally denied the project on 
the basis that it was within a Native American spiritual pathway that extended 130 miles, 
and that the proposed mining activities would impair the ability of the Native 
Americans to travel this pathway. 304  Subsequently, the state of California adopted 
legislation and administrative regulations that mandated the backfilling of all open pit 
mines to near the original surface elevation of the site.305 The investor argued that the 
                                                
299 Id. Para. 219. 
300 Id. para.101. 
301 Id. 
302 Id.  
303 Glamis, supra 56, Para 24 award 
304 Id. Statement of Defense, (Glamis Statement of Defense), 8 April 2008. Paras. 11-12. 
305 Id. Paras. 166-183. 
  
 
63 
project had to be considered as being against these laws. It claimed that the cultural 
review in the EIA was in violation, and that the project “must be approved” if it is in 
compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). Also, regarding the 
fact that cultural resources were damaged, investor argued that “it wouldn’t have 
mattered if a wholly new … significant cultural resource were found at that site[;] under 
the law as applied [the] Imperial Project was entitled to approval.”306  The tribunal 
responded to this argument by explaining that: 
If the claimant thinks that the interpretation307 was incorrect the proper venue would 
have been the domestic court and emphasized that its role is only to determine whether 
the disputed review occasioned “a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant 
unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of 
reasons. 308  
Regarding the duty of due process, the tribunal asserted that “the unlawfulness of an 
action according to municipal law will not necessarily entail a violation of international 
law”.309 The tribunal further advised that it could only decide on a breach of FET if the 
claimant could prove that the process was “so unusual and non-transparent as to be 
manifestly arbitrary and completely lacking in due process”,310 and that: 
It is not the role of this tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant its own 
judgment of underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic 
agency. Indeed, our only task is to decide whether Claimant has adequately proven that 
the agency’s review and conclusions exhibit a gross denial of justice, manifest 
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, 
or a manifest lack of reasons so as to rise to the level of a breach of the customary 
international law standard embedded in Article 1105.311 
The tribunal noted that although the methodology had “never been previously used and 
was specifically designed and utilized for the Imperial Project”, the respondent 
“supplied substantial evidence” that their concerns were genuine. 312  
This line of reasoning could be compared with the Bilcon decision in the previous 
section concerning environmental issues being addressed within the context of 
investment regime. While both cases recognised the importance of protecting 
indigenous people (in Glamis) and environmental protection (in Bilcon), the latter, 
failing to recognise the main concerns, subordinated the environmental protection 
                                                
306 Glamis Award, para. 636 
307 In this dispute the “M.opinion”. 
308 Id. para. 762.  
309 Id. para. 770. 
310 Id. para. 771. 
311 Id. para.779. 
312 Id. para.782. 
  
 
64 
indirectly. The tribunal could have exercised its power to review the methodology that 
the panel had adopted. Being familiar with the importance of environmental protection, 
it could have taken into account the very necessary elements of environmental 
management, and instead of deciding based on unfamiliar methodology, could have 
reviewed the genuineness of the report. This example demonstrates how unpredictable 
the outcome of the disputes can be, even when considering similar claims. 
The Chemtura tribunal viewed the measure differently when determining the treaty 
violation, and played a rather active role. When determining if the treatment by the host 
states was in accordance with the minimum standards, the tribunal further stated that it 
was not an “abstract assessment circumscribed by a legal doctrine about the margin of 
appreciation of specialized regulatory agencies. It is an assessment that must be 
conducted in concreto.313  Moreover, tribunal commented on its authority to review the 
measure by contending that its role “is not to second-guess the correctness of the 
science-based decision-making of highly specialized national regulatory agencies”.314 
When reviewing the legitimacy of the decision, the tribunal first assessed whether the 
review was conducted in such a manner as to reflect bad faith on the part of the Pest 
Management Agency (PMRA) with the burden of proof being on the claimant.315 If it 
was found to be in good faith, the tribunal would have further assessed whether the 
review had breached the due process rights of the claimant.316 In its findings the tribunal 
stated that the review was undertaken under PMRA mandate, and was a result of 
Canada’s international obligations. 317  Moreover, the conduct was prompted by 
international commitments, therefore the allegation of bad faith as the motivation for 
launching the review was dismissed.318 The tribunal was further comforted by the 
conclusion of expert witness, which “confirmed that the conclusions were within 
acceptable scientific parameters”. The tribunal referred to this as additional 
confirmation that scientific divergence does not serve as a basis for finding of breach of 
article 1105.319 
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The final aspect is the approach taken when specifying whether expropriation has 
taken place. This approach is evident in a well-known statement given by the Methanex 
tribunal: 
A non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance 
with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given 
by the regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating 
investment that the government would refrain from such regulation.320 
On June 15, 1999, Methanex notified the United States of its intention to seek damages 
under NAFTA.321 Methanex's 1999 statement of claim identified the ban on MTBE as a 
"measure" that violated the NAFTA's Article 1105 minimum standard of fair and 
equitable treatment.322 Without asserting a loss of physical property, Methanex also 
claimed the California measure was "both directly and indirectly tantamount to an 
expropriation" under Article 1110 because it substantially diminished the value of 
Methanex's investments in the United States for the sale and production of methanol.323 
 
Thus, the tribunal’s determination that the ban was not expropriatory was based on its 
conclusion that the regulation was one of general application, in the public interest, 
scientifically justified, and accomplished with due process.  As such, the tribunal 
concluded, “the California ban was a lawful regulation and not an expropriation.” 324 
 
In the Glamis case, the investor claimed that the regulatory measure that mandated 
backfilling of the mining projects imposed huge costs on the project that made it 
economically unfeasible, which is tantamount to expropriation, and was a violation of 
investment obligations. However, the tribunal did not find it to be an expropriatory 
measure, and stated that the “investor still formally possessed its mining rights and 
could exploit mineral resources at a profit, albeit under changed circumstances”.325 The 
tribunal considered in any event that: 
The measures challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the 
Respondent’s police powers.  As discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of 
NAFTA, the [Pest Management Regulatory Agency of Canada] took measures within its 
mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers 
presented by Lindane for human health and the environment.  A measure adopted 
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under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the State’s police powers and, as a result, 
does not constitute an expropriation.326 
Finally, the Chemtura tribunal indicated that the interference by the government had not 
been substantial, and therefore the measure was not an example of expropriation.327 It 
separated the contractual deprivation and the claim for expropriation, and declared that 
the measure constituted a valid exercise of the respondent’s police power, “irrespective 
of the existence of a contractual deprivation”. Moreover, the following measure was 
taken: 
Within the mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing 
awareness of the dangers presented by Lindane to human health and the environment. 
A measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the State’s police 
power and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation.328 
Although this analysis has covered most of the important investment decisions with 
environmental components, the concerns are not only limited to these disputes. As 
explained in the beginning of this chapter, the analysis of an award would exclude 
disputes that did not reach the merit phase, due to the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction, 
settlement or being still pending. Looking at the variety of claims that the investors have 
made could however further elaborate and support the argument that tribunals need to 
make adjustments in their approach, which ultimately informs their interpretation of 
treaty provisions. This could help tribunals to accommodate the surge of alleged 
violations for environmental protection, and could enable them to reach a decision that 
embraces the purpose of investment regimes as a regime under the international law.  
2.3  Analys i s  
Analysing the most important environment-related investment disputes revealed 
inconsistencies in tribunal’s approaches towards environmental considerations. This 
problem could have an adverse impact on a state’s confidence to take actions for 
effective environmental protection, due to the unpredictability of the outcome.  
Three different approaches were discussed. Although the fist approach (finding 
environmental concerns irrelevant) is less likely to surface again, the second approach is 
more probable, and occurred in the Bilcon Delaware case. While the third approach puts 
the environment in motion and rejects the investors’ claims, it does not contribute to 
consistency and predictability for the parties involved, as it does not provide an 
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objective test. For instance, the Chemtura case was an example of a precautionary 
decision, although the principle was never mentioned, but it cannot be regarded as an 
objective test. All of the elements the tribunal addressed could be condensed in the 
precautionary test, which will be introduced under the analytical framework of this 
research. 
Basically, investors can claim a violation of almost every treaty standard, hoping that at 
least one aspect could help them win. Having a framework would allow the investors to 
understand what to expect and how plan their business around those issues. It would 
allow them to be more prudent in their assessment and business decisions, to include 
community opinions, to negotiate the terms of their contracts more carefully, to request 
assurances more reasonably through valid sources, to conduct due diligence before 
going forward with host states’ encouragements, and so forth. They could better 
evaluate their options by acknowledging that environmental policies are constantly 
changing to address upcoming concerns,. Investors, and host states are both affected by 
the inconsistency and unpredictability of the awards. Their resources and long-term 
business plans are at stake. Therefore, increased predictability in the system would 
benefit them both. Tribunals have been inconsistent regarding several issues that have 
been, and will continue to be, raised in all environmental disputes. Until this 
understanding is settled, and the tribunals’ perception of the nature of the problem is 
not amended, other solutions cannot be practical. Tribunals are the ones who decide at 
the end whether the laws apply to the facts. The areas of inconsistent decisions are: 
Expropriation:  
In general, expropriation occurs in environment-related investment disputes when a 
host state promulgates a decree or resolution targeting a specific area that is owned, and 
is under the operation of a foreign investor (e.g. Santa Elena). Alternatively, the target 
could be an area that comprises the entire project, with the property being taken for the 
purpose of environmental protection. There is a consensus among all tribunals that if an 
investor’s property is taken directly, expropriation has taken place and the host state 
should pay compensation. However, a predicament arises when regulatory taking 
occurs, which is a concept reflected in the references to actions ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’ in modern investment treaties.329 In the context of environment-related 
investment disputes, this refers to cases where the investment has been affected as a 
                                                
329 Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and “Regulatory 
Taking” in International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50.4 (2001), 811–48 (p. 848). 
  
 
68 
result of a measure taken by the state to protect the environment. If it has had an 
impact similar to if the property had been completely taken, it is considered as 
expropriation. The tribunals do not seem to have reached a consensus on this issue. 
Some tribunals have considered this type of measure as indirect expropriation, focusing 
on the extent to which the property was affected (Metalclad). Others, however, have 
ruled that if a measure was genuinely intended to protect the public interest, and was 
adopted according to due process, it is not expropriation. Instead it represents a 
legitimate act of the state, regardless of economic losses (Methanex). In Marion Unglaube 
vs. Costa Rica, however, the tribunal divided the project into different phases, and instead 
of looking at the project as a whole, decided that the zoning decision had affected the 
last phase. The tribunal therefore considered the last phase as being regulatory 
expropriation. This lack of consensus, and difference in interpretations of one concept, 
would increase the uncertainty for the states when making decisions to protect the 
environment. Considering the amount of compensation that the government might be 
charged, this could make the receiving states reluctant to take measures to protect the 
environment. 
It has been argued that regulatory expropriation occurs and compensation is owed only 
in extreme cases. This happens when the economic value of the investor’s property is 
completely and indefinitely destroyed, or if the investors are required by regulation to 
make a special sacrifice in terms of their proprietary rights for environmental protection 
purposes.330 According to Waelde and Kolo, this is a fair outcome, since compensation 
is the price that the community should pay the investors if they are to bear a ‘special and 
exorbitant sacrifice’ for the society.331 In other words, if the environmental protection 
completely destroys the  economic value of an investor’s property, the fair solution is 
that society pays for having the environment protected. Be that as it may, this all 
depends on how the tribunal interprets the concept, and on which approach they take. 
This research, by looking into the peculiarities of environmental regulation, through 
principles of environmental law, provides a context against which tribunals could make 
more informed decisions, and could assess the environmental measures against an 
objective benchmark. 
Fair and Equitable Treatment: 
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FET is the main investment provision that has been used by investors to claim for 
damages imposed by changes in law or adaptation of measures in the host state, for 
environmental protection purposes. In some instances, the foreign investors have 
argued that the breach of FET has had such an effect on the investment that they have 
completely forfeited their benefits. In one instance, the investor argued that the 
‘requirements for environmental remediation were so hard to achieve that it caused 
bankruptcy to the investor since the project could not be operated in bankruptcy’.332 In 
Pac Rim Cayman  v. El Salvador, the investor claimed that the opposition of the 
municipality to the granting of new mining permits had imposed costly and time 
consuming effects on the mineral exploration process. The investor claimed that it had 
been deprived of its substantial and long-term investment, and that its rights in El 
Salvador had been effectively destroyed. The investor therefore asserted that the 
government breached its obligations.333 
One of the most important aims of this research is to influence the tribunals’ perception 
of environmental regulation, which also has implications for investors’ general 
expectations of the states. If the processes and elements of environmental regulations 
were clear to the investors, some of these arguments would have never been raised 
(knowing that they had no basis), or the grounds for the claim would have been 
different. In other words, if the investors had expected that the environmental laws and 
policies would constantly change, and that some of these changes might have had 
economic consequences, then their focus would not have been on the changes in policy 
and regulations. Instead they would have focussed on the processes, and on whether the 
host state had met the criteria for an acceptable environmental measure. This study will 
put forward a list in the format of questions that will lead to a deeper understanding of 
monitoring activities to prevent environmental damages in the future. 
In some recent decisions, the investors claimed that the breach of their legitimate 
expectations has led to the breach of treaty obligations. In some of these cases, the 
tribunals held that an  ‘intelligent and experienced investor is supposed to expect that 
there will be changes in the environmental laws’334 or even that it is ‘foolish’ to expect a 
stable system.335The tribunals also state that the investor’s expectations should include 
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the fact that the law would not freeze.336 Although these recent awards are promising, 
and demonstrate awareness by the tribunals of the peculiarities of the environmental 
regulations, there is no consistent pattern. Some tribunals did not share the same 
opinion, and held that the foreign investors should expect the states’ actions to be 
conducted in a steady manner, with no changes in relevant regulation or supervision. At 
the least these tribunals held that the investor should be exempted from these changes, 
based on an investment treaty. The tribunals stated that states have an obligation ‘to 
provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the 
investment’. 337  While fair and equitable treatment is a sensible concept, again the 
difficulty arises when tribunals have to assess the measure and identify whether an 
unfair treatment had occurred; this can be an extremely subjective judgment.  
Being considered as expropriation or standing alone as a breach of FET, it is necessary 
to determine what investors should expect (from the environmental protection and 
governance perspective) when they commence their activities in a country. Although 
some tribunals have approached the expectations reasonably, many have based their 
decision on the expectation that the investors’ claimed, such as the claims raised in Bilcon 
case. This inconsistency will add to the uncertainty on both sides regarding what 
expectations the investors should have. 
The first two points provide a context in which other issues could be discussed and 
located.  The idea is to review some elements that have influenced the tribunal’s 
decision to find a measure expropriatory or breach of FET. Consequently, this chapter 
will conclude by stating that each of the issues that have been relied upon to declare a 
breach of investment treaty has a special weight and meaning in the field of 
environmental protection and decision making. This will link to the next chapter, which 
explores different mechanisms of environmental decision-making. 
Community opposition:  
Most environment-related investment disputes include, or are mainly triggered by, 
community and local opposition. Protests occur due to the local communities’ 
disapproval of the specific project, which might affect or threaten their environment. 
Governments might take measures as a direct response to such opposition, or the 
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opposition might raise the awareness of the government, leading to further investigation 
into the issue or a change in their policies. The argument by foreign investors in this 
respect is that the opposition of the locals had motivated the main trigger behind the 
changes in the environmental policy or measure. Therefore, these measures are not 
legitimately and genuinely intended to protect the environment, but are mainly designed 
to simply put an end to the protests.  
Tribunals have adopted several different approaches to this argument. While some have 
accepted the foreign investor’s argument, and held that a measure was not genuinely 
intended to protect the environment (Metalclad, Tecmed), others have assumed that the 
local opposition represented legitimate grounds for taking action (Unglaube). 
As will be further explained in the chapter three, it is important to comprehend the 
peculiarities and fundamental elements of environmental regulation and protection. In 
fact, communities are the first to be affected by the potential or actual damage of an 
activity, and a responsible government is expected to respond and take action if there is 
a risk of potential harm to their environment. 
Permits: 
The permit system is one of the most important aspects of environmental regulation 
and supervision. Certain projects are required to obtain certain permits and licenses 
before they start their activity, due to the potential adverse impacts they might have on 
the environment. In the majority of environment-related investment disputes, foreign 
investors have disputed the ways in which the host states treated the permits, and have 
argued that the states’ actions were in breach of FET, or in some cases were 
expropriatory.  
On some occasions, a host state might not give the requested permit to an investor to 
start up their activity. This might cause them to lose some or all of their profits, or they 
might start the project regardless of the permits being denied by negotiating some 
alternative ways and obtaining assurances from other officials in the 
government.338These permits could concern operation, construction, exploitation or 
environmental issues. The focus of this argument is any denial of these permits by the 
government that occurs directly or indirectly as a result of community opposition. One 
could argue that unless all the permits are not obtained, the environmental-related in 
particular, the investment is not established as such. Therefore, the foreign investor 
                                                
338 Metalclad, supra 55. 
  
 
72 
should not be allowed to commence the development, regardless of any assurances it 
has obtained separately from other officials. On many occasions, a permit was revoked 
by the host state (federal or municipal) because of a breach from the investor’s side, or 
because of the changes in the law triggered by environmentally harmful behaviour from 
the investor.339 In some cases the foreign investors challenged these actions, and claimed 
they were a breach of the FET. Investment disputes are not about investor’s obligation, 
but rather their business conduct.  This still needs to be taken into account when 
defining investor’s legitimate expectations however, particularly when it is not in 
conformity with a host state’s environmental policy,. Finally, in some cases a permit was 
granted for a certain period of time, was and subject to periodic renewal. Investors must 
be aware of a permit’s nature when applying for it, and cannot expect to be granted new 
ones unless they follow certain requirements. In addition, there might be changes in the 
environmental law that make their activity unreasonable for permit renewal.   
Although all of these measures have the potential to be used as pretext, the burden of 
proof should be on the investors to demonstrate that the measures have not been 
legitimate. As will be mentioned in the chapter three, issuing permits is one of the most 
common means of supervision of the impact of the project on the country, and allows 
the host state to prevent future harm in case of any malfunction of the business, or 
changes in environmental policies. 
Assurances: 
Assurances are the promises that foreign investors acquire from officials (mainly federal 
when there is a risk of municipality opposition to the project), and are separate from the 
licensing and permit process. In some cases they appear in the form of an agreement or 
Memorandum of Understanding. Foreign investors invoke these assurances as a shield 
to protect against any changes to the laws and any future measures. Tribunals have 
adopted divergent views in this regard. Some consider the assurances as a promise by 
the governments, so that the breach of an assurance would result in a breach of FET 
(Metalclad & Methanex). Others tribunals however have ordered that the burden of 
proof is on the foreign investor to demonstrate that the promise or the assurance was 
the “final approval” of the project, otherwise it is not considered as a breach of the 
investment treaty obligations.340 
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These statements are important when the issue at stake is the environmental impact of 
the projects. This is due to the fact that the projects with potential adverse 
environmental impacts have to obtain certain environmental or construction permits. 
Recognising assurances as being a state’s approval might facilitate a trend in which some 
investors find it more convenient to bypass the permit process -sometimes the 
municipality- and obtain an agreement or assurances from the federal government or 
other agencies (who are not directly dealing with the process). Following this path, there 
is a risk that the investors might be able to use the assurances to breach investment 
treaty obligations.  
Least restrictive (consistent with trade and WTO standards):  
In some cases, investors have challenged the type of measures that the host state has 
adopted and have argued that the government should have chosen the least restrictive 
measure (regarding the investor) when protecting the environment (if that is the genuine 
purpose).341 Some tribunals have accepted this argument based on the WTO standard, 
and have held that measures should be taken in a way that is consistent with trade and 
does not jeopardise the economic interests of the investor. On the other hand, 
Methanex raised the same argument but the tribunal did not consider an alternative 
option. They instead deferred to the government to choose what was necessary to 
protect their public interest. 
Allowing the least restrictive measure would prioritize economic interests over other 
concerns such as environmental matters. The main purpose of the WTO is ensuring the 
flow of free trade and preventing trade barriers. The main purpose of investment law 
and BITs however, is to protect foreign investors against the hostile actions of the host 
states. It doesn’t aim to prioritize their rights over the general practice of the states 
(protecting their public interest), which might have some impact on the investors. The 
different approaches adopted by tribunals might result in uncertainty from the host 
states when making the right choice regarding a potential risk to the environment. 
International environmental obligations:  
As environmental concerns are growing, so are the international obligations of states. 
When a state adopts a measure to comply with its international obligations, this is not 
necessarily a sign of conflict. If the tribunal considers this situation to be a conflict, 
which it did in the SD Myer case, the only solution would be trumping one obligation 
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for the benefit of the other. This approach is not consistent with systemic integration in 
international law, or the assumption that the laws and treaties all work together. It could 
also prevent states from subscribing to or complying with the international programmes 
for environmental protection, for fear of breaching investment treaty obligations. On 
the other hand, the tribunals might consider the international obligations and treaties as 
evidence of concern over a particular issue (a ban on a chemical, for example), and 
therefore a basis for legitimate regulation. This would guarantee the integration of the 
international law systems, and would also allow states to make a balanced decision to 
protect their public interest while complying with all international obligations. This 
approach was adopted in the Chemtura decision, where the tribunal considered that the 
wide international movements to ban a certain product was evidence of legitimate 
environmental regulation, and therefore the state banning that product was not a treaty 
violation.  
New wave of claims: 
Global environmental awareness has not only failed to cut the myriad of complaints 
against states’ environmental measures, but rather has resulted in a new phase of 
disputes. Therefore, the measures have been adopted by questioning the technical basis 
of the decisions, not because of this new wave of assertions by investors. This means 
that the common responses by the host states are insufficient (protection of public 
interest, police power, deference, etc.), and so the tribunals face a more complex and 
technical dispute. Therefore, police power and the protection of public interest cannot 
respond to the technical challenges that the investors are putting forward. There is an 
urge to clarify how these challenges are being answered and what approaches the 
tribunals should adopt. Below are some instances of the investors presenting technical 
arguments.  
a. Rejecting the scientific basis of the measure: 
On several occasions investors have pointed to the study behind the environmental 
measure by challenging its framework, the process, or by claiming that the entire 
scientific basis is flawed. They either claim that the measure has no scientific basis or 
that there is no conclusive scientific evidence.342 
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b. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): 
The EIA plays an extremely important role in environmental regulations, and as will be 
explained in the chapter three, is the key instrument in anticipating the potential adverse 
impacts that a particular project might have on the environment. The EIA determines 
the measures taken to manage or eliminate those risks. In general, the party who is 
proposing to begin a project with a potential environmental impact should conduct the 
EIA, and the government authorities will then assess the EIA study. If the host state 
considers the study to be insufficient, they request modification or a further study from 
the investor. This process is the regular and routine practice of environmental 
governance and supervision. Having this background in mind, in different cases 
investors have questioned the EIA as being discriminatory conduct on behalf of the 
states, as it is not required for all projects. In on instance, the investor argued that they 
failed to secure financing because of unnecessary and time consuming environmental 
requirements (environmental remediation plans or EIA in particular), and therefore 
entered into involuntary bankruptcy. Moreover, in some disputes the investors have 
argued that delays in the assessment of the project have been unnecessary, 
discriminatory and have been a breach of FET and due process. They did not consider 
the elements that might affect the assessment, for instance the size, location and 
particular activity that was aimed at the project. 
c. Proving legitimate concerns or scientific basis: 
Where is the threshold and what is the standard of review? Does the tribunal stop when 
they are satisfied that the measure is not a political sham (Methanex), scrutinize the 
scientific evidence to find flaws (Chemtura) or do they only consider due process?   
Election and the Green party: 
Investors have raised other common points (with regard to the environmental 
measures) that political the motivations behind the measures have also directly or 
indirectly affected their business. A common example is where the investor starts the 
business when the current government is more focused on trade and economic 
development. Fewer trade and investment restrictive measures are adopted, and the 
government issues permits and allows the business to go on. The problem starts when a 
‘green’ party wins the election, or a newly elected governor has promised to deal with 
the local community’s environmental concerns (Vattenfall II v. Germany). The newly 
elected authority will prioritize the environment, or will have environmental issues on its 
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agenda, and take actions accordingly. While legitimate concerns are involved, it is 
important to define to what extend states could be held responsible by changing 
priorities, and whether the investors should expect changes. 
 
Chilling effect: 
Regarding the impact of an investment regime on environmental governance, some 
commentators have suggested that there is more controversy on scholarly writings than 
the decisions.343 They suggest that the current trend in decision-making is not a threat to 
the host states, or their flexibility to regulate the environment. Consequently, there has 
not been any disaster so far in the arbitral decisions, however ‘the risk is there’.344 The 
problem with this statement is that these interpretations might considerably change the 
outcome of the decisions. In fact, the investment regime does not require many adverse 
decisions to affect the regulatory power of poor governments.345 While investment 
disputes may not bankrupt developed countries, developing countries may not have the 
power or money to stand up to rich corporations, and are more likely to accept an 
investor’s demands by withdrawing or abandoning the regulatory measures, without 
even going to arbitration (‘regulatory chill’). However, this problem is not restricted to 
developing countries. Developed countries could also confront this dilemma if they are 
concerned about their international reputation for investment friendly policies, or on 
the other hand if protecting the environment is one of their longstanding goals. 
Susan Frank has conducted an empirical study on the investor-state cases. She suggested 
that developing countries do not disproportionately “lose” under the investment 
arbitration regime, and despite all controversies it is a fair regime. 346 It is important to 
note however that fairness is not the main concern over investment dispute settlement 
regimes, but rather the repercussions that they might have on a state’s regulatory power. 
Some have criticised Frank’s work by stating that her conclusion cannot be supported 
by a case study in the investment regime, due to the lack of sufficient cases.347 Many 
conflicts between foreign investors and the host states will never reach the arbitration 
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stage due to its high cost, and the high risk for both the host state and the investor.348 It 
has been argued that investors hope that they can change the attitude of the government 
and the measure that it has adopted by simply raising the intention to file a dispute 
under treaty provisions as a threat.349 Some even consider arbitration to be used as ‘an 
offensive weapon to harass or intimidate’. Even Walde, one of the lead pro-investor 
scholars, stated that the impact of the arbitration clause is  “…an implicit threat to both 
parties rather than its actual use”.350 
The question remains whether investment tribunals have been provided with the tools 
necessary to deny unmeritorious claims for compensation arising from legitimate 
environmental measures. The question also remains as to whether they can identify 
cases where environmental policy is being used as little more than a shield to obscure 
the arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of a foreign investor. This analysis will lead 
into the chapter three, which explores environmental regulation and introduces the 
precautionary principle as the analytical framework. This principle is one of the most 
effective mechanisms to monitor environmental protection. Its objective is to provide a 
benchmark for an acceptable environmental measure, based on the modern 
environmental decision-making process, which has been accepted by states according to 
the numerous environmental instruments. This would allow tribunals to objectively 
assess the measures to find a breach of investment provisions or reject an investor’s 
claims. 
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3 Analytical Framework 
The Precautionary Principle 
 
3.1  Introduct ion 
 
The previous chapter reviewed environment-related investment disputes to find a 
pattern in the way tribunals approach environmental concerns (as the trigger of disputed 
measures). It was concluded by cataloguing certain elements that have had a bearing on 
tribunals’ reasoning in finding violations in investment provisions. These elements 
include some concepts, tools and methods that have particular meaning in the field of 
environmental regulation and supervision. The argument is that if these elements are 
not taken into account by the tribunals then their interpretation of the investment 
provisions would be incomplete. For instance, in deciding whether an environmental 
policy adopted by a host state has been unfair, against expectations, or a breach of due 
process or discriminatory, the tribunal needs to deconstruct that policy and understand 
its elements.  
The scope of this thesis does not cover the study of environmental regulation in detail, 
just enough to introduce the precautionary principle as an analytical framework. The 
first part of this chapter briefly explains the environment and its peculiarities; a topic 
that requires on-going scrutiny and complex decision-making by states and authorities 
to prevent environmental harm. This includes changes in the environmental regulation 
and supervision to address current concerns and shifting approaches, towards a more 
comprehensive way of managing environmental risks. This introductory section on 
environmental regulation sets the stage for introducing the precautionary principle as 
the analytical framework for this thesis. 
The principle has been chosen as the analytical framework, or in other words, as a lens 
through which the issues surrounding the environment-related investment disputes will 
be addressed. It has, however, been the subject of constant debate inside and outside 
academia over its application and legitimacy. Therefore, it is not an uncontested tool to 
be applied to resolve the identified issues. The principle requires some analysis and 
exploration before considering its application by investment tribunals. Thus, it is 
necessary to establish its core meaning and status under international law and study its 
appropriateness as an applicable tool. Only then would it be possible to apply the 
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principle to investment tribunals in addressing the environmental concerns of host 
states.  
3.2  Environment and r i sk regulat ion  
The answer to the question of how the environment is regulated is a multifaceted one. 
According to Hey, ‘writings in the field of international environmental law which are 
strictly limited to the plain state of the law read much like novels from which the editor 
has deleted every second and third paragraph’. 351 The peculiarities of the environment 
and natural system have attracted special attention from governments and international 
communities. Several incidents have suggested that the stakes are much higher that 10-
20 years ago.352 The unique characteristics of environmental issues include aspects such 
as the complexity and irreversibility of the environmental risks, the cumulative and 
interactive effects within the ecosystem and the indirect and its unquantifiable 
impacts.353 Moreover, by adding human interaction to the picture, the outcome becomes 
even more complicated.354 These complications include new possibilities offered by 
rapid technological development, human action causing environmental damages, 
recognition of the ecosystem’s sensitivity355 and interdependence and also our limited 
understanding of natural process. On the other hand, the common risk governance 
methodology and the problems of using quantitative risk assessments to estimate the 
hazards threating the environment are some of the most important challenges that the 
authorities are now facing. In particular, there is an issue with the disunion of value and 
science, which is reflected in the process of risk assessment and risk management.356 
Thus, the unpredictability, variability, vulnerability and complexity of environmental 
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effects are judged to warrant a prudent approach.357 To understand the materialization 
of precautionary thinking, it is important to briefly mention the gradual adjustments that 
have been made, and are still ongoing, as a response to developments in the 
understanding of the environment’s vulnerability and the ineffectiveness of previous 
methods. 
In general, there are three different approaches to protecting the environment, namely, 
curative, preventive and anticipatory. 358  The curative approach recognizes natural 
resources to be exhaustible; they cannot survive without assistance. The representative 
instrument to this approach is the polluter-pays principle: Principle 16 in the Rio 
Declaration. The polluter-pays economic approach promotes the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments to implement the principle.359 
It focuses on governments using a command and control strategy to control sensitive 
activities, particularly emission-sensitive developments, to internalize their costs. 
However, even in this purely compensatory approach towards environmental damages, 
it has been argued that the direction of companies’ behavior should change from a 
‘purely burden changing polluter-pay to a more preventive one’.360 
The second approach involves reducing the amount of damage that might be caused to 
the environment. In accordance with the Charter of United nations and international 
law, states have a responsibility to ensure that activities within their territory do not 
cause environmental damage to the territories of other states. This responsibility is 
included in the Stockholm Declaration, and is considered as the ‘golden rule of 
international environmental law’. 361  The preventive principle is used to avoid and 
control transboundary harm, for instance; it has to be based on a certain level of 
scientific knowledge, meaning that the threat of harm needs to be established 
convincingly before taking steps towards preventing it. The prevention principle 
responds well to the notion of risk, where the negative outcome of a potential harm to 
the environment can be assessed. However, following an increase in awareness towards 
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environmental issues it has emerged that the consequences of some activities cannot 
always be assessed in advance and this uncertainty cannot be used by states as a 
justification for inaction. 362  Hence, an ex-ante approach towards environmental 
management is required to identify where there is a probability of serious or irreversible 
harm to the environment.  Necessary measure would then need to be adopted to 
prevent it, even if the science is not conclusive. 
The anticipatory approach towards environmental problems thus emerged as a response 
to the complexities of the natural system, and also the inability of science to fully 
recognise and predict its function.363 The principle of precaution was introduced as a 
tool to identify and control environmental threats at source, and prevent them from 
materializing. It is an extension of prevention, as both principles follow the same logic 
to prevent harm, however, precaution is more advanced. The ILO described the 
relationship between these two principles in its 2012 Report:  
In EU environmental law, the prevention principle and the precautionary principle are 
widely understood as elements of one principle, in that they form part of a continuum. 
Locating a dispute on the precaution-prevention continuum depends on the extent of 
scientific uncertainty; only when there is very strong scientific evidence will the 
prevention principle be engaged…. In EU environmental law, the prevention principle 
and the precautionary principle are widely understood as elements of one principle, in 
that they form part of a continuum. Locating a dispute on the precaution-prevention 
continuum depends on the extent of scientific uncertainty; only when there is very 
strong scientific evidence will the prevention principle be engaged.364 
De Sadeleer made a clear distinction between the two in his work: 
Prevention is based on certainties: it rests on cumulative experience concerning the 
degree of risk posed by an activity…therefore, prevention presupposes science, 
technical control, and the notion of an objective assessment of risks in order to reduce 
the probability of their occurrence. Preventive measures are thus intended to avert risks 
for which the cause-and effect relationship is already known. … Precaution, in contrast, 
comes into play when the probability of a suspected risk cannot be irrefutably 
demonstrated. The distinction between the two … is thus the degree of uncertainty, the 
greater the justification for intervention as a means of prevention rather than in the 
name of precaution. By contrast, precaution is used when scientific research has not yet 
reached a stage that allows the veil of uncertainty to be lifted.365 
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It should be noted that despite their similarities, these approaches function in different 
spheres.366 Furthermore, adopting the appropriate approach totally depends on a state’s 
level of risk tolerance, and the specific environmental problem at stake. Each 
government approaches its environmental affairs, makes its own trade-offs and adopts 
different mechanisms according to its own priorities and objectives.  
Before the 1990s, dealing with risk consisted of a two-stage process, namely risk 
assessment and risk evaluation. The focus was less on probability, and more on conflict.367 
Risk assessment has since become common practice. Risk assessment was thought of as 
a reliable practice to control environmental harm until recently; a debate has now 
surfaced over the objectivity of science in environmental decisions.368 This debate has 
resulted in the substitution of the scientific process of risk assessment with a more 
multi-layered process of ‘risk regulation’. This is based on the understanding that the 
assessment and mitigation of environmental threats is a multilayered process. The 
managing of uncertain risks is inherently political and cannot be based merely on 
quantified data. This has resulted in a need to separate risk assessment from risk 
management. 369  In addition, society has become more risk averse. Ulrich Beck 
introduced the concept of the ‘risk society’ in 1992,370 which suggests that modernity 
produces more and more uncontrollable consequences. Therefore, society has become 
risk averse to minimize the harmful consequences of possible environmental harm.371 
Moreover, recent experiences of loss through large disasters, combined with further 
understanding of the limitations of science in fully detecting environmental hazards, 
have encouraged governments to adopt more systemic and rigorous methods to 
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mitigate risks. 372  In general, the current idea of risk regulation consists of risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication.373  
In the risk management stage, the aim is to scale the risks and the consequent hazard 
severity acknowledged at the risk assessment stage. The risks can then be evaluated 
according to their level of acceptability.374 The supplementary methods/phases added to 
risk assessment process are the result of loosing faith in science as the single tool for 
recognizing risks. Many of the supplementary methods and tools that accompany the 
risk assessment focus on the need to take into account the values. However, the focus 
here is not about value versus science, or values prevailing over science, but rather to 
demonstrate the distinction between risk assessment vs. management. Risk assessment 
fails to capture either the delicate relationship between science and values or what is 
really at stake in risk regulation.375 The Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
in 1997 developed recommendations for how the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) should perform risk assessments as part of developing air quality 
regulations.376 Evaluating the conventional risk assessment methods, it acknowledged the 
importance of risk assessment and its contribution to the remarkable progress in reducing 
health and environmental risks in recent decades. However, the commission recommended 
that risk assessment is not ‘adequate for addressing the more complex risk problems we 
now face’.377  
3.2.1 Public opinion  
Before focusing on the role of science it is important to briefly mention the role of 
community and public opinion in the current approaches towards environmental 
management. The previous chapter featured several instances in which foreign investors 
claimed that the disputed environmental measures were triggered by the public/local 
protests. Therefore, they claimed that the measure/treatment was political, instead of 
genuinely for environmental protection purposes. Environmental protection has a very 
close connection with the local community, and the public in general. In the case of any 
accident or flaw in a proposed activity, it is the community who pays. Therefore, their 
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concerns are legitimate, and governments are responsible for them. The serious 
consequences and externalities for the environment and health turns a private choice 
into a public decision, which justifies public protests against hazardous activities. 
In modern environmental management, there have been heated debates on engaging 
stakeholders in environmental decision-making, which is a method of soliciting public 
opinion.378 This method promises an open debate about what kind of place a society 
wants to live in, because it creates a discourse between a concerned and activated public 
and scientific community. It has been defined as the ‘modern environmental 
movement’. The precautionary Principle has been claimed to be the ‘key catalyst in the 
renegotiation of the appropriate role of science in public dialogue about risk’.379 This 
demonstrates not only that public judgment and attitude does not undermine the 
legitimacy of the environmental regulation, but also that it constitutes an important 
element of the process, which is gaining increasing attention.380 Furthermore, it provides 
evidence of the potential of the principle for democratization, coming from its ability to 
uncover the trade-offs inherent in risk analysis.381  
3.2.2 The role of science in decision-making 
Science plays a crucial role in environmental decision-making. When identifying an 
environmental harm, tribunals mostly ask for, and rely on, scientific proof. In many 
cases tribunals reject a claim due to the lack of scientific evidence that certain activity 
poses a risk to the environment. This section intends to highlight the importance of 
science in environmental decision-making and describe its limitations. This will serve as 
a basis for adopting precautionary measures. 
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Science is the method of extracting best practice and standards. Due to its rigor and 
objectivity it is believed to be capable of making sound decisions.382 Gregory et al, argue 
that the key judgment tasks that form the fundamental aspects of environmental 
decision-makings have been mostly taken from the domain of science. These tasks 
include explicit value judgments, creating alternatives by merging scientific facts and 
identified values and addressing conflicts about uncertainty. The responsibility of 
addressing these issues lies on the decision maker’s shoulder, and cannot be resolved by 
good science alone.383 
At large, science describes what we know, whereas decision makers decide what we 
value; science can address the risks and problems but cannot decide what to do. 384 At the 
risk assessment phase, scientific methods help to identify alternative candidates for 
taking action, the consequences of a certain hazard (realistic and estimations) and the 
potential consequences of a proposed action. Nonetheless, these are the likely 
consequences, and not the required actions- i.e. scientists deliver information and not 
prescription.385 Science provides substantial inputs to the decision-making process but 
its role is limited and very specific; it ensures that the decision makers are making ‘sound 
interpretations of the consequences’. 386 Therefore it is not for science to determine the 
acceptable level of risk, or the actions to be taken to mitigate them. Making decisions on 
the acceptability of the risk for the society, the cost-benefit analysis and also the implied 
trade offs are not scientific decisions. Thus, science plays a crucial role in decision-
making process, but only in identification and characterisation of risks and estimation of 
the consequences. This means that its role is minimal in making choices and trade-offs. 
According to Gregory et al: 
Objective science is only capable of stating that one risk is likely to be more significant 
than another with respect to a given attribute; it cannot determine if that risk is 
‘‘acceptable’’ or if the cost of reducing it is ‘‘worth it’’ or if changes should be made in 
the short-term or long-term.387 
Moreover, it has been argued that to make a democratic decision and comply with 
administrative law, agencies who are in making environmental decisions not only have 
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to make references to scientific evidence, but also demonstrate the value of the choices 
that are inherent in their decision making.388 
Acknowledging scientific uncertainty does not devalue science. It involves undertaking 
an action assuming that the environmental consequences are well understood and easily 
predicted,, which justifies the importance of the precautionary decision-making. 389 
Wynne differentiated between two types of uncertainty. The first type is the 
conventional concept of uncertainty, which is caused by a lack of data, and can be 
resolved by conducting more studies and collecting more evidence. 390 The second is 
indeterminacy, which is the ‘recognition of the essentially open-ended and conditional 
nature of all knowledge and its embeddedness in social context’.391 It has been argued 
that the conventional science and risk assessment methods tend to handle all 
uncertainties ‘as if they were due to the incomplete definition of an essentially 
determinate cause-effect system’ .392 This method would fail when the subject matter 
under study is a complex system however, and its process cannot be captured by those 
methods. 393  For instance, in the case of accumulation, conditions can change 
dramatically, which, combined with the ‘erratic influences’ of social behavior, can create 
uncertainty in all scientific assessments.394  
The impact of uncertainty has caused disagreements as to the appropriate role of 
science. There is no consensus on the objectivity of science, as one might assume, and 
the literature is quite divergent on this topic. Advocates of the objectivity of science, 
believe that there is no room for precaution, and that science is and should remain 
value-neutral.395 Its opponents, however, claim that science is not completely objective, 
and that expert’s findings necessarily involve a value component, since they cannot be 
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separated from their own perspectives.396 Although objectivity in science is the ideal 
type397, there are situations where these beliefs become relevant, i.e. when there is a 
significant threat to the environment that the decision maker must address. Scientists 
routinely adopt worst-case assumptions when data is unavailable or not sufficient. The 
argument is that these assumptions can not be based merely on scientific grounds, to be 
decided by risk assessors and scientists in the la., The risk manager, namely the policy 
maker, must decide whether a given risk is acceptable to society.398 
The early version of the precautionary principle was considered to deal with 
conventional uncertainty. According to its temporary character, it will be bridged by 
more scientific research and therefore is a tool in the hand of decision makers to ‘buy 
more time’.399 The realistic role of science is explained as:  
If the status of scientific knowledge shifts from being the objective, final arbiter to a 
more conditional and consensus-seeking knowledge form, which allows other forms of 
knowledge equal standing (and there is evidence that this is occurring), then its 
legitimatory function may be re-affirmed through a more realistic, and less rhetorical, 
appreciation of what science can and cannot do with respect to environmental 
management.400 
The opponents believe that by penetrating into the science and risk assessment phase, 
the precautionary principle manipulates the truth, which is the objective of science. 
However, Scott rejected this observation by remarking that:  
Burdens of proof are as inevitable in hypothesis testing as they are in law. The nature of 
a burden is that it is deliberately unbalanced- it is biased. Shifting the burden of proof, 
then, in science means being explicit about what values are favored and why. We have 
not surrendered truth because what we were getting in the past was not ‘pure truth’ but 
truth encompassing a hidden judgment- a measure of justice not disclosed….science 
does not provide objective truth but ‘it delivers truth with a healthy dose of justice 
mixed in .401 
Be that as it may, applying the precautionary principle is not a rejection of scientific 
method whatsoever. On the contrary, it is through science that hazards are recognised, 
and the two must work together to reach a desirable result. The precautionary principle 
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suggests that science does not always provide all the answers, and that in managing 
potential risks some other elements are also relevant, such as social sciences, common 
fears, etc.402 It allows biased decision making by granting the environment the benefit of 
the doubt when it comes to new technologies and development.403 It is more of a ‘go-
slow’ approach rather than ‘stop and end’. Some banning measures are adopted based 
on the principle, however, which shows a level of harm in the proposed activity that is 
beyond society’s acceptable levels. This is an extreme example of precautionary action, 
and is not necessarily applied in all cases. New technologies are welcomed after meeting 
the certain predetermined criteria for safety through EIA, for instance. 
Environmental protection is constantly improving, and therefore governments and 
decision-makers are introducing more measures to ensure compliance with international 
and national standards. This issue was discussed in the previous chapter, which 
considered the surge of environmental components in investment disputes, and the 
wide range of monitoring mechanisms that they include. This discussion also observed 
the crucial role of the investment tribunals, and the difference they could make by 
acknowledging the environmental concerns of the host states. The following section 
aims to analyze the precautionary principle regardless of its impact on investment 
disputes. It aims to demonstrate the potential of the principle as a tool for tribunals, and 
to understand: What precisely are the dimensions of the core content just mentioned? 
To what extent can and does the principle guide the decisions of governments in 
concrete instances? When is it triggered? What measures qualify for its implementation? 
Who bares the burden of proof? These and other queries must be addressed to answer 
the main research question posed above. 
The advantages of addressing these questions could be useful for the arbitral tribunal 
resolving a dispute between a host state and a foreign investor. It would enable the 
tribunal to interpret the provisions of the investment treaties while taking into account 
the currents trends regarding environmental protection and supervision. These 
questions will chiefly be answered by analyzing the principle’s definition, core elements, 
criticisms and also its legal status and application.  
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3.3  Precaut ionary Princ ip le404  
In general, the logic behind the principle405 is the idea of in dubio pro natura, meaning if in 
doubt decide in favour of the environment.406 This is an age-old concept, and references 
are found in oral tradition around the globe, in accordance with common sense, as the 
proverbial ‘look before you leap’. The recognition of the principle comes mainly from 
the intuitiveness of the general idea of precaution,407 which is much wider than the 
principle, and does not provide any guidance for specific situations.408 Nonetheless, the 
motivation behind its introduction as a principle was partly due to the flaws in orthodox 
approaches towards environmental decision-making, which was chiefly based on risk 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis.409 
The principle has been criticised widely inside and outside of academia. Several analyses 
and definitions from various disciplines have been conducted, such as risk analysis, legal 
theories, philosophy, economics, ethics and political science.410 The practicality of the 
principle however remains a matter of continuing controversy. The main debate centres 
over two basic but crucial issues: definition and implementation.411 Notwithstanding 
these controversies, the principle is an important, if not the most important, general 
principle of international environmental law. Some commentators have even suggested 
that the criteria for the formation of the customary international law have already been 
fulfilled.412 Some others do not support the idea that it is a norm of customary law, but 
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regard it rather as a general principle of law.413 This demonstrates how far the discourse 
on the topic has reached; it is very unlikely that commentators will reach a consensus in 
the near future. Furthermore, the decisions of international courts and tribunals do not 
help to clarify the aforementioned issues as well. As a result, the precautionary principle 
remains one of the most contentious concepts of environmental law.414 
The precautionary principle has been heavily criticised since its emergence and rapid 
growth. Its critics have raised different concerns, while some have taken the extreme of 
refusing to recognise the existence of such a principle. Other critics have recognised it, 
but have criticised its function and appointed a soft weight on its applicability. This 
section will evaluate some of those arguments, and attempt to respond to them. While 
some critics take a more pessimistic view on the applicability of the principle, some 
others only question some of its aspects. 
The more radical reviews suggest that the precautionary principle is not even a real 
principle, for it has some serious and even fatal flaws; it could only be an approach for 
decision making. Other condemnations include: the principle calls for proving the 
absence of harm, which is impossible; 415 It is unnecessary; it imposes more harm and 
increases costs;416 and it is reckless, arbitrary, and ill-advised.417 Unnecessary precaution 
results from unjustified fears, which could paralyse actions, as the principle requires 
conclusive proof of zero risk.418 In the political scope, the Bush administration official in 
charge of the regulatory policy called the principle ‘a mythical concept, perhaps like a 
unicorn’.419 There has been even disagreement over the inclusion of the principle as a 
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component of the risk management phase. Its opponents believe that decision makers 
could use its inclusion to completely refute the role of science.420 
One of the most cited arguments against the principle is its vagueness and that it suffers 
from ‘profound ambiguity’. 421 It is undefined, and therefore is unfit to guide the actions 
of government and decision makers. It is more of guide for beliefs, rather than actions, 
and is considered to be purely an epistemic or procedural principle.422 Bodansky argued 
that the principle, at its best, can serve as a general goal, and not a regulatory standard, 
since it does not specify how much precaution should be made/taken.423  
The opponents’ main concern is that the unnecessary fears and risk-averse approach 
associated with the principle could paralyse and stifle innovation, leading to economic 
stagnation.424 The consequences could prevent new technologies that commonly contain 
high degree of uncertainty, for instance, particularly if implementation of the principle 
causes the shifting of burdens.,425 Miller and Conko, for instance, claimed that if the 
principle had been implemented in the past then we would not have antibiotics or 
vaccines today.426 Sustain has claimed that the principle forbids all courses of action; he 
also deemed the pre-marketing testing of the drugs unnecessary and argued that such a 
principle is logically incoherent. 427  He suggested that the only way to avoid this 
predicament is a cost-benefit analysis. Critics have suggested that by conducting 
quantitative analysis in scientific researches, regulators will be able to evaluate the cost 
of different actions. They can then make the most cost effective and risk-reducing 
measures by identifying the risks.428 
Having mentioned the essence of the central criticisms, this study does not attempt to 
defend every measure taken based on the principle. Some precautionary decisions and 
measures to protect the environment or health can be prone to political favouritism, and 
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can be disguised as being genuinely precautionary.429 The principle is not an alien to 
decision makers however, even to the United States (its strongest critic according to its 
practice). It is not paralysing and cannot be so easily dismissed. 
Advocates have referred to the generality of the principle when responding to the main 
argument against it. To them, the measures to be taken, the degree of the threat and the 
amount of the information are not specified. Those that assume that the precautionary 
principle should have a clear list on those issues are missing the point of the principle’s 
generality and wide application.430 Also, like other principles it offers a framework 
towards decision-making, and should not be expected to offer a detailed prescription for 
action. This should be defined through legislation, and not the principle itself, because 
the ‘regulatory design’ responses and timing of the action would vary depending on 
many different contexts. Therefore, it would be irrational and unrealistic to expect a one 
or two sentence principle to provide total guidance for regulators in managing 
multifaceted health and environmental risks. 431  Its generality should also not be 
considered as a truism, and the vacuity of the principle creates ‘a recognizable 
architecture’. This establishes who bears the burden of proof in the case of complex 
environmental and health risks.432 In fact, many international courts and tribunals use 
the principle as a basis for resolving environmental and health related disputes. These 
include the ICJ, WTO, ITLOS, ECHR and CJEU (Court of Justice of the European 
Union – formerly ECJ).433 
As to the relationship between science and the principle, it has been contended that that 
the application of the precautionary principle does not reject science and scientific 
analysis, in the contrary, it is, in fact, consistent with science and requires sound 
scientific risk assessment to demonstrate potential risks on an ex-ante basis, rather than 
‘a reactive posture’ in response to harm that has already happened.434 The principle 
offers flexibility in each area of risk regulation, determining the tolerable level and a 
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threshold for action. The principle cannot be inherently unworkable as it is already used 
in several national laws, including US law.435 
It has also been argued that the principle approaches complex trade-offs through 
deliberation, moral reflection and appreciation of the limits of human cognition. This is 
as apposed to cost-benefit analysis, which ‘proceeds awkwardly in the absence of fully 
characterized risks’, and involves questionable monetization of harm to the environment 
and public health.436 In addition, the precautionary principle could help decision makers 
make choices between the ‘avoidance of sure immediate loss and avoidance of unsure 
future loss’.437 Therefore, not using the principle would result in tort remedies or ex-post 
regulatory interventions, neither of which is desirable, or capable of preventing harm 
from happening. 
Nevertheless, there is an element that characterizes almost all of the statements 
concerning the precautionary principle in international legal texts: the reference to 
scientific uncertainty. More precisely, the principle attributes legal significance even in 
situations where the science is divided or uncertain on the actual existence and extent of 
a risk. The doctrine aptly captures this aspect of the innovative nature of a precaution, 
as opposed to the traditional approach in environmental protection policies. Tradition 
dictates that it is necessary to have a certain scientific response to the risks involved 
before taking steps to avoid them. This evolution is schematically summarized as a shift 
from prevention to precaution.438 
This section is devoted to examine the definition, elements and status of the principle 
under international law, in addition to analysing some of the main criticisms. It will then 
analyse the potential functions of the principle, which are both procedural and 
substantive. For the first function, the potential and limitations of the principle will be 
examined as a burden-shifting instrument. In addition, this section will highlight some 
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references to this function in case law. The second function, which is the main focus of 
this research, is the substantive. This involves the application of the principle as an 
interpretative tool. An evaluation of case law is warranted to provide a practical example 
of its potential applicability. This will also provide an accurate evaluation of the 
substantive function of the principle. For this purpose, the principle will be examined in 
the ECJ, ICJ, ITLOS and WTO. The jurisprudence on the precautionary principle will 
be discussed separately in chapter four, as it involves a detailed analysis. The conclusion 
on the analytical framework, which has been extracted from both chapters, will also be 
demonstrated at the end of chapter four. Therefore, the goal is to provide, as the 
outcome of chapters three and four combined, a ‘precautionary test’, which consists of a 
set of questions to be applied by the investment tribunals.  
3.3.1 Definition 
Controversy over the definition of the precautionary principle starts from the very 
beginning: is it even a principle? Some have suggested that it is more proper to call it an 
‘approach’, rather than a ‘principle’.439 According to a state’s practice, there is no 
substantive difference between the precautionary principle and a precautionary 
approach. The difference is only terminological, and according to some scholars, is 
rhetorical.440 The term is used interchangeably, as both of them represent the same 
concept, with the same features, components and characteristics.441 
As per the content, failing a secure definition, the principle has often been criticised for 
not having a uniformly applicable description.442 It is however, an undeniable fact that 
different definitions exist both at the national and international level. Many instruments 
have only referred to the principle without actually providing a definition.443 Arguably, 
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the formulation provided by the Rio Declaration is not the best version of the principle. 
This has been the most commonly noted version and is thus argued to be the cause of 
the majority of the controversies over its implication. It states that: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.444 
Many scholars have commented on this issue, and have provided different answers. For 
instance, at the time some thought the principle’s vagueness made it impossible for it to 
be clearly defined; some thought it was left undefined so that its future development 
wouldn’t be impaired; some referred to disagreements over a unified definition. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that there is no need for the principle to be defined. In that, 
after the 1992 Earth Summit and the principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, the principle was 
so globally known that apparently the need for defining the principle was diminished. 
This was argued to be the logic behind the development of any norm. Nevertheless, the 
most logical reason could be the capacity of the principle as a general principle of 
international environmental law; a specific definition could limit its capacity.445  
The EU has been the pioneer of the principle, and has vouched for it in regulatory and 
judiciary level. The EU member states have widely applied it and aided its development. 
However, even in the EU instruments such as the EC Treaty, the 2000 Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle and also the Council’s Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, the 
principle was explicitly mentioned but not defined. This might suggest that being 
undefined does not impede its application to a wide array of environmental topics. It 
remains open to accommodate particular actions, and to respond to particular 
circumstances. 
However, in the literature, it has become common to differentiate between weak and 
strong versions to classify and justify different formulations of the principle. The weak 
versions follow preventive goals and allow regulators to take action in the case of 
potential harm, without waiting for the full scientific proof. They do not prescribe any 
particular regulatory measures. Critics such as Cass Sunstein favour implementing this 
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weak version of the principle.446 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration represents a weak 
version of the principle, despite its wide application,.447 It is weak since it does not 
directly order states to take action. Instead it suggests that if there is a threat of harm, 
the uncertainty of science ‘shall not be used as a reason for postponing’ action.448 The 
Wingspread Statement, as an example of a strong version, asserts that: 
Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are 
not fully established scientifically.449 
 It takes a further step towards strengthening the principle by suggesting a shift in the 
burden of proof. This is achieved by affirming that the ‘proponent of an activity, rather than 
the public, bears the burden of proof.450 
In the weak version, regulators should be empowered to address the risk even in the case of 
scientific uncertainty or regulators are allowed to take precautionary measures. The 
strong version, however, requires an affirmative call for action, as precautionary 
measures should be taken.451 The weak version is seen as negative, and therefore ‘less 
demanding’ and less ‘action-forcing’.452 Another difference is that the weak version 
concerns the ‘timing ‘of the governmental measure, whereas the strong version ‘shifts 
the burden of proof’ from decision maker to the performer of the risk-creating activity. 
This proves that the activity does not cause any serious or unreasonable risk to the 
environment.453 However, the measures chosen by the regulator will ‘necessarily’ vary 
depending on the potential harm and strength of the evidence. Accordingly, they could 
range from a total ban to more relaxed measures such as warning requirements, 
moratoriums or EIA requirements.454  
These considerations aside, the lack of unified description does not and should not 
prevent and interrupt the principle’s function. It is possible to trace a set of common 
elements among the array of definitions, according to state practice, through several 
instruments. The meaning has been developed through repeated application and 
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controversies.455 It is essential to outline the principle to determine it, as it applies under 
the practice of the states at the international level. This will find a common ground, 
which apparently exists. According to one commentator, the principle specifies the 
directions that the decision makers should take without specifying the parameters of 
decision making.456 However, a closer look at the instruments that have adopted the 
principle shows a pattern in some of the parameters. This pattern will be explained in 
the following section under the elements of the precautionary principle. 
3.3.2 Elements  
Although differently phrased, the principle’s common and basic components are 
traceable in various legal instruments.457 Accordingly, three commonly accepted and 
quintessential elements of the principle are the (i) threat of environmental harm, (ii) 
uncertainty and (iii) action.458 This means that the principle requires action whenever 
there is a threat of environmental harm, even in the lack of scientific certainty. By 
extension, this implies that the principle requires two elements before taking any action. 
The following paragraphs will elaborate on these elements as the thresholds of the 
principle’s application.  
3.3.2.1  Threat o f  Environmental  harm 
The threat of environmental harm has been the leading trigger for emergence of the 
principle as a means of anticipation and prevention.459, It is appropriate therefore to 
explain this factor as the principal element of the precautionary principle. 
Environmental risks are unique in the sense that harm and damage to the environment 
is often ‘irreparable, interminable and not compensable’. 460  With regard to the 
irreversibility of the environmental harm, the International Law Commission has 
acknowledged that ‘compensation in case of harm often cannot restore the situation 
prevailing prior to the event or accident’.461Many examples of serious and irreversible 
damages to the environment have been caused by a lack of prudent and anticipation. 
For instance, problems regarding radioactivity, ozone layer, acid rain, fisheries and also 
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persistent organic pollutants (DDT, TBT and PCB) are the adverse consequences of not 
taking the precautionary approach into account.462 
The beginning of concerns over damages to the environment can be traced back to the 
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, where the states acknowledged 
that ‘through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm to the 
earthly environment on which our life and well-being depend’.463 The same concern was 
highlighted in the 1988 Baltic Sea Declaration,464 in which the committee was convinced 
that ‘damage to the marine environment can be irreversible or remediable only in a long 
term perspective and at considerable expenses.465 The Rio Declaration was a significant 
statement of the principle, and has been frequently referred to by other instruments. It 
highlighted the element of environmental protection as the principal objective of the 
precautionary principle.466 This concern has continued to be the primary reason for the 
existence and development of the precautionary principle and, according to Bodansky, 
has become the ‘staple’ of every environmental agreement. 
Be that as it may, for practical reasons not all environmental harms are always 
irreparable, and therefore not all of them count as a trigger for taking precautionary 
measures.467 There are different types and levels of risks threatening the environment, 
including natural risks, technological risks and mixed risks. Mixed risks concern the 
natural patterns being disrupted by disproportionate human interferences. 468 
Nevertheless, not all types of risks and harms should be completely banned. In other 
words, the principle does not cover all damages to the environment. Of those that it 
does cover, not all would trigger a precautionary action. Therefore, it must be asked if, 
under international law, the application of the principle is limited to certain thresholds of 
environmental harm. If so, what particular thresholds trigger the principle to have legal 
consequences? According to different formulations, there are some thresholds of magnitude 
to be met to activate the duty of taking precautionary action. While some formulations 
do not set out a minimum threshold to apply the principle, other formulations do make 
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a threshold. They actually distinguish between different levels of gravity, and decide 
when the application of the principle becomes obligatory.  
According to state practice in different international instruments, evidently, a minimum 
gravity standard must be introduced, the crossing of which activates the application of 
the principle. In other words, the principle becomes relevant only if the risk of harm to 
the environment is at least significant. 469 The 1992 Biodiversity Convention470, the OECD 
Council Recommendation on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 471 and the International 
Law Association (ILA)472 have all recommended that the principle should be triggered by 
a minimum of significant risk to the environment. Insignificant risk, as a result, does not 
bring the principle into play. Several definitions are provided for significant harm to the 
environment. Significant harm, for instance, should be ‘appreciable’ and ‘tangible’, as 
apposed to ‘trivial’473. It should be something ‘more than detectable’, but less than 
‘serious or substantial’.474 
Significance was set as the minimum threshold and starting point of the application of 
the principle in some documents. The second level of gravity of environmental harm 
not only triggers the principle but also necessitates its application, and as argued by 
some scholars, it becomes a duty of the states.475 This level is the fear of ‘serious’ or 
‘Irreversible’ harm to the environment. While ‘serious’ harm focuses more on the 
gravity and distribution of an environmental threat, ‘irreversible’ refers to the duration 
and persistence of the risks to the environment. They have been used either together or 
                                                
469 For instance see: the 1988 Baltic Sea Declaration at eighth preambular paragraph; the PARCOM (Paris 
commission established under the late 1974 Convention For The Prevention Of Marine Pollution Form Land-
Based Sources) 1989 Recommendation 89/1 on the Principle of Precautionary action; Principle 21 of the 1972 
Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment. (1972 Stockholm Declaration); the 1992 Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention )Article 2(2)(a).; see also 
Trouwborst, 2006. P. 44-47. There are some formulations of the precautionary principle where there is no 
requirement of a potential environmental damage to set a minimum. These types of broad formulation of 
the principle cover all the potential damages to be foreseen and is criticised for casting doubt on the fact 
that precautionary principle has certain thresholds to be triggered for its application.469 Thus, there should 
be a minimum level of potential harm beyond which the application of the precautionary principle becomes 
necessary, otherwise it would mean that each and every minor environmental impact has to be prevented 
according to the principle, which makes it irrational and unfeasible.  
470 Preamble, paragraph 9. ‘where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity.’;  
471  1991 Council Recommendation C(90)164 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control: ‘the 
absence of complete information should not preclude precautionary action to mitigate the risk of significant 
harm to the environment.’. 
472  Declaration on Principles of International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development, the 
International Law Association (ILA) at its 2002 Conference in New Delhi, paragraph 4.1. ‘A 
precautionary approach …commits States…to avoid human activity which may cause significant harm to 
human health, natural resources or ecosystems...’. 
473 Commentary to the 1994 ILC draft articles on The Law Of The Non-Navigational Uses Of International 
Watercourses. 
474 ILC 2001, commentary to Article 2(a) of the Draft Articles on Harm Prevention, Paragraph 4. 
475 For an extensive analysis see Trouwborst. 2006. Supra 119. 
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separately. They were mentioned together for instance in principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration, and also in some other international instruments476 and tribunal decisions.477 
Although principle 15 of the Rio Declaration represents a weak version, it adopted both 
thresholds as triggers, and called for precautionary action whenever there is a ‘serious’ 
or ‘irreversible’ threat of environmental harm.478 Some other significant instruments 
adopted the same thresholds, such as: the 1990 Bergen Declaration479, the 1990 Ministerial 
Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference480, the 1992 Climate Change Convention481, 
the 1995 Waigani Convention482, the 1995 Barcelona Convention amendments,483 the 1995 Land-
Based Activities Action Program484, the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution485and the 2001 Albatross Agreement486. The formulations, suggested by different 
and widely accepted instruments, seem to differentiate the environmental threats 
according to their gravity. They incorporated different thresholds that need to be 
crossed for the principle to be applied – either as a right or as a duty.487 
3.3.2.2  Uncertainty  
The second element of the precautionary principle is ‘uncertainty’ or lack of scientific 
certainty, which is also among its basic components. The principle could be considered 
as a so-called permission to prevent environmental harm, without waiting for full 
scientific certainty. However, the uncertainty itself is not an unambiguous concept. It 
comes in multiple forms, for there are different sources for uncertainty.488 It might result 
                                                
476  1990 Bergen Declaration; 1992 Climate Change Convention; 1995 Barcelona Convention 
amendments; 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. 
477  1997 ICJ Gobcigovo-Nagymaros; 1999 ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna; 2003 ITLOS Land 
Reclamation. 
478 Rio Declaration, supra 128, principle 15. 
479 Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, (Bergen, May 1990) paragraph 7. 
480 Principle 7. 
481 Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 1992, Article3 (3). 
482 Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous Wastes and Radioactive Wastes and to 
Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within the South Pacific, Article 1.  
483 Amendments to the 1976 Barcelona Convention for Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea 
Article 4(3)(a). 
484 UNEP, Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA), 
paragraph 24. 
485 Association of South East Asian Nations, Article 3(3). 
486 Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), Article II(3). 
487 Those commentators who believe in the normativity of the principle and advocates of its binding 
character suggest that precautionary principle becomes applicable when there is a fear of ‘significant’ 
harm to the environment and when this risk becomes ‘significant’ or ‘irreversible’ and exceeds this 
threshold, the right to take action becomes a duty of the states and hence, compulsory. Although, whether 
the harm qualifies as significant or serious and irreversible depends on the particular circumstances of 
each case. This hypothesis is supported by the occurrence of substantial portion of formulations that 
expressly set out such thresholds. 
488  The European union commented on the forms on uncertainty in its communication on the 
Precautionary principle: ‘Scientific uncertainty results usually from five characteristics of the scientific 
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from a lack of information, complexity and variability of the natural system, or from 
human interaction with the natural and ecological system. 
A lack of information may result from the limited availability of tools or technologies, 
or from incomplete or inaccessible historical records. In addition, there is a lack of 
information on the baseline condition of the environment. 489  The environmental 
changes can hardly be measured without having a clear big picture of reliable records.490 
The uncertainty could also be caused by the quality of nature, the namely complexity 
and variability of the natural system. This complexity comes from the fact that 
everything in the nature is interrelated,491 as confirmed by the signatories to the Rio 
Declaration, who stated that the nature of the earth is ‘integral and interdependent’.492 
This complexity of the natural system interrupts human understanding and accordingly 
inhibits the ability of science to foresee all the changes.493 The peculiarities of the natural 
system make it extremely difficult to comprehensively understand and predict the 
dynamics of the ecosystem. The understanding of science from the dynamics of the 
ecosystem is limited, and is acknowledged as a matter of principle.494 Along with this 
complexity, the unpredictability of nature adds to the uncertainty. In other words, the 
elements of the nature are not linear and regular, but rather are unpredictable and 
variable. When these two elements of nature combine, the ability of mathematical 
methods and laboratorial studies are fundamentally limited.495 However, these qualities 
do not represent disorder, but rather evidence of unpredictability. Among the causes of 
uncertainty, one could not deny the role of the modern era and the interruptions made 
by human interaction. Examples of this include climate change, bioaccumulation, 
desertification, deforestation, pollution, acid rain, industrial and household waste, ozone 
layer depletion, genetic engineering and so on.  
                                                                                                                                     
method: the variable chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the models used and the causal 
relationships employed. Scientific uncertainty may also arise from a controversy on existing data or lack of 
some relevant data. Uncertainty may relate to qualitative or quantitative elements of the analysis.’, 
Communication COM(2000)1, p. 14.  
489 Paragraph 19 of UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/27/Add.3 of 18 October 2005. Report Of The Group 
Of Legal And Technical Experts On Liability And redress In The Context Of Paragraph 2 Of Article 14 Of 
The Convention on Biological Diversity. Available at: <https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-
08/official/cop-08-27-add3-en.pdf>. 
490James Gleick, Chaos  : The Amazing Science of the Unpredictable. (1998 Vintage, London. Reprint, 1901), p. 
169.  
491 Thomas M. Smith and Robert Leo Smith, Elements of Ecology, 8 edition (San Francisco: Benjamin 
Cummings, 2012). 
492 Rio Declaration, supra 126, final preambular paragraph. 
493 Trouwborst, 2006, supra 112, p. 78.  
494 Joel Tickner, Carolyn Raffensperger and Nancy Myers, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Action a 
Handbook’, 1998, p. 162. 
495 Trouwborst, 2006, supra 119, p. 78. 
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Several types of uncertainty have been discussed; not all of them are manageable. 
However, it is important to identify what type of uncertainty the precautionary principle 
targets. Trouwborst distinguished between different types of uncertainty as quantifiable 
risk in a comprehensive study on the principle. These included approximate certainty, 
uncertainty, and ignorance (figure 2 ).496 After defining the risk as a function of gravity 
of harm and probability of harm (Risk = Gravity x Likelihood), he explained that a risk 
is quantifiable if the gravity and probability of harm are both known (approximately 
rather than genuine certainties).497  The second type is where the gravity is known but 
the probability of the harm is unknown, and the third type (ignorance) is where both 
gravity and probability is unknown. 
 Gravity Probability 
Quantifiable risk known known 
Uncertainty Proper known unknown 
Ignorance unknown unknown 
                                                   Figure 2: Arie Trouwborst. 2006 
 
The threshold of uncertainty as a trigger for precautionary measures is quite a 
controversial topic in the literature. Its opponents argue that the principle does not 
define the level of required uncertainty for its application, whereas its advocates 
consider it as an eligible reason to take precautionary measures.498 This statement implies 
that if there is no uncertainty then there is no action (precautionary action). However, this 
assertion does not reflect the main objectives of the several formulations of the 
principle, including the Rio Declaration, which clearly announced that a ‘lack of scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason to postponing… measures to prevent 
environmental degradation’. 499  Therefore, action is triggered by the threat of 
environmental damage and not by uncertainty; uncertainty should not be used as a 
reason for not taking action. This view differs from the statement that uncertainty is the 
reason for taking action. The literature regarding the precautionary principle often refers 
to uncertainty as the condition for its application.500 This statement means that if there is 
no uncertainty, there is no action, which has been argued to be a misrepresentation of 
the principle. Advocates of the principle argue that although it is a basic element, 
                                                
496 Id. 
497 Id. 
498 Tickner, J.et al.,supra 494, p. 90. 
499 Rio Declaration, Article 15. 
500 Tickner, J.et al., supra 498, p. 92. 
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uncertainty is of secondary importance to the prevention of environmental damage.501 
The application of the principle is triggered by concerns over potential harm to the 
environment and not scientific uncertainty, as mentioned previously in this section. 
Therefore, according to Trouwborst, it is appropriate to say that the principle requires 
action in spite of uncertainty, and not because of it.502  This notion is inherent in or explicitly 
evident from several articulations of the principle. For instance, when there is reason to 
assume that a threat of environmental harm, preventive action should be taken ‘even 
when’ there is scientific uncertainty.503 Therefore, the principle appears to suggest that the 
threat of environmental harm should be avoided, regardless of the presence or absence 
of scientific uncertainty.504 Thus, the precautionary action is triggered not by a certain 
level of uncertainty, but by the level of potential environmental damage. 
Moreover, several formulations of the principle do not seem to choose a certain type of 
uncertainty, which appears to suggest that many kinds of uncertainty are acceptable. It 
seems rather impractical however to expect the principle to be applicable if there is a 
threat of environmental harm with any level of uncertainty. This notion would bring any 
action in the society to a standstill.505 A duty to do the impossible can never be legally 
binding,506 and zero risk is not a realistic goal, nor is it a goal of the precautionary 
principle.507It is true that uncertainty, as explained earlier, exists and is inevitable. 
However, it would be impossible for the promoter of an activity to prove with certainty 
that the activity is harmless when it might possibility have an adverse environmental 
impact. Therefore, there should be a threshold of proof beyond which the principle 
becomes applicable. Otherwise, based on the notion of precaution the principle would 
apply to any situation. This section does not only aim to demonstrate that the principle 
does not allow action under any level. It also aims to show that, as a principle of 
international environmental law, it provides certain thresholds for the level of 
uncertainty at which it becomes effective (within reasonable bounds).508 Although the 
principle applies to all types of uncertainty, is it true to say that it also applies to all levels 
                                                
501 Trouwborst, 2006, supra 119, p. 80. 
502 Id. 
503 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, article 3(2); See also: 2002 ASEAN agreement on Trans boundary haze 
pollution, precautionary measures shall be taken in the case of serious and irreversible harm to the 
environment ‘even without full scientific certainty’; the same formulation appears in several other 
instruments such as 1992 OSPAR Convention article 2(2) a, the 1997 Trilateral Wadden Sea Plan 
paragraph 8, European Commission’s Communication COM (2000) p.13, etc. 
504 Trouwborst, 2006, supra 119, p. 94. 
505  Tickner, J.et al., supra 494, p. 12.  
506 Id. p. vi. 
507 Communication COM (2000)1, supra25, pp. 9 and 18. 
508 Trouwborst, 2006, supra 119, p. 98. 
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of potential harm to the environment. Therefore, the question should not be how much 
uncertainty is required, but rather how much uncertainty is tolerable.509 This can be 
found in international and national state practices. Is there any coherent pattern? Can 
purely hypothetical threats be sufficient as a basis? Without this, the remotest possibility 
of harm would be eligible as a basis to take action. 
As there are certain thresholds for the gravity of harm (significant, serious or 
irreversible), there also exists a threshold, based on the international formulations of the 
principle, regarding the likelihood of harm. This threshold excludes certain levels of 
probability from the territory of the precautionary principle. In other words, not every 
possible environmental harm would trigger the precautionary principle. In fact, 
according to several formulations, there should be a belief that there is a threat to the 
environment for the principle to become applicable. In other words, purely hypothetical 
threats cannot trigger the precautionary action. The available evidence reflects a 
common ground among states that the precautionary principle is not applicable if there 
are no reasonable grounds.  
To conclude, decision makers can take any environmental measures at their own 
discretion, but to justify them under the precautionary principle they have to prove that 
there is a certain gravity of potential harm, and also a certain likelihood. Accordingly, 
these two elements should be considered if a state’s measure is being assessed as to 
whether it is a genuine environmental concern (under the principle). However, these 
thresholds only demonstrate an objective test. What does the application of the 
principle mean for an arbitrator, and how should the thresholds be applied in practice? 
How should they decide what is serious, significant or not significant? If we assume that 
we know what the thresholds are, the next important step is to know when they have 
been crossed. This process seems to be utterly subjective. Though some room for 
subjectivity might be expected, it needs to be narrowed down; there is no such thing as 
an authoritative manual on each of these thresholds.510  
3.3.2.3  Action 
The previous two subsections examined the first two elements of the precautionary 
principle. Without the third element, which is precautionary action, the principle would 
be meaningless.511 In other words, it is not sufficient to simply know the thresholds of 
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the triggers for the precautionary principle. It is equally important, once the threshold 
has passed, to determine what kind of actions should be taken. Does the principle 
determine what action is warranted in the case of uncertainty over potential 
environmental harm, or does it all depend on the discretion of each state? 
Effectiveness is one of the most fundamental requirements for any environmental 
policy regarding its compliance with the criteria of the precautionary principle.512 This 
means that the measure or policy should effectively safeguard the environment from 
anticipated specific harm. This requirement has also been acknowledged by tribunals, 
and by several international instruments. The tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, 
for instance, affirmed that the state should ‘act with prudence and caution to ensure that 
effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna’.513 The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in its Shehla Zia v WAPDA 
judgment, stated that ‘effective measures’ should be taken to control environmental 
threats.514 As explained by the European Commission’s Communication,  ‘the measures 
envisaged must make it possible to achieve the appropriate level of protection’.515 In 
other words, it should produce the desired outcome in protecting the environment, 
which depends on each specific situation. 
Another concept that has particular importance for the precautionary principle, besides 
effectiveness, is the principle of proportionality. A precautionary measure or policy is 
proportional when it corresponds to the probability and gravity of the risk. This allows 
the avoidance of excessive risks, and works as a counterweight to effectiveness. 
According to Trouwborst, ‘effectiveness ensures that the relevant purpose is served; 
proportionality ensures that this is all that happens and no more than that, by adjusting 
the means to the objective’.516 
It has also been argued that the thresholds of the precautionary principle are an 
expression of the idea of proportionality. The graver and more probable the risk, the 
more rigorous a measure it calls for.517 In addition, ‘action will vary in accordance with 
                                                
512 Id.  
513 Southern Bluefin Tune, ITLOS, infra 749, paragraph 77; see also: 2002 Antigua Convention Article 
5(6)(a): ‘effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. 
514 Shehla Zia v WAPDA, PLD, 1994 SC 693, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Feb 12 1994. p. 709. 
515 COM(2000)1, supra25. 
516 Trouwborst, supra 119, p. 149. 
517 Id. p. 151. 
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the severity of the risk’.518 According to the EU Commission’s Communication ‘in some 
cases a total ban may not be a proportional response to a potential risk. In other cases, it 
may be the sole possible response.’519 For instance, the long-term effects of a measure 
should be considered when evaluating proportionality, so that the immediate action 
required to prevent such risks can be counted.520 Therefore, ‘the greater the aggregate 
risk, the more rigorous the precautionary action to match it, and vice versa’. In general, 
precautionary policies or measures come in different forms. They include research, EIA, 
zoning decisions, shifting the burden of harmlessness to the proponents of potentially 
harmful activities, and – the most obviously precautionary measure –suspension. 
Depending on each situation and the risk involved, any one of these measures may 
constitute an appropriate implementation of the principle, providing that it complies 
with the requirements of effectiveness and proportionality. 521 
3.3.3 Status   
There is an unconcealed disagreement among scholars regarding the status of the 
precautionary principle. Many authors have considered it to be binding by arguing that it 
is a customary norm of international law.This view is supported by many treaties in the 
field of international law, through their choice of language. Critics do not even consider 
it as a principle, however, and categorise it as an approach, being only a political 
decision-making instruments. Some other scholars have taken a middle ground by 
considering it as a declarative norm. The resistance comes from not considering 
precaution as an obligation. All objections have attempted to prove that the principle 
does not have the necessary content to make it an obligation and therefore no legal 
consequences would follow if it is not applied. However, if its role as a non binding 
principle was recognised, and scholars efforts to prove or disprove its binding character 
were instead devoted to studying how the principle is already working and its potential, 
it would be better appreciated.  This issue is a matter of perception, and is partly due to 
the context in which it has been developed. The middle ground in this instance involves 
identifying the precautionary principle as a principle of interpretation. This does not 
create obligations of conduct for states, but regulates the manner of interpreting the 
                                                
518 Commentary to Article 7 of the 1995 Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (IUCN 
Draft Covenant), 
519 COM(2000)1, supra 25. p. 18. 
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obligations and rights that are designed to protect the environment and human health, 
creating legal uncertainty and scientific relevance.522 
This research takes a position that the precautionary principle does not necessarily need 
to gain a binding nature to fulfil its purpose. Considering, first, as a norm or standard 
under environmental law, precautionary principle, as it is, a non-binding principle under 
international law is fully capable of fulfilling its purpose. This is due to the different law-
making mechanism under environmental law and also having a task that requires 
enormous flexibility. In fact, instead of focusing on the status of the principle and 
making efforts to fit the principle in the conventional hard-law formulas, one should 
ask: what function do we want the precautionary principle to fulfil within the settlement 
of investment disputes? This question should remain at the forefront of the assessment 
of the principle’s status. 
The nature of the precaution as a principle and not rule does not diminish its impact 
and normativity. As Dworkin explains principle is: 
 a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, 
political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice 
or fairness or some other dimension of morality.523 
 
In its well-known article on ‘the Model Rues’, Dworkin differentiated between legal 
rules and legal principles and criticised the positivist approach towards making the rules 
the only source of legal obligations and suggested that: 
The law includes principles as well as rules. Some principles are binding as law and must 
be taken into account by those who make decisions of legal obligation. It however 
cannot be binding as some rules are.524 
 
In attempting to answer if the principle should be adopted based on an obligation, 
Bodansky claims that states do not have to adopt the principle, i.e. it is not an obligation. 
States do it ‘because it represents the right approach to the problem of uncertainty.525 
Moreover, the principle is not a rule, as it doesn’t govern behaviour by defining 
precisely what is permissible and what is not. It is in fact a standard, which sets forth an 
open-ended test and channels future decision making, leaving a significant part of the 
                                                
522 Di Benedetto, ‘La Funzione Interpretativa Del Principio Di Precauzione In Diritto Internazionale’. 
Unofficial  English translation. 
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decision making process to the subsequent decision maker. 526  Standards such as 
precautionary principle influence the behaviour of states, courts and the development of 
the negotiations, since they: 
do not directly guide behaviour, instead they set boundary conditions for the 
development of more precise behavioural rules. They serve to frame the debate rather 
than to govern the conduct. Although this role is more intangible and difficult to 
measure than of treaties, this does not mean that it is any less real.527 
Thus, environmental standards such as the precautionary principle make 
recommendations and not legally binding decisions; they are normative since they are 
intended to guide or influence behaviour by providing reasons for action. These 
standards are a ‘social creation and the product of identifiable norm making, thus, as a 
non-binding and soft law principle it does not represent absence of law but rather a kind 
of purgatory’.528 
To surmise, the current precautionary principle does not provide any rights or 
obligations; it provides the interpreter a new interpretation of the existing 
environmental protection instruments.529 There remains, however, the possibility that it 
might become a binding legal instrument in the future. Therefore, this study attempts to 
develop a framework for a comprehensive and analytical reconstruction of the meaning 
of the principle, and its application in the context of investment law. 
3.3.4 Functions of the Principle 
The unique characterization of the precautionary principle allows it to function both at 
the procedural and substantive level. It has been argued that the importance of the 
principle is more procedural than substantive. 530   The principle imposes certain 
procedural obligations on decision-makers. However, based on extensive analysis of the 
principle in chapter two, this research argues that the precautionary principle is not only 
an essential procedural tool in the hands of the tribunals, 531  it can also have a 
substantive role in informing their interpretation of certain obligations. Thus, both 
procedural and substantive functions of the principle will be addressed in this study.  
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3.3.4.1  Procedural :  Shi f t ing the burden o f  proof  
According to the traditional legal standards in the area of environment, and general rules 
on the burden of proof, conductors of new technologies and activities have ignorance 
on their side, therefore their activity or product is safe unless proven otherwise.532 The 
idea of setting the burden of proof and the status quo is to bring stability and 
consistency in the law.533 According to Harding and Fisher, the general rule and status 
quo in the field of environment is: 
Where scientific uncertainty exists concerning possible harmful impacts of a 
development it has traditionally been left to those suggesting harm to demonstrate its 
likelihood convincingly, rather than those carrying out the development to demonstrate 
with a high level of confidence that harm will not occur.534 
Opponents of the principle include those who are benefiting from the status quo of the 
burden of proof, which requires decisions to be based on scientific proof – to establish 
the harm and causal link convincingly. This is different from the perceived risks 
identified by the principle, which, according to them, have no sound scientific basis, 
unnecessarily paralyse innovation and are therefore ‘anti-scientific’.535 
Following  this line of argument, Ambrus has argued that the main trigger of the shift in 
the burden of proof is the inherent need to achieve fairness.536  The traditional purpose 
of the burden of proof is maintaining the status quo to bring consistency.537 This would 
result in allowing pollution in the guise of protecting the status quo, for examples. As 
Olson remarked:  
                                                
532  James Cameron, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Core Meaning, Constitutional Framework and 
Procedures for Implementation’, in Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle, Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth 
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Shifting the burden of proof does nothing more than internalize the costs, risks and 
uncertainty of hazardous products or by-products to those who have the information, 
expertise and control in the first instance.538 
Moreover, putting the burden on those that pose a threat to the environment, and 
requiring them to demonstrate safety and harmlessness, could act as an incentive to 
reduce the risks from their activities. 539  This has also been acknowledged by 
Nollkaemper, who claimed that shifting the burden would ‘induce prevention’540. 
The environment is affected by significant amount of uncertainty, and so shifting the 
burden of proof is highly determinative of the outcome of disputes.541 However, it is 
important that proving safety is proving a negative matter, which is logically impossible. 
This is the main practical criticism of changing the burden of proof in environmental 
cases.542 This problem also has been acknowledged by advocates of the change, yet their 
argument is that changing the burden is not equal to proving safety. The conductor of 
an activity is not asked for scientific proof of safety, but instead should demonstrate evidence of 
the absence of harm.543 These two concepts are completely different. In other words, safety 
can not be proven, but it is possible, and in fact a common practice, to provide some 
evidence that the proposed activity does not exceed the prearranged thresholds for 
being harmful. The idea is not a mere theoretical allegation for the shifted burden; it is 
already being applied in the field of environmental law, which corresponds to the idea 
that the precautionary principle is being applied without demanding proof of safety.544 
Fracking (hydraulic Fracturing) is one of the most recent concerns that have been raised 
in several countries.545 In the Netherlands for instance, there is currently a moratorium 
on shale gas exploration, and unless an environmental impact study is conducted, the 
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permission for exploration will not be granted.546 The Oslo commission provides another 
example of demanding the developer of a potentially harmful activity to bear the burden 
of proof. This commission established a procedure under which aircraft and ships are 
granted permission to dump waste in the sea only after they have demonstrated that a 
set of harm thresholds would not be exceeded.547 In addition, an amendment to the 
whaling commission in 1979 adopted a moratorium prohibiting whaling unless the whalers 
present sound evidence that there is no threat to the whale species concerned. Only 
then could the activity be resumed without harm. 548  Other examples include the 
undesirability of driftnets unless proven otherwise, the reverse listing of products that 
require permits for certain substances or activities that are potentially harmful, and also 
the obligation of conducting an EIA. All of these measures are inherently precautionary, 
however, it should be noted that states, in order to require evidence of harmlessness, 
should establish some reasons to suspect harm. This is to entitle the threat to be 
considered potentially harmful under the requirement of the precautionary principle. 
These examples validate the ability of precautionary principle to shift the burden, and 
show that the task is far from demanding the impossible.  
To tie this section to the main purpose of this thesis it is important to understand what 
the idea of precautionary burden shifting means in environment-related investment 
disputes. In investment disputes, the foreign investor always makes the claim and 
initiates the dispute, due to its peculiar characteristics. Therefore, host states that claim 
that an investor’s activity poses an environmental threat do not bear any burden in the 
beginning. Instead, the investor has to prove and establish a breach of an investment 
provisions. If the host state claims that a measure was adopted due to the threat of harm 
to the environment, then it has to prove that the regulation was genuine, and that there 
was a threat of potential environmental harm. In this scenario there seems to be no 
burden shifting, and each party bears the burden of establishing its claim/allegation 
(burden of production). Ergo, even if the tribunal accepts the argument by the decision 
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maker (the host state in this scenario), and acknowledges the precautionary decision-
making, the host state still has to establish a threat to the environment that triggered the 
regulation. In other words, it has to prove that it had reasonable grounds to suspect that 
there was a ‘significant’, ‘serious’ or ‘irreversible’ threat of harm to the environment.  
One could argue that shifting burdens using the precautionary principle would excuse 
the host state from proving a causal link, i.e. convincingly proving harmfulness or 
providing conclusive scientific evidence. However, the state still has to establish a threat. 
Therefore, applying the principle does not shift the burden, but instead lowers the 
threshold. This makes it easier for the respondent to prove that its measure has been 
fair and equitable, or nondiscriminatory etc. This demonstrates the principle’s potential 
capacity to act as a balanced tool, one that not only allocates the burden of proof 
according to fairness and recognizes the vulnerability of the environment, but also sets a 
threshold for implementation, and requires the applicant of the principle to meet the 
threshold.  
Consequently, many assumptions that were made by the foreign investors in the second 
chapter could be affected by application of this principle.549 There are several arguments 
that foreign investors have claimed to be illegitimate regulatory measures, and therefore 
breaches of investment treaties. One example is an argument concerning an 
environmental permit that was not extended by the authorities. If there are reasonable 
grounds for concern that its activity poses significant, serious or irreversible harm to the 
environment, which is based on scientific information but not scientifically proven, 
there is not an immediate causal link between the harm and the activity. In addition, if 
the community protested against development when it felt the threat, they are in fact 
recognized in environmental law under the precautionary principle. 
Therefore, if the host state proves existence of a threat to the environment, previous 
scenarios could be justified under the principle. At this stage, when the treat of harm is 
established, the burden is on the foreign investor to prove that its action is not harmful 
to the environment if it wants to prove the violation of investment standards. 
Therefore, even if the burden to prove harm may have shifted, the burden to prove the 
existence of a threat still lies with the host state.550According to Scott, the idea that the 
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burden may not be shifted according to precautionary principle is only created by our 
‘imagination’, and there is no such limitation in law.551 
Recent dissatisfaction with the design of risk assessment, chiefly in the area of the 
environment, has caused rejection of the idea that all scientific certainties are reliable 
and controllable.552 In other words, the idea of a world that is ‘determinate (ultimately 
knowable) and probabilistic (calculable)’ has been widely rejected.553 As a result, the 
precautionary principle has emerged as a response to the limitations of science and the 
ways it is applied to environmental issues.554 Its advocates argue that if we are ignorant, 
why should this work against the environment. Instead the benefit of doubt should be 
granted to the environment. Moreover, permissive environmental regulation is no 
longer desirable or effective, since it cannot address the inherent uncertainty and 
indeterminacy of scientific studies. ‘Rigorous science’ recognizes the need to take 
uncertainty into account. However it is not only for the scientists and decision makers 
to acknowledge this fact but also for the judiciary. As stated by M'Gonigle et al: 
The judiciary must be more cognizant of the implications of scientific uncertainty in 
order to respond realistically and imaginatively to problems of causation. Reallocating 
the burden of proof from the environmental management agencies or public to the 
polluter, and setting appropriate standards of proof, are important ways to begin.555 
Strong precaution is often associated with the placement of the burden of proof. 556 A 
critique of the principle mentioned that shifting the burden of proof towards the 
manufactures is like ‘demanding a new-born baby prove that it will never grow up to be 
a serial killer…’ and that zero risk is ‘unattainable’, ‘undesirable’. It is also important to 
remember that safe is not equivalent to risk-free. 557  While some versions of the 
precautionary principle have been argued to shift the burden of proof from the 
opponent of the activity (with potential threats to the environment) to the conductor of 
the activity, there is no consensus over this particular issue. This is because the shift of 
burden argues that proving safety is proving negative, and is therefore logically 
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impossible.558 In other words, it would be impossible to prove that going forward with 
an activity will cause no harm or no risk, since zero risk does not exist. The advocates of 
this power of the principle argue that it is required for effective management of the 
environment.559 According to Di Benedetto, the argument of zero risk falls into a kind 
of new positivism of backward-looking matrixes. This means that giving legal weight to 
each uncertain risk would return to the paradox of a new legal certainty, according to 
which any doubt leads to inaction. Therefore, instead of the reverse burden, a more 
nuanced position would be that the precautionary principle implies alleviating the 
burden of proof, which is still in the hands of those who claim that there is a risk. This 
is a convincing reconstruction, which fully enhances the element of scientific 
uncertainty without upsetting the classic procedural structure. In this way the 
precautionary principle, as a new way of thinking, affects the content of the evidence 
that must be taken, and opens the legal experience to the understanding of human 
limitations in knowing clearly the effects of new technologies.560 
Moreover, EU case law has also touched upon the application of the principle in 
procedural matters such as the burden of proof. In the practice of EU laws there are 
ample instances of the special burden of proof, as apposed to the general one, and 
shifting the evidentiary requirement in favour of the environmental caution 561 . 
Furthermore, the precautionary burden of proof has also found its way into the 
jurisprudence of the EU.562 
In the Pfizer case, for instance, the company who was affected by the regulation 
requested the community to provide ‘proof of the reality or the seriousness of the risks’ 
in the contested product.563 The court rejected the claim, and stated that it is adequate 
for the community to demonstrate that it has conducted ‘as thorough a scientific risk 
assessment as possible’. Based on this it had ‘sufficient scientific indications’ to 
conclude, on an ‘objective’ scientific basis, that the use of the contested product 
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constituted a risk to human health.564 The court further explained that in agricultural 
policy there exists a wide discretion for the public authority to decide on the ‘objectives 
to be pursued and choice of the appropriate means of action’.565 In addition, this also 
determines the level of risk deemed unacceptable for society. 566  Therefore, when 
institutions are required to provide a scientific risk assessment and to ‘evaluate highly 
complex scientific and technical facts’,567 the judicial review is limited to finding out 
whether there has been a ‘manifest error’, a ‘misuse of powers’ or the institutions have 
clearly ‘exceeded the bounds of their discretion’.568 The Community judicature, thus, is 
not entitled to substitute its assessment of the facts for that of the Community 
institutions.569  
The ECJ was asked for a preliminary ruling regarding the interpretation of a provision in 
the Bird’s Directive.570 One of the questions concerned whether the Directive allowed 
national authorities to fix the closing date for hunting.571 The ECJ decided that the 
directive does not empower the authorities for such action unless the concerned member 
state can demonstrate, based on scientific and technical data relevant to each individual 
case, that the closing dates for hunting do not impede the complete protection of the 
species of bird affected.572 The influence of the principle in interpreting the directive’s 
provision and the shift in the burden of proof was later the main factor of the court’s 
interpretation on the Waddenzee case in 2004.573 In this case, the ECJ applied a reversal 
of the burden of proof as there was doubt regarding the environmental effects of the 
project. They achieved this by requiring the applicants to demonstrate that no harm 
would be caused under the Habitat Directive. The Court held that a risk of significant 
effects to the mechanical fishery on the area exists if ‘it cannot be excluded on the basis 
of objective information that the plan or project will have significant effects on the site 
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concerned.’574 The Court recognized the need for the shift of the general evidentiary 
requirement, and interpreted that:  
in the light of the site's conservation objectives, are to authorize such an activity only if 
they have made certain that it will not adversely affect the integrity of that site, that 
being the case if there remains no reasonable scientific doubt as to the absence of such 
effects.575  
3.3.4.2  Substant ive :  Guiding Interpretat ion 
The present study’s argument to apply precautionary principle through its substantive 
function is linked to treaty interpretation. It recognized that, in light of the open-
textured nature of the various substantive standards provided in an investment treaty, 
the identification of the ‘object and purpose’ of investment treaties represents a crucial 
element in imparting meaning to these standards.576 This also acts as a relevant principle 
of international law applicable between the parties.  
Chapter four is devoted to analyzing how different courts and tribunals have addressed 
the precautionary principle. The purpose of this section, however, is not to identify how 
other tribunals had used the principle in using the same reasoning for interpreting 
investment provision. This is simply not realistic, due to the completely different 
context of the disputes, the constitution of the tribunals, the different objectives and 
specifically the different role for the precautionary principle in each of the tribunals in 
the following chapter. Instead, the idea is to examine the potential applicability of the 
principle by building on its core elements, which are identified in the present chapter 
and complemented by the next chapter on jurisprudence. Thus, the chapter four is an 
extension of the analytical framework, and analyses the jurisprudence on the 
precautionary principle. It concludes by synthesizing both chapters and introducing the 
‘precautionary test’ as its outcome. 
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4 The precautionary principle in international case law 
4.1  Introduct ion  
Chapter three addressed the peculiarities of the environmental concerns, and the ways 
in which these concerns are addressed under environmental law. However, it left open 
the practice of courts, and how the precautionary principle has been applied in dispute 
settlement. This chapter can therefore be seen as a continuation, as it further develops 
the characterization of the principle extracted from jurisprudence. In addition, the 
analysis is an important step in the study of the interpretative function of the 
precautionary principle, which will be discussed in chapter five of this study. It has been 
argued that tribunals that are assigned to settle environment-related investment disputes 
should be aware of these processes when evaluating the legitimacy of policies and 
measures. Moreover, the previous chapter discussed the emergence of the precautionary 
principle as an instrument to respond to the uncertainty of science in addressing 
environmental problems.577 This chapter aims to extract how the precautionary principle 
and its core elements operate in practice to assist courts and tribunals in evaluating 
states’ environmental policies. In addition, the chapter features a close analysis of the 
decisions, which demonstrates how the same line of thinking could be incorporated by 
the investment tribunals. This mostly concerns decisions in which precautionary 
thinking played a role in settling the dispute, regardless of whether it was explicitly 
mentioned. 
This chapter will also closely scrutinize the decisions of four different international 
courts and tribunals, including the decisions by European Union courts, the 
International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and 
dispute settlement bodies under the World Trade Organization Agreement. There are 
other tribunals who may have faced disputed that the precautionary principle could be 
relevant. However, these four tribunals are selected firstly because of the cluster of 
important cases dealing with the issue of precautionary principle that might have been 
raised by the parties or referred to by the tribunals. On the other hand, in majority of 
these cases, there is a tension between economic interests and environmental protection 
that make the principle relevant and also could provide a background to the issues 
raised under this thesis that is environment related investment disputes. 
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 The purpose of looking into these cases is to find out how the contending parties to 
the disputes have invoked the precautionary principle. It is also important to observe 
whether and how the dispute settlement bodies have implemented the principle. 
4.2  EU Jurisprudence  
The European Union (EU) has emerged as the ‘global leader in international 
environmental politics’ during the past two decades.578 Therefore, it has taken the lead in 
developing its standards in regulatory policies. As a result of this initiation, the EU has 
established a solid platform in the EC Treaty, particularly for application of the 
precautionary principle.  This has granted the adjudicatory system the power to 
elaborate on these standards. Through this exercise, the EU has now built up a 
‘reservoir of credibility’ in the area of precautionary principle. 579 
Article 174 of the EC Treaty lays down the precautionary principle, among other 
principles of environmental law, and calls for the Community policies to comply with 
some of the main international environmental principles. It reads as follows: 
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection into 
account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be 
based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be 
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the 
polluter should pay.580 
This article is the sole treaty provision embodying the precautionary principle. The 
provision was proclaimed among other environmental principles, but was not defined. 
This might be because the application of this principle is very contextual, due to the 
wide range of policies that it could address.581 Therefore, the European Commission has 
produced a document as a guideline for decision-makers to fill the gap and further 
clarify and operationalize the precautionary principle.582 It provides information on how 
the Community applies the principle when it comes to making decisions and taking 
action, or to controlling the risk. According to the Communication, precaution is a risk 
management tool, and is part of the risk analysis framework. Although the 
Communication represents a soft law instrument, it is not devoid of legal effects. In 
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fact, the Court of First Instance (CFI) recognized the legal consequences of the 
Communications in the form of guidelines, and stated that the court will define whether 
the disputed measure ‘is consistent with the guidelines that the institutions have laid down 
for themselves by adopting and publishing such communications’.583 
Examining the principle in the EU is important not merely for its inclusion in the main 
treaty and the secondary law, but primarily for the case law regarding its use. This has 
complemented the principle by attempting to define and set a practical threshold for its 
application in numerous cases. The principle has not been defined, and is also not given 
a threshold, in the treaty text provided in the Communication. Instead, the decision 
makers and the courts are left to flesh out the content of the principle. Its scope, to 
some extent, depends on social and political factors in a cases-by-case basis.584 
Nevertheless, even within the EU system, the principle is still an area for controversy. It 
has raised questions among scholars as to whether the principle is a general principle of 
community law. Some contend that it is merely a limited sector-specific principle, which 
is only applicable in environmental policy. Furthermore, there is debate as to whether its 
application is only limited to the community institutions, according to the wording of 
the treaty provision.585 This section, however, will focus more on how EU case law has 
expanded the application and operationalization of the principle by elaborating on its 
content.  
After the Maastricht Treaty the principle was raised up to the same status of other 
environmental principles in article 174 (2). This article forces the institutions to base 
their environmental policies and decisions on principles drawn from international 
environmental law.586 Its broad scope and ‘autonomous character’, according to case 
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law, enables the principle to act as a general principle of community law.587 In fact, the 
extension of its application as an environmental principle to the protection of human 
health is a testament of its generality and autonomous character. 
Due to its lack of definition in the legislative texts of the EU, the judicial body is left to 
define the content and criteria for the application of the principle.588 Cases that have 
been brought before the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) and the General 
Court (hereinafter GC) have allowed the application of the principle to be reviewed.589 
The cases below explain how the principle has been elucidated and broken down into 
more precise legal obligation through the interpretations made by the EU courts. EU 
case law has been carving out the implementation of the principle.  
Be that as it may, different factors might influence the approach of the courts in 
adopting either a narrow or broad interpretation of the precautionary principle. On the 
one hand, it is important to be cognizant of whether a dispute concerns health or 
protects the environment.590 Also, it is important to understand whether the claimant is 
an individual, a member state or the Commission.591  These factors are important in 
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understanding that the application of the precautionary principle might differ according 
to the nature of the dispute and the parties involved. 
When settling cases on health and environmental protection, European courts are 
mostly asked to weigh the measures against the economic consequences that they 
might cause. Therefore, EU case law provides evidence as to how the precautionary 
principle could play a key role in tipping the balance between the two interests.592 In any 
case, according to Article 30 of the EC Treaty,593 and case law, the measure should 
correspond to the general interest, here the protection of the environment. It also 
should not impose an intolerable interference with the very substance of the guaranteed 
rights.594  
In the Danish bees case for instance, the ECJ ruled in favor of the prohibition by the 
Danish government on the import of any species of bee other than the endemic 
subspecies, the brown bee, on the Danish island of Laeso.595 The measure involved a 
prohibition on importation, and thus had an equivalent effect contrary to Article 30 of 
the Treaty. Danish authorities could not establish conclusively the nature of the 
particular sub-species, nor could they determine its risk of extinction. Nevertheless, the 
measure was justified by the ECJ under article 30 EC.596 The Court considered that: 
Measures to preserve an indigenous animal population with distinct characteristics 
contribute to the maintenance of biodiversity by ensuring the survival of the population 
concerned. By so doing, they are aimed at protecting the life of those animals and are 
capable of being justified under Article 36 of the Treaty.597 
This could be an instance in which the precautionary principle has assisted the courts in 
justifying the measures, which were imposed to protect the environment to the 
detriment of certain economic rights. The principle has helped to reduce the hurdle of 
conclusive scientific evidence for the EC and member states.  
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In the Toolex case, the Swedish authorities banned a chemical substance, 
Trichloroethylene, which was claimed to be against the EU harmonization standards.598 
The measure caused economic restrictions by obstructing the free movement of the 
product in the market.599 This case is significant because the court did not explicitly 
mention the precautionary principle, but did recognize the anticipatory action by the 
decision maker in the case of scientific uncertainty. It also justified the ban on the 
grounds of protection of human health, under article 30 EC. It held that ‘taking account 
of the latest medical research on the subject, and also the difficulty of establishing the 
threshold above which exposure to trichloroethylene poses a serious health risk to 
humans, given the present state of the research’.600 Moreover, the court considered that 
it was impossible to argue that the adopted measure goes beyond the requirements of 
necessity. They therefore found it to be compatible as long as it is effective, and stated 
that the measure was necessary to effectively protect health and the environment, 
despite the uncertainty.601 In this case, Advocate-General Mischo affirmed that the 
genuine and recognized dangerous nature of the product eliminated the possibility of 
any disguised restriction of trade. 602  Indeed, the ECJ made a rather restrictive 
interpretation of the EU regulation in this case. 
The Nationale Raad case  was referred by Belgium to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling 
regarding a regulation. This included the prohibition of the commercial use of 
specimens and the restrictions it imposed on the free movement of goods. 603 The Court 
ruled that: 
Where it proves impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of the 
risk envisaged because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the 
results of the studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to human or animal 
health or to the environment persists should the risk materialize, the precautionary 
principle justifies the adoption of restrictive measures. 604 
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Therefore, the precautionary principle justified the restrictive measure, provided that 
‘such prohibitions or restrictions do not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States’.605 
Case law has also clarified the thresholds for the application of the principle, which 
were not specified in the EC Treaty or the secondary laws. The Pfizer case is probably 
the most significant instance in which the ECJ set a clear threshold for application of 
the principle. This threshold has since been followed in subsequent decisions. The 
producer of an antibiotic challenged the disputed regulation on grounds that the 
precautionary principle had not been properly employed. The use of their product had 
been banned in animal feedstuffs by the EC council in 1998. To assess whether the 
measure in question was properly based on the principle, the ECJ ruled that: 
A preventive measure may be taken only if the risk, although the reality and extent 
thereof have not been ‘fully’ demonstrated by conclusive scientific evidence, appears 
nevertheless to be adequately backed up by the scientific data available at the time when the 
measure was taken.606 
The Court went further by setting a minimum threshold, below which the principle 
could not be invoked, and clarified that: 
The precautionary principle can therefore apply only in situations in which there is a 
risk, notably to human health, which, although it is not founded on mere hypotheses 
that have not been scientifically confirmed, has not yet been fully demonstrated.607 
It can be seen from the above statements that the principle cannot be based on a ‘purely 
hypothetical approach to the risk’ or on ‘mere conjecture which has not been 
scientifically verified’. It should instead be ‘adequately backed up by the scientific data 
available’ at the time of making the decision, even if, ‘the reality and extent thereof have 
not been fully demonstrated by conclusive scientific evidence’.608 
The court in the Waddenzee case ruled in its precautionary reasoning that the requirement 
to conduct an EIA is still essential even if there is a ‘mere probability’ of harm and not 
‘definitely significant effects’.609 This defined the trigger point for protection under 
article 6.3 of the ‘habitat directive’, which lowered the threshold and allowed the 
authorities to consider uncertain risks in the criteria for risk assessment. 
In the Nationale Raad case, the court held that the risk assessment should be based on 
the ‘most reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of international 
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research’. If certainty was impossible, due to the ‘insufficiency, inconclusiveness or 
imprecision’ of science and there still was a ‘likelihood of real harm’, then it ruled that 
the measure was justified by the precautionary principle.610 
In the Toolex case, the court, in determining the legitimacy of the measure adopted by 
the member state, took into account ‘the latest medical research on the subject’ and 
acknowledged the member state’s concern regarding the danger of the substance to 
human health:  
Taking account of the latest medical research on the subject, and also the difficulty of 
establishing the threshold above which exposure to trichloroethylene poses a serious 
health risk to humans, given the present state of the research, there is no evidence in 
this case to justify a conclusion by the Court that national legislation such as that at 
issue in the case in the main proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objective in view.’611 
As per the Council's duty to take scientific data into account, the court in the Mondiet 
case acknowledged the wide discretionary power of the council in the application of the 
common agricultural policy. It stated that the judicial review must: 
Be limited to examining whether the measure in question is vitiated by a manifest error 
or misuse of powers, or whether the authority in question has manifestly exceeded the 
limits of its discretion.612 
The court put a threshold for the discretion granted to the decision makers in the case 
Commission v. Netherlands, however. It ruled: 
That discretion relating to the protection of public health is particularly wide where it is 
shown that uncertainties continue to exist in the current state of scientific research as to 
certain substances.613  
4.2.1 Tests  
This section looks into some remarkable and different tests that courts have mostly 
applied when operationalizing the precautionary principle. Namely, these are 
‘proportionality’, risk assessment’ and the principle’s role as ‘an interpretative tool’. 
Proportionality 
As explained in chapter three, along with the elements of environmental harm and 
uncertainty, the precautionary action is also important. A precautionary measure to 
protect the environment from potential damage is evidently required to be effective and 
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proportional. The ECJ has emphasised the importance of proportionality in the 
implementation of the principle on several different occasions. 
In Commission v Netherlands, which concerned the prohibition imposed by the 
Netherlands on the marketing of fortified foodstuffs, the court recognized the right for 
the member states, in the absence of harmonization law, to choose their level of 
protection. However, they stated that this discretion should comply with the 
proportionality principle, and that the measures must be: 
Confined to what is actually necessary to ensure the safeguarding of public health; they 
must be proportional to the objective thus pursued, which could not have been attained 
by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade.614 
Accordingly, a strict interpretation is required, since protecting public health and the 
environment under Article 36 of the treaty is an exception to the general rule of the free 
movement of goods. National authorities have to demonstrate, in light of international 
scientific evidence, the necessity of adopting a restrictive measure.615 In addition, these 
measures must be based on a ‘detailed assessment of risk’ if they invoke article 36.616 To 
review the risk assessment, a national authority has to ‘appraise the degree of probability 
of harmful effects’.617 The court must then consider the uncertainty of the risk and 
include the possibility of the ‘future effects’ and ‘cumulative effects’ in the risk 
assessment. It can then promote a precautionary risk assessment.618 Therefore, if the 
national authority can demonstrate that a measure is necessary, based on the possibility 
of the future effects, then the measure is considered to be proportional and legitimate.  
The court In the Nationale Raad case acknowledged that proportionality, under Article 
30 EC, requires the restrictive measures to be confined to ‘what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of protection being legitimately pursued’.619 However, it held that when 
applying the principle of proportionality, it is also necessary to ‘take into account the 
specific nature of the species concerned’. Therefore, it concluded that if one member 
state imposed a less stringent measure than another member state, this does not imply 
that the latter’s measure is disproportionate.620 Following this statement, it recognized 
the right for member states to choose their own level of protection, and held that:  
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Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that adopted by 
another Member State cannot affect the appraisal as to the need for and proportionality 
of the provisions adopted.621 
The court further stated that it could not decide on the proportionality of the measure, 
since deciding on whether a measure is least restrictive, in this case ‘requires a specific 
analysis on the basis, inter alia, of the various applicable provisions, previous practice and 
scientific studies’. This was a matter for the national courts to decide.622 In this fashion, 
the court narrowly interpreted the principle of proportionality, and the necessity test, in 
favour of the environmental concerns. 
In a similar manner, the Court in the Waddenzee case interpreted the restrictive measure 
of the member state in light of the principle, and held that ‘a less stringent authorization 
criterion than that in question could not as effectively ensure the fulfillment of the 
objective of site protection intended under that provision’.623  
This line of reasoning, in which the proportionality of the measure was not simply 
assessed against its economic impact, also has a bearing on environment-related 
investment disputes. In general, the protection of the environment is an exception to 
free trade under the EU law. Accordingly, a court has to decide whether a measure 
intended to protect the environment meets the criteria to be excepted from trade 
restrictive measures. Nevertheless, when evaluating a measure’s proportionality courts 
should not only ask whether a measure is proportional to the impact it has caused on 
trade, but should also take into account the nature of environmental harm that is being 
prevented. One could draw an analogy between the task of ECJ and investment 
tribunals, in the sense that they both have to assess whether a measure to protect the 
environment is proportional. Therefore, when deciding whether a host state’s measure 
to prevent a potential harm is proportional, tribunals could also take into account the 
nature of the specific environmental danger, instead of focusing only on the ‘charge and 
weight imposed on the foreign investor’.624 
 
Risk assessment 
In EU case law, risk assessment is defined as a tool to assess the degree of probability of 
harm.625 Conducting a risk assessment prior to carrying out health and environmental 
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measures in the EU is crucial. However, despite the WTO, it is not regarded as an 
exclusive basis of precautionary action. By way of explanation, in general, measures have 
to be based on risk assessment, however, if the decision maker justifies that the measure 
was taken according to the public interest or other social or political concerns, that is in 
the realm of risk management, the result of the risk assessment could be disregarded. 
Regarding the risk assessment, the court from the Pfizer case held that in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, ‘risk assessment cannot be required to provide the Community 
institutions with conclusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the 
seriousness of the potential adverse effects were that risk to become a reality’.626  The 
court acknowledged that when the precautionary principle is applied, it may prove 
impossible to carry out a full risk assessment due to the ‘inadequate nature of the 
available scientific data’, since it requires ‘long and detailed scientific research’.627 A 
decision maker or public authority should not wait for a full risk assessment to take 
preventive measures ‘at very short notice if necessary, when such measures appear 
essential given the level of risk to human health which the authority has deemed 
unacceptable for society’.628 However, the precautionary measure cannot also be based 
on a purely hypothetical approach,629 and it should be taken only:  
If the risk, although the reality and extent thereof have not been ‘fully’ demonstrated by 
conclusive scientific evidence, appears nevertheless to be adequately backed up by the 
scientific data available at the time when the measure was taken.630 
Accordingly, the Court, introduced a step-by-step basis towards a risk assessment with a 
precautionary approach based on the guidelines provided under the Communication. It 
took this approach to answer the question on how the decision maker should define its 
accepted level of risk. The court also stated that to determine the acceptable level of 
risk, the level of protection appropriate for the society should first be defined. This 
could be a possibility threshold for the adverse effects that is no longer acceptable by 
the society and beyond that point that the decision maker. Here, the Community has to 
take a preventive measure in the face of scientific uncertainty. Nevertheless, the 
seriousness of the case has to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
the ‘severity’, ‘persistency’, ‘reversibility’ and the ‘possibility’ of the delayed effects.631 To 
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decide on this, the Court asserted that the decision maker should take into account the 
political objectives that it is pursuing.632  
In the Commission v. Netherlands case, the principle was invoked by the member state 
when justifying the rejection of the manufacturers’ application, which was to add 
nutrient to foodstuffs. When reviewing the Netherlands’ decision on the basis of the 
precautionary principle, the court affirmed that according to the case law, decisions have 
to be made according to an in-depth risk assessment.633 However, the court allowed the 
authorities to enjoy discretion as regards the public’s need for the nutrient in foodstuffs, 
which was ‘not part of the assessment of risk for public health’.634 When affirming that 
the risk assessment was necessary, the court demonstrated that this could not the only 
grounds for the decision. They determined that the decision maker’s other social/non-
science-based concerns should also be taken into account.635 In the same vein, AG 
Maduro affirmed that member states should have discretion regarding decisions that are 
taken based on scientific assessment, and that recourse to the principle should not only 
be based on the risk assessment. The policy dimension of defining the acceptable level 
of risk should also be taken into account. A review of case law has acknowledged that 
community decisions may be different from the finding of the scientific assessment.636 
In the National Raad case, the court ruled that the authority, which adopted the 
restrictive measure to protect the species, was required to conduct a risk assessment 
based on the available scientific evidence.637 The court also ruled that if, because of the 
‘insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision’, it was impossible to be certain about the 
risks, but the ‘likelihood of real harm persists if the risk materialized’, the principle still 
justified adopting the restrictive measure.638 Therefore, although the risk assessment is a 
requirement under EU law and jurisprudence, states have leeway in choosing how much 
risk society is willing to accept. 
The implication of this analysis was to demonstrate that in the context of EU case law, 
the precautionary principle is placed beyond the risk assessment requirement. The latter 
cannot encompass all the factors that are required to prevent and manage a potential 
environmental harm. 
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Precautionary principle as an interpretative tool 
Courts have implemented the principle to evaluate the legitimacy of measures taken in 
the face of scientific uncertainty when protecting the environment and human health. 
The principle has been used in the capacity that it was given under the Article 130r 
Treaty, namely, to interpret obligations. 
The Mondiet case represents an instance in which the court made use of the principle, 
implicitly, to interpret the provisions of the legislation.639 The case involved a challenge 
to the legality of Council Regulation on the conservation of fishery resources, which was 
adopted in the face of uncertainty. The regulation imposed a limitation on the use of 
driftnets larger than 2.5 km, to protect cetaceans.640 Mondiet, the ship owner, challenged 
the ban by claiming that no scientific data justified this measure, and that it did not 
conform to the only information available stipulated in the article two of the Regulation. 
This article stipulated that ‘the conservation measure should be in view of the 
information that was available’.641 The Court held that the provision didn’t require the 
institutions to adopt the measure ‘consistent with the scientific advice’, and stated that if 
they were inconclusive it should not prevent the institution from taking necessary 
measures to achieve the ‘objectives of the common fisheries policy’.642 Therefore, the 
institutions should not be forced to follow a particular scientific opinion.643 In this case, 
the concept of the precautionary principle played an important role in justifying the 
secondary legislation in the face of uncertainty, although it was not explicitly mentioned.  
In Greenpeace, a case regarding marketing approval for genetically modified maize, was 
brought before the ECJ for preliminary ruling. This case is another example of 
implementing the principle to interpret the secondary rules. The question was whether, 
among other things, the member state was obliged to give consent to a company 
allowing the product to be placed in the market. The precautionary principle was 
reflected in the directive for the requirement of a risk assessment, notifying other 
member states of new information regarding the risks and the rights of the member 
state. Specifically, this case concerned the state’s right to restrict or prohibit the use of 
the product in its territory when it had justifiable reasons to consider that it constituted 
a risk to human health or the environment. According to the court, these requirements 
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by the law necessarily implied that the ‘member state could not be obliged to grant an 
authorization if it had received new information in the meantime which led it to 
consider that the product may constitute a risk to human health or the environment’.644 
De Sadeleer suggested that ‘the court’s decision demonstrated that the Directive should 
be interpreted in such a way that would give full weight to the environmental 
protection. In this sense the principle appears capable of modifying the meaning’ of a 
text in favor of the environment.645 In this context, the precautionary principle was used 
as an interpretative tool, and by this reasoning, the economic restrictions imposed by 
the measures were justified by its notion. The court ruled that the precautionary 
principle was already reflected in the Directive by the requirement to give notice when 
facing a risk. It was also reflected in the right to restrict or prohibit the trade of a 
hazardous product. 646  Therefore, the national authority was allowed to take the 
provisional measure in question. 
The court in the Pfizer case also used the principle to interpret the duty contained in 
Article 129(1) of the EC Treaty to ensure a high level of human health protection. It 
held that the community is not required to ‘wait for the adverse effects… to 
materialize’, and is: 
Entitled to take a preventive measure…even though, owing to existing scientific 
uncertainty, the reality and the seriousness of the risks to human health associated with 
that use were not yet fully apparent.647 
Moreover, the court considered the complexity of the issue and the uncertainties 
surrounding it. It stated that public authorities should ensure that decisions are taken in 
the light of the best scientific information available, and should also use the most recent 
results of international research.648 
In the Waddenzee case, the Netherlands’ State Council sought interpretation of the 
Habitats Directive from the Court.649 According to this Directive, any project that is 
‘likely to have a significant effect’ should be subject to an EIA. This is done to assess 
and ensure that the project’s safety is in line with the site’s conservation objectives. The 
court ruled that authorities were to authorize the plan only if the applicant could prove 
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that the project ‘would not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned’. The 
national authority referred some questions to ECJ regarding, inter alia, the requirements 
to recognize the likelihood of significant adverse effects, and also when it should be 
considered significant. When responding, the court used the principle as an 
interpretative tool to look at the obligations under the Directive, here the EIA, by 
holding that: 
In the light, in particular, of the precautionary principle, which is one of the 
foundations of the high level of protection pursued by Community policy on the 
environment, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Art.174 (2) EC, and by 
reference to which the Habitats Directive must be interpreted, such a risk exists if it 
cannot be excluded on the basis of objective information that the plan or project will 
have significant effects on the site concerned.650 
According to the court, such an interpretation contributed to achieving the main aim of 
the Directive, which is ‘ensuring biodiversity through the conservation of natural 
habitats and of wild fauna and flora.’651 In this way, the court contended that the 
authorization system ‘integrated’ the precautionary principle and made it possible to 
effectively prevent adverse effects to the protected sites.652 The court also concluded 
that a less stringent measure would not have effectively ensured the fulfillment of the 
objectives of the directive.653Accordingly, by adopting a precautionary thinking, the 
court lowered the threshold for conducting a risk assessment. It stated that article 6(3) 
does not presume that the activity has adverse effect on the environment but the mere 
probability of having such effect will trigger the application of the article.654 
 
In Denmark and European Parliament v. Commission,655 the Commission granted a general 
exemption of the use of a hazardous chemical substance in electrical equipment. The 
exemption was challenged by the European parliament and Denmark before the ECJ, 
on the grounds that granting the exemption was not perusing the main objective of the 
directive. 656 In addition, the granting of the exception did not meet its conditions, which 
showed that the prohibition of products should be ‘only in accordance with the carefully 
defined condition’. 657 The court stated that:  
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Such an objective, in compliance with Article 152 EC, according to which a high level 
of human health protection is to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
Community policies and activities, and in compliance with Article 174(2) EC, according 
to which Community policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection 
and is based on the principles of precaution and preventive action justifies the strict 
interpretation of the conditions for exemption. 658 
Therefore, the precautionary principle was not applied by the Court as grounds for the 
annulment, but was instead used as an interpretative tool to support the strict 
interpretation. 
To sum up, although the definition of the principle is rather general, and is only 
applicable in certain areas, European case law has clarified a great deal of vagueness in 
this regard. EU case law has extended the application of the precautionary principle 
from environmental field to other fields of the decision making, in particular, health and 
food safety. It has also designed a general framework for the implementation of the 
principle in the law, by clarifying the definition of the principle.659 EU courts have 
attempted in several instances to define the precautionary principle, which has shaped 
its general meaning and content. These attempts have frequently been cited by 
subsequent decisions. The case law definition reads as follows: 
Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, 
protective measures may be taken without having to wait until the reality and 
seriousness of those risks become fully apparent.660  
In addition to contributing to the applicable framework of the precautionary principle, 
EU case law demonstrate a model for employing the principle as an interpretative tool 
to ensure a high level of environmental protection.  
4.3  ICJ case  law  
The initial concern for protecting the environment in the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has been narrowly focused on the consequences, and on preventing the 
transboundary harm. This concern is as opposed to the idea of protecting the 
environment as an international common good to be preserved by all states.661 The 
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origin of this legal conception can mainly be found in the famous Trail Smelter case.662 
Nevertheless, this narrow conception of environmental protection needs to be changed, 
due to the fact that the environment has an intrinsic value that must be protected, 
irrespective of whether or not a neighbor state is injured.663 The following cases brought 
before the ICJ demonstrate instances in which the contending parties invoked the 
precautionary principle. The crucial fact is that although the Court has not expressly 
applied the principle, it has never refuted its existence. 
 
Nuclear Test cases 
The Nuclear Test case was brought by New Zealand and Australia in 1973 against France 
for its attempt to conduct atmospheric nuclear testing. Australia and New Zealand 
requested for a provisional measure and a permanent ban to stop France from 
conducting nuclear tests, which were causing radioactive fallout on Australian and New 
Zealand territory.664 Both claimants insisted that under contemporary international law, 
states planning to conduct activities with the potential to harm the environment have to 
take the burden of proving the safety of those activities. This demonstrates a 
precautionary approach. The court noted the French statement that the radioactive 
matter and any fallout had never posed any danger to the population’s health, however 
it did not give its opinion on the merits, and rejected the request for a provisional 
measure since the nuclear testing had allegedly come to an end.665 The claimants raised 
the question of the precautionary principle, but it was only briefly mentioned in a 
dissenting opinion. In his dissenting opinion on the Nuclear test II, Judge Weeramantry 
argued that the principle was already relevant to New Zealand in its original application, 
and that the court should have considered it.666 
The court included a provision in its judgment in an innovative manner, according to 
which ‘if the basis of this judgment were to be affected, the applicant could request an 
examination of the situation’.667 Judge Weeramantry’s later dissenting opinion on the 
Nuclear test II, argued the judgment to be a ‘precautionary provision’, which the court 
included in the judgment when France unilaterally declared that it would discontinue the 
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atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.668 He noted that the court enabled New 
Zealand to come before the court again, by making a ‘procedural innovation’, although 
it was convinced that New Zealand had achieved its objectives and its rights had been 
protected. 669 In his words, the court: 
Considered the protection of New Zealand's rights to be so fundamental that it 
reinforced New Zealand's protections by inserting the precautionary provision that if 
the basis of the Judgment should be affected, New Zealand may approach the Court 
again670… It was a procedural innovation by the court.671 
After twenty years, in 1995, France decided to conduct underground nuclear testing. 
The parties attempted to reopen the case based on the section of the previous judgment 
in Nuclear Test I. 672 New Zealand argued that France was under an obligation to 
conduct an EIA prior to the nuclear testing, and also had to ‘provide evidence’ 
according to the ‘precautionary principle’, as a widely accepted principle in 
contemporary international law, that such an activity would not introduce radioactive 
materials to the marine environment.673 
The majority decided that the previous judgment regarded atmospheric tests, whereas 
the current case regarded an underground nuclear test. Therefore, without entering to 
the merit phase, the court regarded the cases as a new claim, and therefore dismissed 
New Zealand’s request. Regardless of this fact, the dissenting opinions that followed the 
order provided some valuable assertions on the directions that the court might have 
taken, had it been able to hear the case.  Judge Korma questioned the court’s decision, 
and affirmed that based on the weight of the evidence and the seriousness of the matter 
concerning the ‘cumulative effect of underground testing’, 674  New Zealand had 
established ‘a prima facie case’ for the Court to consider and grant a provisional order.675 
In addition, although not explicitly referring to the principle, he asserted that ‘under 
contemporary international law, there is probably a duty not to cause gross or serious 
damage which can reasonably be avoided’.676 Judge Korma added that ‘the evidence, 
though not conclusive, is sufficient to show that a risk of radioactive contamination of 
the marine environment may be brought about as a result of the resumed tests’.677 
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Judge Palmer referred ad hoc to the risks involved in executing nuclear testing, and 
emphasized that the inherent nature of the risk in the activity itself ‘would suggest 
caution to be appropriate’. 678 He also took into account the relevant principles of 
international law with respect to this case. He argued that ‘international environmental 
law has developed rapidly and is tending to develop in a way that provides 
comprehensive protection for the natural environment’.679 Conducting an EIA where 
the activities pose a significant risk to the environment and the precautionary principle, 
which has developed rapidly, may now be the principle of customary international law 
relating to the environment.680 
Finally, Judge Weeramantry, who in several instances attempted to develop the concept 
and applicability of the precautionary principle, made note of the importance of the 
principle. He insisted that the magnitude of destructive power that had been awesomely 
demonstrated by New Zealand required the court to be ‘ultra-cautious’.681 He also 
commented on a constituent element of the principle, the shift in the burden of proof, 
and argued that proof or disproof of the disputed matter would be very difficult for 
New Zealand. The data necessary to might be largely in the hands of France who is 
threatening the damage by its activities.682 He asserted that the precautionary principle is 
the only way for the law to overcome this ‘evidentiary difficulty’.683 In this situation:  
The principle then springs into operation to give the Court the basic rationale for 
considering New Zealand's request and not postponing the application of such means 
as are available to the Court to prevent, on a provisional basis, the threatened 
environmental degradation, until such time as the full scientific evidence becomes 
available in refutation of the New Zealand contention.684 
On the status of the principle, Judge Weeramantry emphasized that the principle is 
gaining increasing support as ‘part of the international law of the environment’, and 
‘inevitably calls for consideration’ in this case.685 He also argued that the EIA is ancillary 
to the precautionary principle and, like the latter, is gaining strength and international 
acceptance. It has reached such a level of general recognition that the court should take 
it into account. 686 In cases when there are serious environmental issues at stake, as in 
the current case, the Court is ‘entitled to take into account the Environmental Impact 
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Assessment principle’.687 All of these fears may be well proved to be unmerited, but only 
after conducting such a study.688 
The points made by such an appreciated member of the court are claimed to have the 
potential to be very influential in future disputes and discussions over the law.689 
Generically, the opinions of the judges on the applicability of the principle inferred that 
it might have great potential to play an important role in he future cases.  
Nuclear weapons 
The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
case regarded the question asked by the United Nations on whether states were 
permitted to use their nuclear weapons.690 To be more precise, the United Nations 
asked: ‘Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?’. 
In giving its opinion, the Court made very important statements regarding the 
environment. It acknowledged that since the environment was under serious threat, 
states were under ‘general obligation’ to ensure that their activities within their territory 
would respect the environment of other states. The ICJ recognized that this obligation 
‘is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment’.691 The Court 
went further to emphasize the prominence and urgency of protecting the environment, 
and declared that: 
States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is 
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for 
the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in 
conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.692 
Irrespective of disclosing the potential dangers and admitting the existence of the 
environmental threat, the court finally held that states were forbidden from using 
nuclear weapons when there was no threat to their existence. Whether they could use 
these weapons when there is a threat to their existence, i.e. in wartime, remains 
unclear.693 
Judge Weeramantry’s criticism of this case pointed out some very important issues, 
which while reflecting his own ideas and not those of the court, could be viewed as 
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possible discourse in future decisions. In his opinion, the use of nuclear weapons should 
be illegal in any case regardless of being at war or not. He believed that their use violates 
the fundamental principles of international law. He then referred to the principles of 
environmental law, which are now ‘so deeply rooted in the conscience of mankind that 
they have become particularly essential rules of general international law’.694 Judge 
Weeramantry believed that the use of the nuclear weapons would violate the principles 
of environmental law, including the precautionary principle, the principle that the 
burden of proof lies upon the author of the environmentally harmful act and the 
principle that the polluter pays the principle.695 He emphasized that these principles 
‘proceed from general duties’, and that their validity did not come from the treaty 
provision, as they are ‘part of customary international law’. He stated that they were 
‘part of the sine qua non for human survival’.696 Accordingly, the Court should recognize 
and make use of these principles in reaching its conclusions. 
 
Gabčíkovo -Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)697 
The Slovakia-Hungary Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros project represents another 
environmental case that was brought before the ICJ. This case has significant 
importance for environmental protection, as it has been claimed to be a missed 
opportunity in the context of the development of environmental principles.698 The 
Court  in this case made a remarkable statement on the significance of environmental 
protection. 
Two countries agreed to build a dam on Danube River in 1995. After splitting to Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, Slovakia requested that Hungary fulfill its obligations.699 Hungary 
was concerned about the environmental affects of the activity however, and suspended 
the work. It claimed, among other things, that due to the ‘new requirements’ imposed 
by international law for the protection of the environment, it could no longer perform 
the treaty. 700  In particular, Hungary invoked the precautionary principle in its 
application, stating that: 
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States shall take precautionary measure to anticipate, prevent or minimize damage to 
their transboundary resources and mitigate adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures. Art. 2, paragraph 5(a) of the Convention on the 
Protection and use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes, […] the IUCN Draft 
Art.6 and Brundtland Report, Art.10, provide support for the obligation in general 
international law to apply the precautionary principle to protect a transboundary 
resource. This duty has extreme importance in this dispute where damage threatening 
Hungary is irreparable and enormous.701 
Hungary invoked the principle as the newly developed norms of environmental law. It 
claimed, among other arguments, that this justified the termination of the project, and 
claimed that the previous obligation of not causing transboundary harms had ‘evolved 
into an erga omnes obligation of prevention of damage pursuant to the ‘precautionary 
principle’.702 Moreover, both parties agreed on the need to take environmental concerns 
seriously and therefore to take precautionary measures. Slovakia however rejected the 
claim that environmental norms could be used to breach treaty obligations.703  
The Court acknowledged the relevance of the newly developed norms of environmental 
law for the interpretation of the treaty. However, it maintained that since these 
environmental norms lacked peremptory force, their application should be ruled 
through articles 15, 19 and 20 of the treaty between the parties. These articles required 
the parties to ensure that the quality of the water was not impaired. These articles did 
not have specific obligations of performance, and would only become obligatory if the 
parties had agreed upon it, which is a joint responsibility of the states.704 This statement 
implies that newly developed environmental norms are not applicable under 
international law, but can be applied through an agreement between the parties to 
become binding. They are therefore not a general obligation. 
In an attempt to further justify its defence, Hungary also argued that the ‘state of 
ecological necessity’ precluded the performance of the treaty.705 Slovakia dismissed this 
claim, and contended that, even if such necessity existed, it could not be used as a 
reason to abolish the treaty.706 The Court, however, recognized the significance of the 
environmental harm, and stated that ecological necessity would be sufficient to nullify 
the treaty. Since the harm was uncertain, and Hungary could not demonstrate the ‘peril’ 
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of environmental harm, the ICJ held that the situation in this case did not meet the 
criteria for the necessity in question.707  
When inspecting the ICJ’s ruling on the seriousness of the environmental concerns and 
the state of necessity, one should be aware of the context that informed the decision 
before claiming that it had implicitly rejected the precautionary principle.708 The ICJ’s 
reasoning did not define or reject the principle. It instead assessed whether the state of 
necessity has been materialized. The court specified that necessity could only be invoked 
under certain strictly defined conditions,709 and stated in the following terms: 
Serious though these uncertainties might have been they could not, alone, establish the 
objective existence of a ‘peril’ in the sense of a component element of a state of 
necessity.710 
Even Judge Weeramantry, who has previously argued in favor of the recognition of the 
principle, did not see room for its application, in this case due to the status of estoppel 
for several reasons.711 Therefore, although some have claimed that the case was not a 
repudiation of the precautionary principle due to the Court’s ‘implied’ rejection,712 some 
other studies have identified various statements in the decision that could be linked to 
the principle. 713  These statements included, for instance, the importance of 
environmental protection;, 714 the recognition of the ICJ that the environment was 
vulnerable, which called for assessment of the threatening risks on a ‘continuous 
basis’;715 and also the recognition that the parties should have discussed the actual and 
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‘potential’ risks to the environment.716 These instances demonstrate the precautionary 
thinking of the ICJ. 
Pulp Mills 
The dispute regarding the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay has important implications 
for application of the precautionary principle in the future, since for the first time the 
majority’s opinion addressed the principle.717 In 2006, Argentina claimed Uruguay's 
authorization for the construction of a pulp mill on the Uruguay River had violated the 
1975 Statute of the River Uruguay, a treaty between Argentina and Uruguay to create a 
mechanism to rationally use the river.718 It claimed that Uruguay had breached its 
obligation by unilaterally authorizing the construction of the pulp mills on the river. 
Under the 1975 Statute, the parties were committed to take measures necessary for the 
rational usage of the river.719 Argentina requested the Court to permanently shut down 
the project, claiming that Uruguay had violated its procedural obligations. In the 
meantime, it also requested provisional measures to close the mill, which were rejected 
based on the grounds that the activity was safe and would not pose any imminent or 
irreparable harm. Therefore Uruguay was allowed to continue issuing the permit. 
Argentina presented a broad reading and relied heavily on the precautionary principle in 
two different arguments. Firstly, it argued that the principle required a shift in the 
burden of proof, and secondly, it claimed that, international law, including 
environmental principles, should be taken into account by the ICJ to interpret the 
provisions of the treaty. The two claims will be examined here separately to further 
clarify the positioning of the Court regarding the principle. 
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Regarding the first invocation of the principle, Argentina argued that the precautionary 
approach of the 1975 Statute shifts the burden of proof to Uruguay to establish that the 
project would not cause significant damage to the environment. It argued that it alone 
should not have had to bear the burden of proving the project’s harmlessness.720 
Referring to its previous decisions, the court pointed out that: 
The principle of prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins in the due diligence that 
is required of a State in its territory… It is every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States…A State 
is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take 
place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to 
the environment of another State. This Court has established that this obligation is now 
part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.721 
Therefore, the Court established that the obligation, at the procedural stage, was ‘to 
avoid activities… causing significant damage to the environment of another State’. 
Argentina’s argument was that it should not bear the burden of proving the project’s 
safety, and that it was not the state causing significant harm. It argued instead that the 
precautionary approach required a shift in the party that had to bear the burden of 
proving the safety of the project. Nevertheless, the court did not allow the principle to 
reverse the burden of proof, or at least affect the standard of proof, and held that:  
While a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of 
the provisions of the Statute, it does not follow that it operates as a reversal of the 
burden of proof.722 
This statement by the Court, although could have been much stronger, represents 
progress for the principle. For the first time, its applicability was acknowledged outside 
of the treaty provision, and as a relevant rule for interpretation.723 However, since the 
Court applied the general evidentiary rules, which required the applicant to demonstrate 
and prove the claim of environmental harm, it turned the forward-looking nature of the 
principle to a ‘result oriented obligation’. This made it difficult for Argentina, as the 
applicant, to prove.724  
The second occasion in which Argentina insisted on the applicability of the principle 
regarded the interpretation of the 1975 Statute. This must be ‘interpreted in the light of 
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principles governing the law of international watercourses and principles of 
international law ensuring protection of the environment’.725 Argentina argued that: 
The 1975 Statute must be interpreted so as to take account of all ‘relevant rules’ of 
international law applicable in the relations between the Parties, so that the Statute’s 
interpretation remains current and evolves in accordance with changes in 
environmental standards. In this connection Argentina refers to the principles of 
equitable, reasonable and non-injurious use of international watercourses, the principles 
of sustainable development, prevention, precaution and the need to carry out an 
environmental impact assessment. It contends that these rules and principles are 
applicable in giving the 1975 Statute a dynamic interpretation, although they neither 
replace it nor restrict its scope.726 
Therefore, Argentina believed the precautionary principle to be relevant and applicable 
in terms of interpreting the treaty obligations. This statement was approved by Uruguay, 
however they had different interpretation of these principles regarding their extent and 
scope.727 The Court availed itself of the relevant rules of applicable international law to 
interpret the Statute.728 In interpreting the obligation under the article 41 of the Statute 
regarding the ‘protect and preserve the aquatic environment and, in particular, to 
prevent its pollution’, the Court recalled two cases. The advisory opinion of the first 
case, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, asserted that ‘The existence of 
the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control 
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part 
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment’.729 The ICJ also referred 
to the Gabčíkovo case, which stated, ‘the Parties together should look afresh at the 
effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabčíkovo power plant’. Having 
considered these two decisions, the Court held that it is an obligation of due diligence in 
respect of all activities that take place under the jurisdiction and control of each party.730 
According to the court, the obligation of due diligence means:  
An obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, 
but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of 
administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the 
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monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the 
other party.731 
The ICJ finally adjudged that Uruguay had only breached the procedural obligations to 
notify and to inform.732 It had not breached its substantive obligations, and so it could 
continue running the mill. It is however, important to take note of the general obligation 
of due diligence that the ICJ considered for the states. As will be discussed in the next 
section, under the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) jurisprudence, 
in a recent advisory opinion, the tribunal referred to this statement by the ICJ that the 
precautionary principle is an integral part of the obligation of due diligence, and 
therefore could be considered an obligation under international law.733 
Judge Vinuesa criticized this part of the decision, and argued that although the 
obligations under the treaty did not justify a shift on the burden of proof, the 
application of the precautionary principle, which the court recognized to be relevant in 
the interpretation of the Statute, should have been used to interpret the Treaty.734 This 
means that the obligation of proof is binding to both parties, whereas the court finally 
held that Uruguay had to co-operate. Judge Vinuesa argues that the statements by the 
Court were contradicting, as: 
It is difficult to follow the Court’s reasoning when, on the one hand, it states that 
Uruguay has breached its procedural obligations (among which is the obligation to 
produce information) and, on the other hand, it merely exhorts Uruguay, as the 
Respondent, to co-operate.  The Court is thus transforming a previous binding 
obligation to produce evidence into a mere goodwill gesture to co-operate by providing 
evidence to the Court.735 
With respect to the EIA, both parties agreed on the necessity of conducting an EIA. 
The point of disagreement regarded the scope and the content of the study that 
Uruguay should have conducted. Uruguay failed to take all of the potential impacts into 
account, and argued that international law does not impose the conditions and scope of 
such an assessment; it only imposes ‘assessments of the project’s potential harmful 
transboundary effects on people, property and the environment of other States’ as 
required by states’ practice and the international law. Uruguay argued that this did not 
require the study to ‘assess remote or purely speculative risks’.736  
According to the ICJ, the obligation to ‘protect and preserve’ had to be interpreted in 
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accordance with: 
 
A practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it 
may now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial 
activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, 
on a shared resource.  Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and 
prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have been exercised, if a party 
planning works liable to affect the regime of the river or the quality of its waters did not 
undertake an environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of such 
works.737 
In this important statement, the ICJ observed that the practice of conducting an EIA: 
Has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be considered a 
requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental impact 
assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a 
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared 
resource.738  
In addition, it stated that the lack of specific content and scope under international law 
should not prevent the applicability of the EIA principle, or domestic legislators. 
Accordingly, authorities have the duty to define its specific content on a case-by-case 
basis: 
Having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely 
adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in 
conducting such an assessment.739   
The ICJ made several very important statements on the importance of the threats to the 
environment, in addition to affirming the status of the EIA. These have been noted by 
several judges and scholars as being precautionary in nature; here the ICJ did not make 
use of the principle to consider Argentina’s claim. Several judges have since appended 
the decision and demonstrated their concerns regarding the issue. Judge Simma and 
Judge Khasawneh both claimed that this case was a golden opportunity that the court 
missed to demonstrate its ability to adopt a forward looking approach towards the 
environmental issues, rather than making decisions ex post facto.740 The ICJ could have 
utilized its power, given by the 1975 Statute, to step in when there was disagreement 
between the parties regarding the threat of potential harm to the environment. 
According to these judges, the ICJ could have assisted the parties before the actual harm 
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occurred by adopting a more ‘preventive rather than compensatory logic’.741 The logic 
of a preventive and forward-looking approach in the field of environment was affirmed 
by the Court. The ICJ itself stated in the Gabčíkovo case in 1997 that:  
In the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on 
account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the 
limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage742 
The Judges also emphasized that the ICJ should have been aware of the ‘inherent 
weaknesses and flaws of the traditional retrospective judicial process and its 
compensatory logic’, and of the urgency to adopt a ‘preventive assessment of risk’ when 
confronting environmental risks, which often have irreparable character.743 Judge Simma 
and Judge Khasawneh also regretted that the ICJ did not consider the multiplicity and 
complexity of the scientific facts into its reasoning. They stated that: 
Given the multiplicity of the factors involved, the long periods of time and 
accumulation of effects to be taken into account, the intricate questions of causality and 
interdependence to be considered, all these add up to a complex matrix of factual issues 
which can only be transformed into a sound evidentiary basis for the Court’s reasoning 
and decision-making if, and only if, the Court makes use of external scientific and 
technical expert input, combined with necessary procedural guarantees. This is even 
more so if there exists a situation where the scientific community itself is divided and 
the question arises whether, and to what extent, the precautionary principle should 
enter the fore.744 
This point was also mentioned in Judge Vinuesa’s criticism, in which he expressed 
regret that the ICJ did not consider the long-term effects of the already existing 
pollution that could be attributed to the project. He stated that: 
The Court, in my opinion, pre-empted its opportunity to apply the precautionary 
principle to properly prevent pollution and preserve the aquatic environment of the 
River Uruguay in conformity with the 1975 Statute and general international law.745 
Finally, Judge Trindade provided the strongest criticism of the way that the 
precautionary principle was appended to the award. He extensively elaborated on the 
principle and its elements, and argued that the principle had taken shape by ‘human 
conscience’ and the ‘universal juridical conscience’, and was now a general principle of 
law.746 With respect to the application of the principle, he argued that the applicability of 
the principle was accepted by both Argentina and Uruguay, and: 
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Only the ICJ did not acknowledge, nor affirmed, the existence of those principles, nor 
elaborated on them, thus missing a unique occasion for their consolidation in the 
present domain of contemporary International Law. The fact that the Court’s Judgment 
silenced on them does not mean that those principles, of prevention and of precaution, 
do not exist. They do exist and apply, and are, in my view, of the utmost important, as 
part of the jus necessarium. We can hardly speak of International Environmental Law 
nowadays without those general principles. The Court had a unique occasion, in the 
circumstances of the case of the Pulp Mills, to assert the applicability of the preventive 
as well as the precautionary principles; it unfortunately preferred not to do so, for 
reasons which go beyond, and escape, my comprehension.747 
As can be deducted from the above cases, compared to other tribunals, ICJ has been 
more reticent towards precautionary principle. In fact, ICJ’s approach towards the 
principle could be divided to two phases; prior to Pulp Mills and post pulp Mills.    
Before Pulp Mills, the principle was only referred to in dissents and never in a majority 
opinion. Even in Gabcikovo- Nagymaros where the Court made a crucial statement on 
the importance of environmental concerns, the principle was not accepted to play a role. 
Nevertheless, Pulp Mills was the first instance where the majority opinion of the ICJ 
explicitly addressed the precautionary principle. Although the court did not apply the 
principle to reverse the burden of proof, it confirmed its relevance in the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of the Status. In a post Pulp-Mills decision, ITLOS 
referred to this acknowledgement by the Court as the affirmation of the precautionary 
principle. 
4.4  ITLOS case  law 
ITLOS is the central forum in the dispute settlement system established by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It has been described as the 
‘judicial guardian’ of the marine environment.748  This section aims to give a brief 
overview of the relevant cases that have been taken before ITLOS, and to examine how 
its findings on the Precautionary principle reflect the goal of defining the principle. It 
focuses on the precautionary principle and its implementation into aspects of tribunals’ 
jurisprudence. This section purposely omits other legal issues, and focuses on the state 
of case law regarding the implementation of the precautionary principle in the law of the 
sea. This approach was taken to find a common understanding of the principle, and to 
extract evidence of its acceptance and recognition. Furthermore, this analysis is not 
                                                
747 Dissent Judge Trindade para.113. 
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the Law of the Sea’, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 16 (2003), 421 (p. 423). 
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meant to be exhaustive, but rather is focused only on the most pertinent 
implementations of the Precautionary principle by the ITLOS. 
 
Southern Bluefin Tuna  
This case arose from the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(CSBT), a 1993 treaty between Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The parties agreed 
on a total allowable catch for the member states, since they were concerned about the 
species being in the danger of extinction. Despite this agreement, Japan later unilaterally 
performed a so-called experimental fishing of 1,400 tones of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(SBT). Australia and New Zealand sued Japan for this reason in ITLOS. 749  The 
claimants argued that Japan had violated the PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLEas a 
customary international norm, in addition to breaching the provisions of the ITLOS 
Convention. They argued that it had failed to take the required measures for the 
conservation and management of SBT.750 For these reasons, Australia and New Zealand 
requested ITLOS to order provisional measures in accordance with Article 290.5 of the 
Convention while awaiting the establishment of the Annex VII tribunal. Under article 
290, provisional measures can be prescribed if the tribunal ‘considers appropriate under 
the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to 
prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision’.751 Under 
Article 290.5, the tribunal must be satisfied inter alia that the matter is one of urgency.752 
Japan, the respondent, argued among other things, that the prescription of the 
provisional measure based on article 290.5 ITLOS Convention was not appropriate. It 
argued that there was no urgency, as its experimental fishing program would not cause 
irreparable damage to the stock,753 and that there was no danger of a serious harm to the 
marine environment, so no provisional measure was required.754  
The tribunal recognized the scientific uncertainty surrounding the measures to conserve 
the stock of SBT, and also acknowledged that there was no agreement among the 
parties as to whether the conservation measures taken so far had improved the stock of 
SBT.755 Therefore, it held that the situation was one of urgency, both in relation to 
                                                
749 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (NewZealand v. Japan), (Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, 
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751 UNCLOS. Article 290.1. 
752 Id. Article 290.5. 
753  SBT Award, supra 758, para. 66. 
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preserving the rights of the parties and to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment. In relation to the latter, ITLOS considered that ‘the conservation of the 
living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment’. 756  Therefore, the provisional measure was required to ‘avert further 
deterioration of the Southern Bluefin Tuna stock’.757 As a result, ITLOS dismissed 
Japan’s claim that its catch was experimental and therefore not subject to the limitations 
of the agreement, and ultimately enjoined the country from increasing its total allowable 
catch. ITLOS explicitly referred to the ‘scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be 
taken to conserve the stock of southern Bluefin tuna,’758 which, combined with the risk 
of ‘deterioration of the southern Bluefin tuna stock’759 and the risk of ‘serious harm’ to 
the Bluefin tuna,760 led to the tribunal granting provisional measures.761 The Annex VII 
tribunal finally declared its lack of jurisdiction on the case without entering into the 
merit phase.762 Nevertheless, the implementation of the precautionary approach towards 
the fisheries, although only implied, was unprecedented.763 
Judge Traves provided a separate opinion on the tribunal’s award, indicating that 
urgency was part of the very nature of the provisional measure, which was designed to 
preserve the right of the parties pending the final decision.764 Therefore, the requirement 
of urgency to grant a provisional measure could be justified in the light of the 
precautionary principle.765 
Although ITLOS did not explicitly mention the precautionary principle in its decisions, 
many commentators have observed that the decision relied on it heavily.766 This proves 
the increasing importance of the precautionary principle in international law. ITLOS in 
a subsequence case, the Seabed Advisory Opinion, declared that the Bluefin Tuna Cases 
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Environmental Law, 10.1 (2000), 15–24 (p. 17); David Freestone, ‘Caution or Precaution: “A Rose By Any 
Other Name...”?’, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 10.1 (2000), 25–32 (p. 25).  
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had implicitly adopted the precautionary principle.767 Moreover, and most importantly, 
the precautionary principle is capable of being applied not only directly through the 
treaty, but also according to general international law, and through the obligation of due 
diligence.768 It referred to the tribunal’s decision in the SBT case, and stated that: 
The link between the obligation of due diligence and the precautionary approach is 
implicit in the.. [SBT case]… this emerges from the declaration of the tribunal that the 
parties ‘should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that 
conservation measures are taken’… and is confirmed by the further statements that 
‘there is scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the stock of 
[SBT]’ and that ‘although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific evidence 
presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of 
urgency.769 
Judge Traves further argued that there was no need for the tribunal to decide on the 
status of the precautionary principle. He stated that it was not relevant for the tribunal 
to rule on whether the principle had gained the form customary international norm to 
make it applicable, or wait for the customary international law to ‘dictate’ it. Indeed, he 
stated that the precautionary principle is inherent in the notion of the provisional 
measure, and that it can be seen as a ‘logical consequence’ of the need to ensure that the 
situation would not change before the court’s decision.770  
 
MOX Plant 771 
The MOX plant dispute was between Ireland and the United Kingdom. The case 
involved a dispute over marine pollution under UNCLOS Convention.772 Ireland was 
concerned about the radioactive emissions of the MOX Plant, and possible pollution in 
the Irish Sea. Ireland expressed its concerns by submitting cases for the UK’s breach of 
various obligations.773 The first regarded the request for a provisional measure from 
ITLOS, under article 290.5. This was submitted at the same time as the case for 
arbitration under UNCLOS, and claimed that the UK had violated its provisions by 
                                                
767 See Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
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polluting the Irish Sea.774 Another case was submitted under OSPAR, which argued that 
the UK was obliged to make data available to Ireland regarding the emissions and 
accidents of the MOX Plant,.775 Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, the analysis 
will focus on the tribunal’s decision with respect to the provisional measure, where 
Ireland grounded its argument on the precautionary principle.776 It has been argued that 
the case, on the surface, adopted a different approach of the precautionary principle.777 
Ireland sought a provisional measure from ITLOS. It requested that the tribunal grant a 
provisional measure to suspend the authorization of the plant, pending the Annex VII 
Tribunal. Ireland sought two provisional measures; first the suspension of 
commissioning of the plant, and second the prohibition of any transportation of 
radioactive waste through the Irish costal zone. It argued that the precautionary 
principle justified the need for the provisional measure in the short period before the 
constitution of Annex VII Tribunal.778 On the other hand, the UK responded that the 
precautionary principle could not be utilized to substitute the basic foundation of 
evidence.779 
ITLOS was not satisfied with the evidence of a risk of serious harm provided by 
Ireland. Therefore, it did not find the urgency under articles 290.6 UNCLOS to prescribe 
a provisional measure. Nevertheless, it stated that ‘prudence and caution’ was required, 
and that both countries should cooperate in exchanging data on the risks concerning the 
operation of the MOX Plant, and should find ways to manage them appropriately.780  
Judge Wolfrum was of the view that the precautionary principlewas not applicable in 
relation to provisional measures, even if the principle was being considered as 
customary international law (which he believes is still a matter of discussion).781 This was 
due to the exceptional nature of the provisional measure, and because the tribunal was 
bound by jurisdictional limitations, which did not allow it to anticipate the judgment in 
merit and evaluate the documentary evidence.782 He also asserted that Ireland could not 
rely on the SBT award to invoke the precautionary principle. This is due to the fact that 
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in the current case, the tribunal was asked to qualify the harmfulness of the introduction 
of radioactivity, without being able to assess evidence about the situation, whereas in the 
former case both of the parties agreed that the risk was established.783 
Judge Mensah opined that the temporal competence of the tribunal imposed a 
constraint to deal with the request of a provisional measure. The competence is not to 
examine if there is a potential of prejudice of harm to the environment in abstract, but 
rather in the period of time pending the establishment of the annex VII tribunal. The 
requirement of ‘urgency’ delimited the competence of the tribunal. Ireland, however, 
could not provide enough evidence to satisfy the court that protection was necessary 
prior to the composition of the tribunal.784 
Judge Traves however considered the precautionary principle to be relevant regarding to 
this case, as it might be appropriate to preserve procedural rights. The court mentioned 
prudence and caution relating to cooperation and exchange information, and therefore 
he stated that:  
Compliance with procedural rights, relating to cooperation, exchange of information, 
etc., is relevant for complying with the general obligation of due diligence when 
engaging in activities which might have an impact on the environment.785 
He also subscribed to the same argument made by other judges that the precautionary 
principle was not applied. The applicant could not demonstrate a substantial risk to the 
marine environment within the time frame required for the tribunal to prescribe a 
provisional measure.786 
The context of this case is rather different in that the urgency of the situation did not 
require the prescription of the provisional measure. The possibility of serious damage to 
the environment in the duration between the provisional measure and constitution of 
the Annex VII tribunal was not serious enough to be viewed as necessary and urgent. 
Therefore, the MOX Plant case did not represent the position of ITLOS on the 
precaution. 
Land Reclamation 
This case has been claimed to reach the highest level of settlement of an international 
dispute involving scientific uncertainty in a co-operative manner. 787  In July 2003, 
Malaysia commenced proceedings against Singapore requesting an annex VII tribunal to 
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be established to, inter alia, stop Singapore from land reclamation activities until an 
adequate EIA had been conducted. 788 Malaysia also sought a provisional measure from 
ITLOS. Singapore responded that it had taken the precautionary principle into account 
and made all the arrangements to avoid danger.789 IT argued that Malaysia could not 
request the suspension of the project by invoking the precautionary principle, as there 
was no evidence of serious or irreversible damage.790    
Malaysia claimed that Singapore’s land reclamation project was causing ocean currents 
and also sedimentary transportation in the area, and was affecting the salinity of estuary 
waters and coastal erosion. These were argued to be having adverse effects on the 
environment and aquaculture, and also on the interests of local fishermen.791 Malaysia 
was concerned that a long-term study was required to answer with confidence the 
questions regarding these changes and the effects of the disputed activity.792 It was also 
concerned that Singapore had not conducted a full EIA of the project, and argued that 
an independent environmental impact assessment was a central tool of the international 
law of the precautionary principle. As such, it stated that Singapore should have 
conducted an EIA. 793  Moreover, Malaysia claimed that Singapore breached the 
obligations under the UNCLOS and general international law and also that the 
reclamation project infringed the precautionary principle. Malaysia argued that: 
Singapore has placed itself in breach of its obligations under international law, 
specifically under articles … of the Convention, and in relation thereto, article 300 of 
the Convention and the precautionary principle, which under international law must 
direct any party in the application and implementation of those obligations;794 
Malaysia also regarded that the precautionary principle was a ‘role reversal’ with respect 
to the burden of proof. Sir Elihu Lautherpacht noted that, in accordance with the  
precautionary principle the party who is taking the risk-bearing activity should bear the 
administrative burden of proof: 
One may argue about the status of the precautionary principle, but Malaysia submits 
that this Tribunal should not reject the widely held view that it is for the state that 
proposes action that may detrimentally affect the environment to show, not to itself, 
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789 Verbatim record of the sitting on 27 September 2003, p.32. 
790 Response of Singapore of 20 of September 2003, para. 141. 
791 Request for provisional measure,4 September 2003, paras 5,17. 
792 Id. para. 5. 
793 Verbatim Record of the sitting on 25 September 2003, p. 20.. 
794 Id. para 74 
  
 
153 
but to those that may be affected by it, that there is no real likelihood of harm to the 
environment795 
The tribunal prescribed a provisional measure and asked the parties to collaborate and 
conduct a joint study to analyse the effects of the project and provide measures to deal 
with it within a year.796 As a result of this co-operation the parties reached a settlement 
agreement, and therefore the dispute was brought to end.797 
In this regard, ITLOS stated that it could not rule out that the project may have adverse 
effects on the marine environment’.798 The court held that: 
 Given the possible implications of land reclamation on the marine environment, prudence 
and caution require that Malaysia and Singapore establish mechanisms for exchanging 
information and assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation works and devising 
ways to deal with them in the areas concerned;799 
The tribunal refused to accept Singapore’s request, and stated that all of the concerns 
‘direct Singapore not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that might cause…. serious 
harm to the marine environment’800. It also ruled that the parties must adhere themselves 
to the precautionary principle, and ordered the parties to cooperate in this regard.  
 
 Seabed Advisory Opinion  
On the 1st of February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber (‘the Chamber’) delivered its 
first advisory opinion on state responsibility, in respect of private entities undertaking 
seabed-mining activities in international waters. 801In providing its opinion on the 
questions that were raised, the Chamber further clarified a number of norms, principles 
and concepts that reinforced the environmental protection of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.802 The Opinion made a number of important statements, including that the 
precautionary principle, as formulated in the Rio Declaration, has initiated ‘a trend 
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towards making this approach part of customary international law’.  
The Chamber considered the following key provisions, when answering the question of 
‘what are a state’s responsibilities regarding the sponsored activity’:  articles 139.1, 153.4 
and the Annex III article 4.4 of the ITLOS Convention. According to article 139.1: 
‘States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the Area… shall be 
carried out in conformity with this part…’803 
The Chamber considered that the ‘responsibility to ensure’ in the article was the central 
issue to be interpreted. In doing so, the Chamber compared this obligation with the 
obligation of ‘due diligence’, which emerged from the judgment of the ICJ in the Pulp 
Mills case. The reason for this comparison was that both ‘due diligence’ and 
‘responsibility to ensure’ are obligations of conduct, and not obligations of results. The 
ICJ also confirmed this:804   
An obligation to adopt regulatory or administrative measures … and to enforce them is an 
obligation of conduct. Both parties are therefore called upon, under article 36 [of the 
Statute of the River Uruguay], to exercise due diligence in acting through the [Uruguay 
River] Commission for the necessary measures to preserve the ecological balance of the river.805 
When interpreting the treaty obligation, which in this case is ‘the obligation to ensure’, 
the chamber referred again to the ICJ’s decision in the Pulp mills case. In this case, the 
court interpreted the specific obligation to be qualified as the ‘obligation to act with due 
diligence’.806 The ICJ court defined this obligation further as:  
It is an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and 
measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of 
administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the 
monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators.807 
The Chamber further referred to the ‘International Law Commission’ in its 
Commentary on Article three of its Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities. 808  These articles were adopted in 2001 to support its 
decision to utilize the obligation of due diligence when interpreting the treaty 
provision.809According to this article on the prevention of the transboundary harm, the 
state of origin ‘shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary 
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harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof’.810 The commentary defined this 
obligation as:  
‘The obligation of the State of origin to take preventive or minimization measures is 
one of due diligence. It is the conduct of the State of origin that will determine whether 
the State has complied with its obligation under the present articles. The duty of due 
diligence involved, however, is not intended to guarantee that significant harm be 
totally prevented, if it is not possible to do so. In that eventuality, the State of origin is 
required … to exert its best possible efforts to minimize the risk. In this sense, it does 
not guarantee that the harm would not occur.’811 
In an attempt to define the content of the obligation of ‘due diligence’, the Chamber 
acknowledged its ‘variable concept’, and recognized that the content of the obligation 
could change from case to case due to, for instance, the new scientific evidence or the 
amount of the risk that was involved. Therefore, it recognized that there existed 
different standards of diligence.812 The Chamber explained that these elements could 
render a measure that could have been diligent in a normal situation as being not 
diligent. This means that ‘the standard of due diligence has to be more severe in riskier 
activities’.813 
With respect to the precautionary principle, the Chamber considered two sources of 
obligations for the states. Firstly, the precautionary principle was considered as a direct 
obligation, i.e. there was a direct obligation to take, among other principles, 
precautionary measures as reflected in the Rio Declaration814, Nodules regulation and 
Sulphides Regulation.815 Secondly, the Chamber regarded the precautionary measures, 
among some other principles such as the best environmental practice and the EIA as 
being ‘a relevant factor in meeting the due diligence factor of the obligation to 
ensure’.816 Therefore, the obligation of due diligence and within it the precautionary 
principle, were regarded as being indirect obligations. In most cases these were ‘couched 
as obligations to ensure compliance with specific rules’.817 
In doing this, the Chamber went beyond direct obligation, and pointed out that the 
precautionary approach is an ‘integral part of the general obligation of due diligence … 
which is applicable even outside of the scope of the regulation’.818 This part of the 
opinion adds momentum to the application of the precaution by the tribunals. It 
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expresses the idea that even if a regulation does not include the obligation to take 
precautionary measures, the obligation of due diligence requires states to take all 
measures necessary to prevent damages were the ‘scientific evidence concerning the 
scope and potential negative impact of the activity is insufficient’, and where there are 
‘plausible indications of potential risk’.819 Most importantly, disregarding these risks 
constitutes breaching the obligations of due diligence, and subsequently represents a 
‘failure to comply with the precautionary approach’. 820 Consequently, the Chamber 
considered that the precautionary principle was applicable through compliance with ‘due 
diligence obligation’, along with the direct obligations from the treaty and other relevant 
regulations. It saw the precautionary principle as a general and indirect obligation to 
interpret and define the scope of the obligation, which was set out in the convention as 
‘responsibility to ensure’.821  
The link between the precautionary principle and due diligence was noted to be implicit 
in the SBT case, in which ITLOS held that the parties should act with ‘prudence and 
caution to ensure that the conservation measures are taken’.822 ITLOS also ruled that the 
measure ‘should be taken as a matter of urgency’.823 
The Chamber went further in commenting on the status of the precautionary principle 
by noting its incorporation into a growing number of treaties. In its view, the 
precautionary principle  has started to become a part of Customary International Law.824 
The Chamber claimed that the latter statement was clearly reinforced by the ICJ’s 
judgment in the Pulp Mills case: that the PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLEmay be 
‘relevant in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the statute’ and 
should be read in light of the article 31.3.c of the Vienna Convention.825 
The Chamber also considered ‘the best environmental practice’ as enshrined in the 
state’s obligation of due diligence.826 Since the Nodule regulation does not include this 
obligation, like the Sulphide regulation, the Chamber stated that the former should be 
‘interpreted in light of the development of the law’. 827 Regarding the EIA, the state was 
under a direct obligation and a general obligation of due diligence, according to the 
contract. It was also under customary international law,  which extended beyond the 
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scope of applying the specific provisions of the regulation.828 With respect to customary 
international law, the Chamber quoted the decision by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills case, 
which considered an EIA as a requirement under general international law where there 
is a risk that industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context or a shared resource. Perhaps most significantly, the Chamber recognized829 that 
the obligation to conduct the EIA was both direct, under the treaty, and indirect, under 
customary international law.830 
The Chamber reiterated the due diligence requirements set out in the Pulp Mills case, 
and went further by finding that the precautionary principle, as expressed in principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration, formed part of customary international law. As such the 
Chamber considered the precautionary principle to be part of a state’s due diligence 
obligations. The Advisory Opinion was the first express statement by an international 
court that the precautionary principle should form part of customary international law. 
It was also the first time it had reached a unanimous decision. The Chamber held that 
the measures taken by a state to fulfil its responsibilities must include having laws in 
place to ensure environmental due diligence. Contractual arrangements with the 
sponsored entity are not sufficient. ‘Rather, states must ensure that there are appropriate 
laws, monitoring and enforcement to ensure that a sufficient level of due diligence is 
achieved.’. The Chamber’s unanimous opinion set the highest standards of due 
diligence, and endorsed a legal obligation to apply precaution, best environmental 
practices, and EIA.831 
In General, ITLOS has treated the precautionary principle as customary international 
law.832 Therefore, it lowered the standard of proof and in some cases even reversed the 
burden of proof.  The ITLOS Seabed Dispute Chamber, most recently, considered 
principle 15 of the Rio Declaration a ‘trend towards making the [precautionary] 
approach part of customary international law’.833 With no doubt, this decision set a new 
trend towards application of the principle in future cases or by other tribunals. 
                                                
828 Id. paras. 145-150. 
829 David Freestone, ‘Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea on ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With 
Respect To Activities in the Area’’, American Society of International Law, ASIL Insights, 15.7 (2011), p. 3. 
830 Advisory Opinion. para 145. 
831 Freestone, ‘Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea on “Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect 
To Activities in the Area”’. 
832 Kazhdan, p. 533. 
833 Advisory Opinion, Supra 776, paras 127 and 135. 
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4.5  WTO Jurisprudence  
The WTO has a very specific procedure when it comes to measures taken by member 
states aimed at environmental and health protection. The specific criteria and substance 
of the precautionary-like measures under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) has prevented the application of the 
precautionary principle.834 Therefore, these cases are only relevant in highlighting the 
awareness of the tribunals of uncertainty, and to the extent to which they recognize the 
measures being taken by the member states despite uncertainty. Therefore, as 
mentioned above, the cases in this section were not used to establish the content of the 
principle. The requirements and the criteria for its application are very specific, which 
justifies the fact that the WTO has treated the scientific evidence and the precautionary 
principle differently. The WTO’s SPS Agreement sets strict criteria for health and 
environmental regulation, to be fulfilled by member states, and the WTO Appellate 
Body has clarified that the precautionary principle does not prevail over the SPS 
provisions. However, it is important to consider cases in which the tribunals mostly 
attempted to balance environmental and health concerns with the liberalization and 
economic restrictions to free trade that the disputed measure or legislation might have 
caused.  
The first provision designed to grant some room for the member state to protect the 
environment and human health can be found in Article XX of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This allows governments to act on trade to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, provided that this does not amount to a disguised 
protectionism or discrimination.835 In addition, two specific WTO agreements, namely 
the SPS Agreement and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement), deal with food safety, animal and plant health and safety, and with 
technical product standards in general. Both agreements attempt to identify how states 
could achieve their own level of protection, and at the same time avoid protectionism in 
disguise. The precautionary principle was embraced into SPS agreements as a result of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. However, its formation is still unclear. The SPS 
                                                
834 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (hereinafter SPS 
Agreement), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf. 
835   Article XX: ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:…. (b) necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health.’ 
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agreement is essentially designed to respond to member states’ concerns regarding their 
ability to adopt measures and regulations to protect the area of the sanitary and 
phytosanitary. These measures might be considered non-tariff barriers to trade.836 It also 
prevents these measures from being protectionist by setting some requirements for the 
measure to be acceptable. Most importantly in the context of this chapter, the measures 
should be based on risk assessment and scientific justifications. 
While under the SPS agreement, the measures must typically be scientifically justified 
according to article 2.2837 and 5.1838. Article 5.7, on the other hand, provides some room 
for the member states to act on trade in the face of insufficient scientific evidence with respect 
to the risks. Article 5.7 reads as follows: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including 
that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members 
shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of 
risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period 
of time. 839 
 In Japan-Varietals, which marked the first occasion in which Article 5.7 was interpreted, 
the panel established a cumulative four-step-test based on the wording of the article: 
‘1) the measure is imposed in respect of a situation where ‘relevant scientific 
information is insufficient’;  
2) the measure is adopted ‘on the basis of available pertinent information’; 
   … and obligation to 
3) ‘seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment 
of risk’;  
4) ‘review the … phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time’.’840 
The first part of this test requires the measure to be where there is insufficient relevant 
scientific evidence. 
 In the Japan-Apple case, Japan challenged the statement made by the panel regarding 
Article 5.7 that ‘Article 5.7 is intended to address only situations where little, or no, 
                                                
836 Bryan Mercurio and Dianna Shao, A Precautionary Approach to Decision Making: The Evolving Jurisprudence 
on Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 23 July 2011), p. 200 . 
837 SPS agreement, Article 2.2: Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific 
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 
7 of Article 5. 
838 Id. Article 5.1: Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, 
taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations. 
839 Article 5.7, SPS Agreement. 
840 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R (hereinafter Japan–
Varietals II). Para. 8.54. 
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reliable evidence was available on the subject matter at issue’.841 It argued that by this 
reasoning, the panel had restricted the application of the article to ‘new uncertainty’, and 
had excluded ‘unresolved uncertainty’.842 According to Japan, new uncertainty ‘arises 
when a new risk is identified’, and unresolved uncertainty is an ‘uncertainty that the 
scientific evidence is not able to resolve, despite accumulated scientific evidence’.843 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body (AB) interpreted this requirement by stating that 
insufficient scientific evidence is different from scientific uncertainty. They therefore stated that 
the two terms could not be used interchangeably.844 The AB went further by stating that 
Article 5.7 is triggered not by scientific uncertainty but by insufficient scientific 
evidence.845 This implies a rather strict application of the precautionary principle, since 
scientific uncertainty is a much broader concept than having insufficient scientific 
evidence to conduct a risk assessment.846 In the same case, the AB further clarified the 
threshold of ‘insufficient scientific evidence’ by stating that it included cases where the 
‘available evidence is more than minimal in quantity, but has not led to reliable or 
conclusive results’.847  
The terms ‘reliable and conclusive’ are arguable according to each member state 
however, and states have room for manoeuvring when determining their level of 
reliability and conclusiveness. Moreover, it should be noted that ‘sufficient scientific 
evidence’ as mentioned in Article 2.2 is different from Article 5.7. While the former 
assesses if scientific evidence is strong enough to justify a measure, the latter is 
applicable where the scientific evidence is not even strong enough to conduct a risk 
assessment.848 
Although the AB in the EC-Hormone case confirmed that Article 5.7 reflects the 
precautionary principle, the statement it made in the Japan-Apple case clearly restricted 
the application of the principle. This demonstrated that even though the article implied 
a precautionary approach, it did not represent the criteria of the principle as it appears in 
                                                
841 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/R  (hereinafter 
Japan–Apples), para. 8.219. 
842 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Apples, para. 183. 
843 Appellate Body Report, Japan–Apples, para. 183. 
844  Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Doc. 
WT/DS245/AB/R, paras 184. 
845  Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Doc. 
WT/DS245/AB/R, paras 184. 
846 Akawat Laowonsiri, ‘Application of the Precautionary Principle in the SPS Agreement’, in Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, Armin von Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Netherlands, 2010), XIV, p. 
578. 
847 Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Doc. WT/DS245/AB/R, 
paras 181 et seq. 
848 Mercurio and Shao, supra 844, p. 202.. 
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international environmental law. Therefore, one should be aware of the specific context 
of the precaution in WTO case law. 
Despite attempts by the panel and AB to establish a framework and produce practical 
results in the Japan-Varietal and Japan-Apple cases, the decision in the EC-Biotech case has 
been, according to some commentators, problematic in its interpretation of Article 
5.7.849 The EU had conducted a risk assessment prior to adopting the measure, which 
implied that it had sufficient scientific evidence to conduct the study. This allowed the 
court to dismiss the EC’s justification by invoking article 5.7, since it was outside the 
scope of this article.850 In relation to this last statement, the panel specified that: 
Determination of whether scientific evidence is sufficient to assess the existence and 
magnitude of a risk must be disconnected from the intended level of protection851 
In this reasoning, the panel did not consider the relevance of Article 3.3, which allows 
member states to choose a ‘higher level’ of protection,852 or its interaction with Article 
5.7. It has been argued that the sufficiency of evidence should be linked to a states’ level 
of protection because what might be considered sufficient for a lower level of protection 
might not be sufficient for a higher level of protection.853 
With respect to the second part of the test, which states that a measure has to be 
adopted ‘Based on available pertinent information’, it should be noted that pertinent information 
is obviously different from relevant scientific evidence. According to a commentator, it 
should therefore be interpreted in a way that includes data other than ‘published 
scientific literature’ i.e. public values, recognized public deliberations etc. This is based 
not on science but on values, which vary from country to country.854 
Prior to this agreement there was no instrument that specifically endorsed precautionary 
thinking in the field of public health.855  The ‘precautionary’ approach or principle does 
                                                
849 Id. p. 206. 
850 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (hereinafter EC– Biotech), para 7.3007. 
851 EC–Biotech Panel Report, para. 7.3238. 
852 Article 3 ‘Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a 
higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the 
relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a 
consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.(2) Notwithstanding the above, all 
measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that which would 
be achieved by measures based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be 
inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.’ (emphasis added) 
853 Mercurio and Shao, supra 836, p. 208. 
854 D. Winickoff et al., ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade 
Law’, Yale J. Int’l L. 30 (2005), p.113. 
855 D. Prévost, UNCTAD Course on Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organization - 3.9 SPS measures, 
2003, 35 et seq. 
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not exist anywhere in the text of the SPS Agreement. Only the AB stated that the 
principle is reflected in the SPS agreement. The scope of the precautionary principle is 
not exhausted in article 5.7, as acknowledged by the AB in the EC-Hormone case, 
which declared that: 
We agree, at the same time, with the European Communities, that there is no need to 
assume that Article 5.7 exhausts the relevance of a precautionary principle. It is 
reflected also in the sixth paragraph of the preamble and in Article 3.3.856  
The AB further stressed that the specific wording of the provisions of Articles 5.1 and 
5.2 of the SPS Agreement prevail over the application of the  precautionary principle.857 
It can be seen from the above statements that the application of the precautionary 
principle within the SPS Agreement is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, SPS 
measures must be based on relevant international standards, unless the member state 
wants to introduce a higher level of protection. In this case, the measure should be 
consistent with the other provisions of the SPS Agreement. Other member states 
should prove, based on scientific justifications, that the international standards are not 
sufficient.858 Secondly, trade restrictive measures should be allowed only if they are 
necessary to achieve the member state’s legitimate policy objectives. This is a 
substantive obligation under the SPS Agreement however.859 Moreover, the risks that 
led to the measure being adopted should be justified by scientific evidence860. Finally, 
when invoking article 5.7, the measure should be temporary where possible.861  
Even supposing that the provision allows member states to choose a higher level of 
protection than the agreement, it would still confine their discretion by requiring the 
measures to be based on ‘scientific justification’. It would also require that they should 
not be ‘inconsistent with other provisions’ of the SPS Agreement. 
There is also a further point to be considered when interpreting the precautionary 
principle in the context of the WTO: It is inevitable to consider its meaning in public 
international law. The AB in the US-Gasoline case determined that the WTO agreement 
should not be read in isolation from public international law.862 sIn interpreting the case 
                                                
856 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, 
para.124.   
857 id. para.125. 
858 article 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. 
859 Articles 2.2 and 5.6 SPS Agreement. 
860 Articles  2.2 and 5.1. SPS Agreement. 
861 Article 5.7. SPS Agreement. 
862 Appellate Body Report, US-Gasoline case, Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, para.16. 
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the AB states that although the precautionary principle reflects in the provision but it 
does not override the explicit wording of the provisions of the SPS Agreement.863 
 
Cases 
Having discussed the framework in which precautionary measures should be applied, 
this section now aims to explore how uncertainty and the precautionary principle have 
been dealt with in WTO jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the SPS Agreement. 
Nevertheless, on account of the previous discussion, this section will not attempt to 
undertake a detailed case study of WTO jurisprudence, since its content and context is 
different. It provides more specific criteria when compared to the application of the 
precautionary principle in international environmental law. Emphasis will therefore be 
focused on the traditional interpretation of Article 5.7 by the tribunal, and on a rather 
unsettling judgment in the EC-Biotech case, which was modified by the AB in the 
US/Canada-Continued Suspension case.864 
The US/Canada-continued suspension dispute was raised as a result of a series of risk 
assessments followed by the European Commission to adopt a regulation. The 
regulation in question concerned a provisional ban on meat products treated with five 
specific hormones. The EC justified this measure under Article 5.7 on the basis of risks 
that were identified in the risk assessment. However, there were insufficient or even 
missing data to conduct a more objective and complete risk assessment.865  
The panel in the US–Continued Suspension case noted that, regarding four out of five 
of the banned hormones, no ‘critical mass’ of new evidence or information was found 
that could render the current scientific evidence insufficient. 866  The panel also 
determined the scope of article 5.7 narrowly. It also disregarded article 3.3 and its 
relevance to article 5.7. It held that the assessment of the existing risk is irrelevant to the 
intended level of protection by the member state.867 
The AB in the US–Continued Suspension reversed the panel’s decision and reduced 
some of the inconsistencies arising out of the previous decisions, namely the EC-
Biotech case which adopted the same approach. The AB affirmed that the member 
states could choose a higher level of protection than the existing international standards. 
                                                
863 United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute; Canada – 
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, US Panel report. para. 1067. 
864 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute, 
WT/DS320/AB/R . Oct. 16, 2008 (hereinafter US–Continued Suspension).  
865 US–Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 44. 
866 US–Continued Suspension.US Panel report. para.7.831-7 xxx 
867 Id. para. 7.612  
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In this respect, it referred to article 3.3, and asserted that the existence of an 
international standard does not necessarily imply the sufficiency of the scientific 
evidence in preventing a member state from invoking Article 5.7.868 Moreover, the AB 
stated that the previous scientific evidence could be held insufficient in the light of new 
studies and scientific information. It therefore lowered the threshold of ‘sufficiency’, 
and ruled that: 
There is no indication in Article 5.7 that a WTO Member may not take a provisional 
SPS measure wherever a relevant international organization or another Member has 
performed a risk assessment.  Information from relevant international organizations 
may not necessarily be considered ‘sufficient’ to perform a risk assessment, as it may be 
part of the ‘available pertinent information’ which provides the basis for a provisional 
SPS measure under Article 5.7…869 
 
The AB also took into account the evolving and uncertain nature of scientific evidence, 
and considered that evidence might change over time, by declaring that: 
   
Scientific evidence that may have been relied upon by an international body when 
performing the risk assessment that led to the adoption of an international standard at a 
certain point in time may no longer be valid, or may become insufficient in the light of 
subsequent scientific developments.  Therefore, the existence of a risk assessment 
performed by JECFA does not mean that scientific evidence underlying it must be 
considered to be sufficient within the meaning of Article 5.7.870  
Most importantly, The AB ruled that the risk assessments and international standards 
that are used by other members to demonstrate that scientific evidence is sufficient 
could be reasonable, but: ‘is not dispositive and may be rebutted by the Member taking 
the provisional SPS measure.’871 Therefore, according to this statement, international 
standards are not affirmative and non-rebuttable. If a state objectively shows that the risk 
assessment does not sufficiently respond to their desired level of protection, and there is 
still is not enough scientific evidence to revise the risk assessment under Article 5.1, 
international standards may be rebutted. 
This was a remarkable change in the interpretation of Article 5.7, in which the AB 
acknowledged the evolving and uncertain nature of the scientific research.872  This 
decision also permitted member states to act more cautiously when bound by the 
previous interpretations of Article 5.7 to conduct a risk assessment. It extended the 
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869 US–Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 695. 
870 Id. para. 695. 
871 Id. para. 696. 
872 Mercurio and Shao, p. 209. 
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operation of Article 5.7 and also gave more room to member states to determine their 
level of protection and their exposure to risk.873 
In the US/Canada-continued suspension case, the ‘critical mass’ standard that was set by the 
panel was found by the AB to be inflexible and difficult.874 Instead, the AB reversed the 
panel’s decision, and allowed the members states to take provisional measures. To do 
so, the states had to demonstrate new scientific evidence, conducted by a ‘qualified and 
respected source’, that placed doubt on the soundness of the existing scientific 
evidence.875 Again, the AB’s interpretation of Article 5.7 was different from the previous 
standard of proof, and allowed member states to respond proactively to risky situations. 
The AB also took into account the precautionary principle when interpreting Article 5.7. 
It recognized the peculiarities of emergency situations, and held that in these situations, 
in which states decide based on ‘limited information’, the obligations imposed on states 
by Article 5.7 should be assessed in light of the ‘exigencies of the emergency’.876   
Through this reasoning, the AB alleviated the existing tension in Article 5.7. While being 
cautious to grant it a broad discretion due to its function for exceptional 
circumstances877, this reasoning allowed member states to take precautionary measures 
based on their own perceived levels of risk.878  
The AB decision in the US/Canada-Continued Suspension case also concerned the judicial 
review, defined a middle ground between de novo review and deference, and elucidated 
on this ambiguous situation. It clarified the member state was under duty to conduct a 
risk assessment, and the panel had to review that risk assessment.879 The panel cannot 
assess the risk, since this would exceed its mandate under Article 11 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU).880. In other words, it should not determine whether 
                                                
873 Mercurio and Shao, p. 209. 
874 US–Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 695. 
874 Id. paras. 699-702 
875 Id. para. 703. 
876 Id. para. 680. 
877 See Japan–Varietals II Appellate Body Report that specifically advised against a ‘too broad or flexible’ 
interpretation of Article 5.7. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) (adopted Mar. 19, 1999), para. 80. 
878 Mercurio and Shao, p. 213. 
879 US–Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 590. 
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the risk assessment is correct, but rather whether ‘coherent reasoning and respectable 
scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable ‘.881 The AB established a 
step-by-step test for the panel to review the risk assessments conducted by the 
members: 
 ‘ 1) identify the scientific basis upon which the SPS measure was adopted. This 
scientific basis need not reflect the majority view within the scientific community but 
may reflect divergent or minority views.   
 2) Having identified the scientific basis underlying the SPS measure, the panel must 
then verify that the scientific basis comes from a respected and qualified source. 
Although the scientific basis need not represent the majority view within the scientific 
community, it must nevertheless have the necessary scientific and methodological 
rigour to be considered reputable science. In other words, while the correctness of the 
views need not have been accepted by the broader scientific community, the views 
must be considered to be legitimate science according to the standards of the relevant 
scientific community.  
 3) A panel should also assess whether the reasoning articulated on the basis of the 
scientific evidence is objective and coherent. In other words, a panel should review 
whether the particular conclusions drawn by the Member assessing the risk find 
sufficient support in the scientific evidence relied upon.  
 4) Finally, the panel must determine whether the results of the risk assessment 
‘sufficiently warrant’ the SPS measure at issue. Here, again, the scientific basis cited as 
warranting the SPS measure need not reflect the majority view of the scientific 
community provided that it comes from a qualified and respected source’882 
This sound interpretative framework, provided by the AB, represented a step forward in 
the evolution of the WTO jurisprudence towards the recognition of scientific 
complexities, and delivered considerable improvements to the system. The panel in the 
Australia–Apples carefully followed this step-by-step test.883 
Although this test provides guidance for member states to review risk assessment, the 
standard of review might be more relevant for the application of Articles 5.1 and 2.2, 
and also has important implications for Article 5.7. The test could be used to determine 
the sufficiency or insufficiency of scientific evidence, as an important factor that could 
trigger the application of Article 5.7. Moreover, it secures the room for the panel to 
objectively review the facts presented by a state that is adopting a precautionary 
measure, instead of completely deferring to its assessments regarding the insufficiency 
of the evidence. It provides more room for states to gather information, rather than 
hindering them with the rigorous and inflexible criteria provided by the previous 
interpretations of Article 5.7.  These previous interpretations determined the sufficiency 
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of evidence based on the ‘ill-defined and inconsistently applied notion of reliability’.884 
The new interpretation could be utilized to consider whether available scientific 
evidence was insufficient to conduct risk assessment. The basis of this interpretation is 
the recognition of the myth of unquestionable science.885 
The recent decision of the WTO in the US/Canada-Continued Suspension case modified 
the interpretative framework established throughout the first ten years of the SPS 
jurisprudence. The approach that the WTO took towards Article 5.7 was important, as 
it allowed greater flexibility for member states who were genuinely concerned about the 
uncertain effects of a particular product. It could be said that the decision was much 
closer to the precautionary principle constituents under international law rather than it 
was to those under Article 5.7. It has been argued that the decision develops a 
framework to be followed in the subsequent cases.886 
To conclude, although occasionally, the implied reflection of the precautionary principle 
in the SPS agreement was recognised, one should be aware of the fundamental 
difference between the exception provided under this agreement and general 
precautionary principle. According to di Benedetto, the WTO precautionary-like 
exception, offers a different perspective as it speaks of a right of the member states and 
not an obligation. The right to adopt restrictive measures necessary to protect human 
health, animal and plant. The reference to a law, which is ‘derived directly from the text 
('may'), is consistent with the logic of the WTO legal system, where protection of the 
environment is allowed only as an exception to the fundamental principles of free 
trade’.887 
4.6  Conclus ion and Synthes i s  o f  the  analy t i ca l  f ramework 
Environment-related disputes, which include scientific evidence, pose new challenges 
on the adjudication at the international level. The challenges arise because the particular 
genre of the disputes, the very core of the factual elements as the basis of the judgment, 
are often unknown. This situation renders traditional decision-making, through the 
application of the laws to the facts, difficult for the courts. Moreover, on account of the 
often-irreversible character of damage to the environment, and of the inherent 
limitations in fixing those damages, courts face the task of adopting a preventive, rather 
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than compensatory, logic. The peculiarities of the environmental concerns, together 
with scientific uncertainty regarding potential risks, require more attention from courts 
when regarding evidentiary rules and forward-looking approaches. 
This section attempted to assay how the precautionary principle has been invoked by 
contending parties in disputes. More importantly, it has attempted to discern whether 
and how courts have recognized this call. The decisions of five different international 
courts and tribunals were closely scrutinized, including the decisions by ECJ, ITLOS, 
ICJ and finally the decisions of dispute settlement bodies under the WTO Agreement. 
The courts, apart from the EU courts and the recent Advisory Opinion by the ITLOS, 
have been reluctant to expressly judge upon the principle and elaborate on its content 
however. There were several instances in which the contenting parties heavily relied 
upon the precautionary principle, but in which procedural issues prevented the courts 
from entering the merit phase. These decisions were criticized by Judges’ dissents to be 
missed opportunities to elaborate on the content and framework of the principle. 
The courts, particularly the EU Courts have in different instances set the criteria for the 
application of the principle, and have defined a threshold (above which the principle 
imposes a duty on the states and becomes binding). The ECJ for instance has specified 
that the precautionary principle cannot be based on a ‘purely hypothetical approach to 
the risk’ or on ‘mere conjecture which has not been scientifically verified’, but rather 
should be ‘adequately backed up by the scientific data available’. The ECJ held that thie 
was true even if, ‘the reality and extent thereof have not been fully demonstrated by 
conclusive scientific evidence’. In another case, it ruled that the precautionary principle 
should apply where there is a ‘mere probability’ of harm, and not ‘definitely significant 
effects’ When there is ‘Insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision’ of science and 
there is still a ‘likelihood of real harm’, a measure can also be justified by the 
precautionary principle.888  
In a landmark decision on the principle, ITLOS recognized it to be an ‘integral part of 
the general obligation of due diligence … which is applicable even outside of the scope 
of the regulation’. The obligation of due diligence requires states to take all measures 
necessary to prevent damages were ‘scientific evidence concerning the scope and 
potential negative impact of the activity is insufficient’, and where there are ‘plausible 
indications of potential risk’. The implication of this reasoning is that disregarding these 
risks is in breach of the obligation of due diligence. Subsequently, it constitutes a ‘failure 
                                                
888 Case C-219/07, Nationale Raad van Dierenkwekersen Liefhebbers VZW, ECJ 2008, paras. 37 and 38. 
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to comply with the precautionary approach’. Judge Trinidade, in his dissenting opinion 
of the Pulp mills case, argued along the same lines that, given the recurring prevalence 
of scientific uncertainties in environmental concerns, the epistemology of the 
precautionary principle is geared to the duty of care of due diligence. 
Besides the direct application of the principle under international law, precautionary 
thinking was also frequently found in other decisions, and was inherent in several 
judgments. Provisional measures were granted by courts, pending the establishment of 
the court, for the merits. It has been often argued that provisional measures are 
precautionary in nature, and are a logical consequence when ensuring that the 
environment is not threatened. The EIA represents another instance that is clearly 
required by the precautionary principle. It has been claimed to be ‘a precondition for 
undertaking the activities, and to demonstrate that there was no risk associated with 
them’, and is now part of customary international law.  
Tribunals have also decided on the admissibility of scientific disputes and judicial 
reviews by ruling that the courts should not conduct scientific assessments. They should 
instead review if there has been a ‘manifest error’ or a ‘misuse of powers’. In the same 
vein, according to the WTO the court should not conduct a new risk assessment; it 
should only review the assessments that have been conducted by the member state. 
Therefore, there exists, in this genre of disputes, a wide discretion for the public 
authority to decide on the objectives to be pursued, and on the choice of the 
appropriate means of action. 
There were frequent criticisms by judges over cases that demonstrated that the 
precautionary principle was capable of playing a role and acknowledged its normative 
capacity. This criticism confirmed that the principle is not an abstract tool, and has 
fulfilled the criteria to be considered as a tool to assist the tribunals. Judge Trinidad has 
argued that: 
The fact that the Court has not expressly acknowledged the existence of this general 
principle of International Environmental Law does not mean that it does not exist. 
A carefully delineated version of the principle can be sensible and useful in dispute 
settlement.  
While the WTO has been reluctant to admit the precautionary principle’s existence as a 
general international law, the ECTHR889 and ITLOS have been more favorable, and the 
ICJ has fallen somewhere in between. In the Pulp Mills case, the Court stated that while 
                                                
889 Tătar v. Romania, supra Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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the principle might be relevant in interpreting and applying the statute, it does not 
reverse the burden of proof. At the EU level, courts have explicitly recognized the 
normative nature of the principle as a general principle of European law. 
Be that as it may, in several occasions courts have applied precautionary thinking and 
have interpreted situations in favor of the environment. This is the essence of the 
principle, and the underlying objective of this study: regardless of its nonbinding nature 
under international law, the precautionary principle has the capacity to inform decisions. 
In almost all of the disputes that were mentioned in this chapter, there was a 
disagreement between developmental and environmental concerns, and in each case the 
precautionary principle was used to justify the restrictive measures, or to prevent 
development. Having the principle as a guiding tool is not equal to protecting the 
environment at any expense, and the precautionary principle requires the developments 
to involve zero risk.  Promoting precautionary thinking requires states to not only allow 
any hypothetical risk to tamper any development, but also requires that policies have to 
meet certain criteria to be justified as precautionary measures. This is also the ultimate 
purpose of sustainable development. 
To synthetize the findings on the precautionary principle as a conclusion of the 
analytical framework, both chapter 3 and chapter 4 will be considered. From the outset, 
this analysis aimed to introduce a benchmark based on the core elements of the 
precautionary principle, and also the jurisprudence on its actual application. Therefore, 
this chapter will conclude by integrating the entire analysis into a set of questions (figure 
3) that could be used by investment tribunals to evaluate whether an environmental 
policy has violated the FET, or has caused regulatory expropriation. 
 
• What is the chosen level by the tribunal to review the measure adopted by the 
host state? Would the tribunal defer to the capability of experts and decision 
makers, or would it decide to conduct a limited (as apposed to de novo) review to 
determine whether the host state had acted according to the obligations that it 
accepted under the relevant investment agreement. 
• Did the host state have reasonable grounds for concern? How probable is the 
occurrence of the feared threat? What would the gravity of harm have been had 
the threat materialized? 
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• What is the degree of the potential adverse effects, taking into account the 
geography of the project, the length of the harmful activity, cumulative effects, 
the existence of international standards or obligations and fatal effects? 
• How was the measure was communicated to the investor? Was the investor 
aware of the legal environment and the review process? 
• After all other aspects of the measure have been assessed, the final question 
should be: was the adopted measure effective and proportional to the threat of 
potential harm? 
 
This set of questions would first and foremost address the main elements of the 
principle, as established by various international instruments. It would also provide a 
background on the measure (through questions two to four), instead of beginning with 
the measure being out of context. The effectiveness and proportionality of the measure 
is crucial to assess if a measure has violated investment provisions. These questions 
would walk the tribunal through an important set of facts, recognized under 
environmental law, which triggered the measure. This would demonstrate to tribunals 
what the measure actually was. Compressing all of these elements into a set of questions 
would improve its practicality, as it is asking questions instead of listing some terms that 
would again be require interpretation. Thus, it would raise the chances of the 
precautionary principle becoming a benchmark to be applied by subsequent tribunals. In 
any case, enough room should be left for the specifics of each case. This thesis proved 
that the precautionary test provided under this thesis was not exhaustive, and could 
accommodate as much specificity as any one case might require. Once again, the 
cardinal point here is to encourage tribunals to understand what triggered the measure, 
and what is at stake, before deciding, based on comparisons, the loss that was imposed 
on the investor and the restrictive measure. 
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‘A Precautionary Test’ 
1) Standard of Review  
• Deference, margin of appreciation, etc. 
• De Novo analysis 
2) Is there reasonable ground for concern? 
• Probability?  
• Gravity? 
3) The degree of the potential adverse effect (seriousness, severity, 
irreversibility) 
• Geography? 
• Size? 
• Length? 
• Cumulative effect?  
• International obligations or standards 
4) How did the measure and concerns were communicated? 
• Due process 
• Guideline 
5) What type of the measure adopted?  
• Was it effective? 
• Was it Proportional? 
                      Figure 3: Precautionary Test 
 
 
5 OPERATIONALIZING THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE 
 
5.1  Introduct ion 
Concerns over environmental protection are rising worldwide. States adopt different 
monitoring and ex-ante mechanisms to either address these concerns at the national 
level or to comply with their international obligations. Sometimes, through their vigilant 
supervision, states might learn that certain activities could potentially damage the 
environment. Among the tools that environmental law has provided for states to 
control environmental damages is the precautionary principle. This principle allows (and 
sometimes obliges) states to take actions to prevent future damage, providing they can 
establish that the activity in question could inflict serious or irreversible harm to the 
environment. As a result, depending on the level of potential harm or the nature of the 
activity, authorities might take different actions. Examples include the revocation of 
permit, the refusal to renew expired permits, the rejection or requirement of the EIA, a 
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temporary or permanent ban on certain products or activities, zoning decisions, etc. As 
a result, the developers or owners of these affected activities might suffer economic 
losses, compared to the time when they started their investment. This common practice 
for environmental protection will give the affected foreign investor a right (or 
opportunity) to file an investor-state dispute claiming violation of investment 
provisions. Consequently, investment tribunals are left to decide whether the impact of 
a measure adopted to prevent environmental damage is a violation of a state’s obligation 
under an investment treaty. This would expose states to have their actions reviewed by 
the arbitral tribunals, who have not yet demonstrated a consistent approach towards 
states’ efforts to monitor the environmental compliance of potentially hazardous 
activities. 
The current trend in the current investor’s claims indicates that disputed environmental 
components are not as straightforward as early disputes, however. While early disputes 
were mainly concerned with a direct ban on a product, zoning decisions and taking 
property for environmental purposes, recent claims have targeted the very core of 
monitoring and supervision mechanisms. For instance, recent disputes include claims 
such as the length of time that states spent to review the environmental impact of a 
project; the requirement to conduct an EIA due to the nature of the proposed project; 
the fact that states granted a renewable permit instead of a permanent one; the method 
that the agencies have adopted to review the project and so forth. These claims could 
interrupt the efficiency of states’ ability to regulate and supervise potentially hazardous 
activities. Moreover, since these claims focus more on the way investors were treated; 
they could create more complexity for the tribunals deciding on treaty violation.  
Previously, in the second chapter, it was argued that tribunals have so far been 
inconsistent on what is or is not a violation (in terms of environmental protection 
measures). This unpredictability exposes genuine environmental protection as well, and 
the subject matter relates to whether these concerns might be a treaty violation, rather 
than whether the state had protectionist concerns. The main research question of this 
study examined if the precautionary principle, not only as a legal principle but also as a 
modern tool for environmental management, could assist tribunals in interpreting the 
investment treaty provisions. In other words, the aim is to encourage investment 
tribunals to take into account current environmental concerns in an objective and 
systematic way, through the precautionary principle. The result of its application is 
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expected to expand objectivity in environment-related investment dispute settlement by 
using a benchmark to assess the disputed measures.  
Be that as it may, identifying a legal principle is entirely different from applying it under 
international law. To view the text of the treaty and come up with an understanding that 
allows application of the precautionary principle, tribunals must act through the medium 
of treaty interpretation. This is given under article 31-33 VCLT, as the general rules of 
treaty interpretation.890 The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the possible ways 
to introduce the precautionary principle as a tool in investment treaty interpretation. 
This analysis would also demonstrate that the principle, as a non-binding instrument, 
could be applied to assist tribunals in raising crucial questions that would greatly 
influence the outcome of the relevant disputes. This argument not only serves the main 
research question, but also responds to the criticism that lacking a binding effect and a 
normative character, the precautionary principle cannot be applicable. 
To provide sufficient justification for operationalizing the precautionary principle, this 
chapter is divided into three sections: theoretical justification, practical justification and 
case evaluation. The section on theoretical justification will introduce two different 
routes, both passing through the general rules of treaty interpretation, to serve as 
gateway for the incorporation of precautionary principle in the interpretation of the 
investment provisions. This will make the principle more digestible, even for opponents. 
The first suggested route is the textual reading of the investment treaty, which also calls 
for an evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation. The second route is the 
fashionable concept of the ‘systemic integration’ through Article 31.3.c VCLT.  
Assuming that the first section provides sufficient theoretical methods to support the 
possibility of this transposition, the second section will further elaborate on why an 
investment tribunal would, or should, consider applying a principle under 
environmental law to interpret the provisions of investment treaty. The third section 
evaluates the feasibility of all of the arguments in this thesis. It will look at three 
different cases and examine how influential the precautionary principle would have 
been,  had the tribunal applied it. The final section features a more speculative outlook 
that will act as an example of what this research has argued about. 
                                                
890 United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, Signed at Vienna 23 May 1969. 
  
 
175 
5.2  Theore t i ca l  Just i f i cat ion 
5.2.1 Evolutionary interpretation 
The text of the treaty is the first thing to look at. For instance, ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ and ‘expropriation’ are the text of the treaty that investors have mostly 
claimed to be violated in environment-related cases. Therefore the arbitrator’s task is, 
first and foremost, to look at these provisions and find out what the treaty requires from 
the host state. Evidently, treaty interpretation only comes in if the text itself is not clear 
and requires investigation into its meaning, to enable the tribunal to apply it to the facts 
of the case. Although, according to the rule of treaty interpretation as encapsulated in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the starting point would be 
the ordinary meaning of the treaty text, international law must be introduced into the 
analysis of a claim under an investment treaty in the first place, through the medium of 
treaty interpretation.891 
The first consideration should be the vague provisions of the investment treaties, which 
call for interpretations, before applying these provisions to the facts. One well-
supported reason for reaching out to the precautionary principle is the incomplete 
language of the treaties or investment protection provisions. The tribunals must 
interpret these and attempt to fill in the gaps. Schill stated that investment treaties 
include ‘the most notorious and vaguely crafted treaty provisions’, such as FET.892 
Walde also argued that Article 31.3 VCLT can be used to ‘fill the open-ended language 
of the main investment obligations in treaties by reference to the common core of the 
over 3,000 bilateral.’893 
It is argued that judgments in practice are based on factual context, and not simply on 
formal rules and legal doctrines.894 However, this is not to claim that legal texts and 
doctrine have less importance, but rather to argue that they are insufficient to 
understand the judicial interpretation and the outcomes of the cases.895 This assumes a 
more active role for the tribunals:  
                                                
891 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention’, p. 
372. 
892 Stephan W Schill, supra, 90 p. 135. 
893  Thomas Waelde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples’, in International 
Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, ed. by Christina Binder and others 
(Oxford  ; New York: OUP Oxford, 2009), p. 732. 
894 Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark Pollack, ‘Hard v. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists 
in International Governance’, Minnesota Law Review, 94 (2010), p. 750. 
895 Id. 
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Judges are viewed as situated decision makers who respond to disputes in light of 
particular social, political, and historical contexts which shape their views of the facts of 
a particular case. The texts of agreements are seen as having a degree of malleability (or 
incompleteness) that can be adapted (or filled out) in light of these contexts.896 
 
Judges or tribunals charged with interpreting such treaties perform a gap-filling 
function, which, according to Reisman, is to perform ‘supplementing task when lacuna 
exist in the applicable law’. They do this by taking into account non-legal issues, 
including the ‘wider implications of the law and the community agreed 
policies’.897   Therefore, the role of judges as gap-fillers in interpreting incomplete 
agreements could encourage the application of soft law and guiding tools to fill these 
gaps. In such interpretative functions, soft-law provisions can indirectly inform the 
interpretation and application of the hard law texts, and hence they can shape the 
outcome of the decisions.898 
As the first step, tribunals are required to start by looking at the text of the treaty and its 
ordinary meaning. This should be considered in the light of the original object and 
purpose of the treaty. According to Article 31.1 VCLT: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.899 
This section raises two important issues. First is the interpretation in light of the object 
and purpose. In this case, the crucial question is the object and purpose of the 
investment treaties. Secondly, the principle of contemporaneity should also be 
considered. According to this principle the terms of a treaty must be interpreted 
according to the ‘meaning, which they possessed, or which would have been attributed 
to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at the time when the treaty was 
originally concluded’.900 This raises the question of whether the tribunal should look for 
the meaning of those provisions at the time of conclusion of that particular treaty, or at 
the time of its application. 
As highlighted previously, due to the vague provisions of the investment treaties, the 
terms should be interpreted in light of their object and purpose. However, interpreting a 
                                                
896 Id. p.749.   
897 Michael Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates’ versus “Systemic Implications”: How Should Investment 
Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture’, Arbitration International, 29.2 (2013), 131–52 (pp. 
149–50). 
898 Shaffer & Pollackt, supra 912. p.751 
899 Article 31.1 VCLT, supra 890. 
900  Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’, British Year Book of International Law, 33 (1957), 203 (p. 212). 
  
 
177 
treaty provision according to its object and purpose is not a straightforward task. As a 
matter of fact, there are diverging views among scholars with respect to the object and 
purpose of investment treaties. One argument is that the object and purpose of the 
BITs is to promote investment. This is achieved by defining the rights of foreign 
investors and the duties of the host states, in connection with the protection of 
international investment. This means that the vague provisions will be interpreted 
according to the investor’s benefit, and according to the extent that they were disturbed 
by the host states’ measures. For instance, in MTD v. Chile, the tribunal specified that it 
would interpret the provision of the BIT ‘in the manner most conducive to fulfil the 
objective of the BIT to protect investments and create conditions favourable to investments’.901 
Other instances of the same view include Siemens v. Argentine, in which the object of the 
treaty was considered to ‘create favourable conditions for investments and to stimulate private 
initiative’, 902 Azurix v Argentina, in which the tribunal simply defined the purpose of the 
treaty ‘to encourage and protect investment’903 and also SGS v. Philippines, in which the tribunal 
referred to the narrow treaty preamble that dictates ‘It is legitimate to resolve 
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments.’904  
Considering the history of the investment regime and the triggers for its occurrence, this 
approach might seem valid. However, it is also true that the object and purpose of a 
treaty is an evolving concept. Furthermore, the purpose of drafting a treaty in 1970s, as 
an emergency response to extensive expropriatory policies, has changed.905 Aside from 
evolving concept, most modern investment treaties do not state that the protection of 
                                                
901 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, supra 45. para 104.  
902 Siemens v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, at para 81.  
903  Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 12 May 2005, Award, 
2006. para. 372. 
904 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, case No ARB/02/6 of. January 29, 
2004. para 116. Also: Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18. Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 
April 2004. para. 85:‘the object and purpose of the BIT is to provide broad protection for investors and 
their investments.’ Sempra Energy International v Argentina , ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005. para. 142 ‘the clear intention was to provide full protection for investors.’ For a 
more ‘enlightened’ view see Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 2010. paras. 272-73. However, it is argued that its not the tribunals to 
be blamed as their reading of the object and purpose are not indefensible, but rather he believes that it is 
for the governments to draft the treaty preambles in such a way that it reflects the prerogatives of the 
states to regulate in public interest. Therefore having a more balanced preamble could help to ensure that 
tribunals  ‘do not view it as ‘legitimate’ to resolve uncertainties in treaty interpretation so as to favour 
investor interests’. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making’, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004, p. 24. 
905 The logic behind this argument is that BIT’s developed as a necessity to cope with an emergency 
situation which was the extensive expropriation policies in 1960’s. After the efforts to draft an 
international agreements failed, BITs took over. The 1962 draft convention on protection of foreign 
assets and its provisions, argued to be the model based on which all major investment exporting 
countries, all being OECD members, prepared their BITs in other words, it acted like a model treaty. 
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foreign investment is the only object and purpose, but rather that it is only one of the 
treaty’s several objects and purposes.906This was also confirmed by the WTO Appellate 
Body in Shrimp case, which ruled that ‘most treaties have no single, undiluted object and 
purpose but rather a variety of different, and possibly conflicting, objects and 
purposes.’907 
Some tribunals have assented to this approach. For instance, the Saluka tribunal started 
with the ordinary meaning and referred to the SD Myer908 tribunal’s finding to interpret 
the FET. They asserted that the ordinary meaning could not provide much insight.909 
The tribunal then referred to the immediate and broader context of the provision, 
which allowed the object and purpose of the treaty to be discerned from its title and 
preamble.910 Looking at the preamble of the treaty, which indicated that its objectives 
were investment promotion and economic development, the tribunal noted that: 
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a 
necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and 
extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls for a 
balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provisions for the 
protection of investments, since an interpretation which exaggerates the protection to 
be accorded to foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting 
foreign investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the 
parties’ mutual economic relations.911  
 
Another example is the LG&E tribunal, who focused on the (apparently) broader 
language in the preamble of the investment treaty, and stated that‘in entering the BIT as 
                                                
906 See Saluka award, supra 41. paras. 299–300; Thomas Waelde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: 
Experiences and Examples’, in International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph 
Schreuer, ed. by Christina Binder and others (Oxford  ; New York: OUP Oxford, 2009); Jan Klabbers, 
‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’, Finnish Y.B. Int’l L, 8, 138; Zachary 
Douglas, ‘Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and Methanex’, 
Arbitration International, 22.1 (2006), 27–52 (p. 51); David S. Jonas and Thomas N. Saunders, ‘The Object 
and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law., 43.3 (2010), 
565 (p. 579) arguing that: ‘The command to interpret a treaty ‘in light of its object and purpose’ suggests a 
holistic mode of interpretation that accounts for more than the goals of specific treaty provisions and 
encompasses the normative logic that presents itself when the entirety of the treaty's provisions are 
considered together’; On evolutionary interpretation see: Bruno Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: 
A Place for Human Rights?’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 60.03 (2011), 573–96 (p. 583); 
Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Questions for Mark Clodfelter and David A. Gantz’, South Texas Law Review, 42 
(2001), 1303 (p. 14). 
907 United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) at para. 17. 
908 ‘treatment in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is 
unacceptable from the international perspective’ S.D. Myers award. para. 263. 
909 Saluka Award, supra 41.para. 297. 
910 Id. para. 299. 
911 Id. para. 300. 
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a whole, the parties’ desire is to ‘promote greater economic cooperation’ and ‘stimulate 
the flow of private capital and the economic development of the parties’. 912 
To justify different interpretation of the object and purpose in general, some have 
argued that there is a distinction between the ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ of a treaty. This 
distinction should be taken into account when one looks into the object and purpose of 
a treaty to interpret a provision. Simply put, the ‘object’ is the substantial content of the 
treaty, including the provisions, rights and obligations created by the treaty, whereas, the 
‘purpose’ is the reason for establishing the substantial content of the treaty.913 Following 
this methodology, it is claimed that the object of the investment treaties, is protection of 
foreign investment. This is common among the many treaties signed since 1959 
between Germany and Pakistan. The purpose however, according to the treaties, is to 
improve economic development among the contracting parties, in addition to increasing 
prosperity and encouraging international capital flow.914 According to one commentator, 
the object of the treaty is the means to achieve its main purpose: 
The investment protection guarantees provided for in the body of the treaty are the 
instruments with which to encourage capital flows between the two countries and in 
turn contribute to the prosperity (or development) of both contracting parties.915 
 
Aligned with the same argument, Douglas emphasises that the promotion of foreign 
investment is not the raison d'être of the treaty; it is only one of the key objectives of 
concluding the investment treaties. Therefore, the policy of favouring the protection of 
                                                
912  LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1. Decision on Liability, October 3, 2006. para. 124. 
913 see Jan Klabbers, supra 906. p. 138; It is suggested that the distinction becomes relevant since focusing 
only on the purpose of the treaty is to prevent excessive teleological interpretation, which might result in 
making the provisions of treaty irrelevant as long as the aim and purpose of the treaty is fulfilled. Whereas 
by including the object in the interpretation the substantive provisions of the treaty are linked to the 
purpose and aim of the treaty. Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a 
Treaty: An Enigma?’, Austrian Review of International and European Law (ARIEL), 3.1 (1998), 311–43 (p. 
332). 
914 The preamble to the 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT reads as follows: DESIRING to intensify economic 
cooperation between the two States, INTENDING to create favourable conditions for investments by 
nationals and companies of either State in the territory of the other State, and RECOGNIZING that an 
understanding reached between the two States is likely to promote investment, encourage private 
industrial and financial enterprise and to increase the prosperity of both the States, HAVE AGREED AS 
FOLLOWS’. The preamble to the 2009 Germany-Pakistan BIT reads as follows: ‘Desiring to intensify 
economic co-operation between both States, Intending to create favourable conditions for investments by 
investors of either State in the territory of the other State, Recognizing that the encouragement and 
protection of such investments can stimulate private business initiative and increase the prosperity of 
both Contracting States, Have agreed as follows’. 
915 Ortino, supra 95 p. 4. 
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foreign investment ‘cannot be invoked to determine the rights and obligations of the 
parties to a particular investment dispute on the merits.’916 
The preamble and objective of the great majority of early treaties are defined as 
‘prosperity’ and ‘development’.917The trend however changed in 1990’s to accommodate 
broader objectives, such as economic growth and, more recently, sustainable 
development.918 The long-term purpose of the treaty is becoming increasingly important 
in treaty interpretation, as is development in both states.919  Following the increasing 
attention to the concept of sustainable development, the meaning of economic 
development has also evolved, as Van den Berge states:  
Economic development describes the full range of changes in humanity’s economic, 
social, and natural environments that are perceived by people as making life more 
pleasant and satisfying.920 
There are many arguments supporting the idea that increasing foreign investment does 
not necessarily cause economic growth by itself.921 It is a multifaceted goal, and as noted 
in a publication by the World Bank: 
It is important to remember that development is far more complex than simply 
economic growth … Development is also the qualitative transformation of a whole 
society, a shift to new ways of thinking, and, correspondingly, to new relations and new 
methods of production. Moreover… transformation qualifies as development only if it 
benefits most people— improves their quality of life and gives them more control over 
their destinies.922 
                                                
916 Zachary Douglas, ‘Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex’, Arbitration International, 22.1 (2006), 27–52 (p. 51); Jan Klabbers, supra 906. p. 147. 
917 1961 Switzerland-Tunisia BIT; 1965 Belgium/Luxembourg-Morocco BIT; 1975 United Kingdom-
Egypt BIT; 1985 Italy-Tunisia BIT; 1979 Netherlands-Senegal BIT; in those years, post-war period, 
prosperity meant economic growth.; 1962 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property recognized the ‘importance of promoting the flow of capital for economic activity and 
development’. 
918  A trend that gradually started after the Stockholm Conference (The United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden from June 5–16 in 1972). 
919 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, Reprint edition (Oxford University Press, U.S.A., 2010), pp. 
196–199. 
920 Hendrik Van den Van den Berg, Economic Growth and Development, 2 edition (Hackensack : World 
Scientific Publishing Company, 2012), p. 28. He also argues that ‘The complexity of the process of 
economic development and its interactions with our greater social and natural environments requires us 
to move beyond the familiar economic relationships studied by orthodox, or mainstream, economics. 
Gaining an understanding of our complex human existence is a difficult task. To be successful, we need 
to formally recognize the interdependence of social and natural phenomena. And, we need to adopt an 
efficient method for increasing our knowledge about this complex reality. The perspective we take in this 
textbook is called holism, our approach to economic modeling is heterodox, and our method of analysis 
seeks to follow the steps of the scientific method.’ Ibid at 29. 
921 See Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford England  ; New York: OUP USA, 2009). 
922 Tatyana P. Soubbotina, Beyond Economic Growth, Second Edition (The World Bank, 2004), p. 123. 
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After all, although some commentators have made a distinction between the treaty's 
‘immediate’ goal, and its ‘distant’ purpose,923 the issue has hardly been mentioned by 
international practice. Some have suggested that they both should be regarded as one 
notion.924 Klabbers argues that object and purpose are not abstract terms; instead they 
are rather flexible and their meaning depends to a large extent on:  
The characteristics of that situation; it depends not only on the treaty itself which may 
be at issue, but also, as argued above, on the particular treaty-problem concerned. As 
such, object and purpose is and will remain indeed an utterly flexible notion, able to 
cater to various needs and different circumstances.925 
 
The next crucial point on the object and purpose of treaties is the issue of the temporal 
reference point of interpretation. Most investment treaties have been concluded for a 
long period of time, and the language and meaning of the provisions have been affected 
by the passage of time. The question is whether the interpretation concerns the meaning 
at the time of conclusion of the treaty, or the time of interpretation. While the former 
does not factor the passage of time, and is rather a static and subjective approach, the 
latter is more dynamic and evolutionary. As a result it provides for a more objective 
interpretation.926 
Crawford supported the concept of evolutionary interpretation as a way to ‘bring a 
treaty up to speed with modern times’, and regarded it as nothing more than the 
‘expression of the traditional canons of treaty construction’. 927  Bjorge argued that 
evolutionary interpretation is not a new method of interpretation; it is a natural part of 
the classical cannons of treaty interpretation under article 31-33 of the VCLT.928  
In Costa Rica v. Nicaragua a dispute before the ICJ, regarding interpretation of the 1858 
Treaty, the Court was of the opinion that whether the meaning of the word ‘commerce’ 
has changed since 1858 is irrelevant. They ruled that the matter only concerned the 
                                                
923 Elizabeth Zoller, La bonnefoi en droit internationalp ublic (1977) p. 74. Quoted in Klabbers, supra 906. p. 
144. 
924 For a detailed analysis on different literature and decisions regarding the object and purpose see Jan 
Klabbers, supra 929. p. 138. 
925 Id. p. 160. See also: Julian Arato, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of 
Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences’, Law & Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals, 9.3 (2010), p. 467. 
926 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, ed. by Bruno Simma and others, 3rd. edition (Oxford, 
United Kingdom: OUP Oxford, 2012), p. 35. 
927 James Crawford, foreword on Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (Oxford University 
Press, 2014). p. v.  
928Bjorge, supra 927. Although, Simma believes that this type of interpretation is more suited for some 
type of treaties than it is for others such as human rights jurisprudence: Bruno Simma, ‘Mainstreaming 
Human Right: the Contribution of the International ourt of Justice: Community Interest Coming to Life?’ 
in CJ Tams and Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 323. 
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‘present meaning’ of the term. The Court justified its opinion by stating that first, since 
the states used a ‘generic term’ as commerce they must be ‘necessarily… aware that the 
meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time’.929 Secondly, when a treaty has a 
‘continuing duration’, parties to the treaty  ‘intended [generic] terms to have an evolving 
meaning’.930 Later, the Court in Pulp Mills cited this decision, and asserted that the 
obligation to ‘protect and preserve’ under the 1975 Treaty has to be interpreted: 
In accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so much 
acceptance among State…to undertake an environmental impact assessment 
where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant 
adverse impact in a transboundary context.931  
 
Therefore, the argument under this subsection is that although the investment treaty 
provisions were initiated to protect the interest of foreign investor in the host country, 
the current practice of state reveals that it is no longer the main purpose. The same 
states and organisations that promoted investment protection have demonstrated their 
determination to promote sustainable development. As a demonstration of evolving 
objectives, the OECD 1962 Draft Convention on Protection of Foreign Assets acted as a model 
treaty for most of the BITs that exist today.932 It is worth noting that the same 
organisation issued a series of guidelines in 1976 regarding the International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises. 933 In the background to the 2011 update, the OECD stated that: 
Since the last review of the Guidelines in 2000, the landscape for international 
investment and multinational enterprises has continued to change rapidly. The world 
economy has witnessed new and more complex patterns of production and 
consumption. Non-OECD countries are attracting a larger share of world investment 
and multinational enterprises from non-adhering countries have grown in importance. 
At the same time, the financial and economic crisis and the loss in confidence in open 
markets, the need to address climate change, and reaffirmed international commitments 
to development goals have prompted renewed calls from governments, the private 
sector and social partners for high standards of responsible business conduct.934 
 
                                                
929 see also,  Julian Arato, supra 943. p. 468; Eirik Bjorge, supra 945. p. 9. 
930 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ Reports 2009, p 243. para. 
66. 
931 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment of April 20, 2010, ICJ Reports 14 (2010). para 204. 
932 Patrick Juillard, Bilateral Investment Treaties In The Context Of Investment Law, Investment Compact 
Regional Roundtable on Bilateral Investment Treaties for the Protection and Promotion of Foreign 
Investment in South East Europe (Dubrovnik, Croatia: OECD, 28 May 2001). 
933 Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 1976, revised several times, 
the last update is 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:  its about duties of 
MNEs as an initiation by the OECD to define the rights and duties of both sides as apposed to the BITs 
which are the rights of the MNEs and duties of the sovereign states. 
934 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/2011update.htm.  
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In the 2011 guideline935 there is a chapter on the environment, which acknowledges the 
importance of environmental protection and its role in sustainable development in its 
commentary. It even recognises the action of the Multinational Enterprises to be based 
on the precautionary approach and an ex ante basis: 
Several instruments already adopted by countries adhering to the Guidelines, including 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, enunciate a 
‘precautionary approach’. None of these instruments is explicitly addressed to 
enterprises, although enterprise contributions are implicit in all of them. 936 
The main idea of this series of guidelines was to ensure that foreign investors are in 
harmony with government policies to contribute to sustainable development,937 and also 
to encourage governments to improve the welfare of their people.938 The guideline also 
emphasised that there should not be any contradiction between the activity of foreign 
investors and sustainable development.939 The reason for highlighting some parts of 
these documents was not for their applicability; instead it was to demonstrate how the 
objective and perspective can evolve within the same institution. A simple glance into 
the current focus of global organisations uncovers how the focus has changed. 
Therefore, the outcome of the argument for evolutionary interpretation is not to deny 
the importance of the obligations to which states have committed themselves. The 
                                                
935 A review of the statements by the OECD as the provider of the first concepts of the BITs is important 
and necessary in the sense that it demonstrates the change of the objective and purpose (The concept is 
the same from the legal standpoint but the issues that are raised in 1960’s and 70’s are not the same as 
current issues as stated by the OECD in the previous paragraph.) of the BITs from the point of view of 
the same organization (and its members) and the evolving nature of the concerns.  
936 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Recommendations for responsible business conduct in a 
global context, Text and Commentary, 2011, id. Commentary on the Environment, 68, p. 45-46. Available 
at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf . 
937 In the preface, the objective of the guideline is explained as ‘The Guidelines aim to ensure that the 
operations of these enterprises are in harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of 
mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help improve the 
foreign investment climate and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by 
multinational enterprises’; Also Principle 1 requires that: ‘MNEs should contribute to economic, 
environmental and social progress with a view to   achieving sustainable development.’937 
938 In the preface ‘Governments can also help by maintaining and promoting appropriate standards and 
policies in support of sustainable development and by engaging in on-going reforms to ensure that public 
sector activity is efficient and effective. Governments adhering to the Guidelines are committed to 
continuous improvement of both domestic and international policies with a view to improving the 
welfare and living standards of all people.’ 
939 Commentary on the general principle ‘There should not be any contradiction between the activity of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and sustainable development, and the Guidelines are meant to foster 
complementarities in this regard. Indeed, links among economic, social, and environmental progress are a 
key means for furthering the goal of sustainable development.’ Also in the introduction to the chapter on 
Environment it stated that ‘Enterprises should, within the framework of laws, regulations and 
administrative practices in the countries in which they operate, and in consideration of relevant 
international agreements, principles, objectives, and standards, take due account of the need to protect the 
environment, public health and safety, and generally to conduct their activities in a manner contributing 
to the wider goal of sustainable development.’ 
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argument instead highlights the stance of those commitments, under the current 
practice of the same states that originally agreed to commit to those treaties. 
Therefore, adopting evolutionary interpretation in the context of this research means 
that a tribunal could interpret the poorly defined provisions of FET and indirect 
expropriation according to the object and purpose of the investment treaty, and also 
according to the current practice of the states. Jonas & Saunder proposed that:  
The command to interpret a treaty ‘in light of its object and purpose’ suggests a holistic 
mode of interpretation that accounts for more than the goals of specific treaty 
provisions and encompasses the normative logic that presents itself when the entirety 
of the treaty's provisions are considered together.940 
 
Building on the arguments based on an evolutionary interpretation of investment 
treaties, the assumption is that the long-term purpose of most treaties could be 
considered to be sustainable development (or sustainable economic development) for 
both parties. Nevertheless, integrative decision-making is at the heart of the concept of 
sustainable development.941 This practice requires a complex and delicate balancing 
exercise, as the needs of the future depend crucially on how well we balance economic, 
environmental and social objectives that might be in conflict with one another.942 The 
2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development confirms this point by declaring 
that states have: 
Collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing pillars of sustainable development—economic development, social 
development and environmental protection—at the local, national, regional and global 
levels.943 
The central point in sustainable development is that there is no theoretical deduction to 
achieve its goals. The determination of the balance is not found in the concept itself; 
this is left for the decision makers. Accordingly, it is argued that sustainable 
development is a process that the decision maker engages in, making the link between the 
                                                
940 Jonas and Saunders, p. 579.  
941 Philippe Sands Principles of International Economic Law  (Cambridge, CUP 2003) at 263. On the 
Principle of integration as a ‘fundamental component of sustainable development’. There are, in fact,  
other key elements identified with the concept of sustainable development such as inter-generational 
equity to preserve natural resources for the benefit of future and also to ensure that all people within the 
current generation are able to meet their basic needs (Ortino p. 12). Nevertheless, integrative decision 
making as the main point is aimed to balance all the needs and ensure that the goal of the concept actually 
happens.  
942 Ortino. P. 13 
943  Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, in Report of the  World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, A/CONF. 199/20 (New York: United Nations, 2002) paragraph 5. 
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three elements of economics, social and environmental in each specific case.944 In other 
words, it is about taking all the elements into account. As one commentator suggests: 
The actual outcome of a given balancing exercise will crucially depend on the relevance 
given, by the decision-maker, to the various economic, environmental and social needs 
at issue in the specific case. In this sense, the principle of integration focuses on 
establishing an appropriate process capable of achieving sustainable development rather 
than providing the result of that balance.945 
Consequently, in light of the fact that sustainable development is the underlying long-
term purpose of the investment treaty (as argued above), it could be concluded that the 
broad terms employed in investment treaties, such as fair and equitable treatment or 
indirect expropriation, must be interpreted in accordance with their current object and 
purpose of the applicable investment treaty existing at the time of the application of 
treaty. The precautionary principle, as one of the most crucial components of sustainable 
development, could be relevant in interpreting the treaty provisions, in light of the 
current object and purpose of the investment treaties.  
Nevertheless, the evolutionary interpretation of investment treaties has certain limits. 
For instance, if the investment treaty expressly referrers to economic prosperity it would 
be hard to translate it to sustainable development through evolutionary interpretation. 
This is because the idea of sustainable development only has become popular since the 
late 1990’s. 946 Thus, as much as the broad interpretation of the object and purpose 
could serve the function of the investment tribunals, they should avoid becoming 
‘interventionist’ by using a ‘presumptive approach’ such as evolutionary criteria to make 
‘aging treaties’ fit with modern concerns.947 As Walde  suggests, the goal should be a 
realistic degree of ‘path coherence’ that is: 
A gradual and  cautious evolution which draws its legitimacy from a style of 
interpretation that is and appears to be reasonably faithful to the authoritative text. A 
major means of achieving greater coherence is by accepting a concept of persuasive 
and, if jurisprudence is settled, binding precedent.948  
5.2.2 Systemic integration 
The second suggested path is the principle of systemic integration. This principle which 
is based on the article 31.3.c VCLT, enables tribunals to interpret the provisions of 
                                                
944 Alan Boyle and David Freestone International Law and Sustainable Development  (OUP, 1999) at 17-
18. 
945 Ortino. P. 16 
946Id. p. 11. 
947 Robin McCaig, ‘The Further Evolution of The Evolutionary Approach to Treaty Interpretation’, The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 69.02 (2010), 250–52 (p. 252). 
948 Waelde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples’, pp. 780–81. 
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investment treaties according to the elements of the precautionary principle. After 
explaining the characteristics and requirements of this significant aspect of 
interpretation, this section will consider two different characters that article 31.3.c could 
give to the precautionary principle: general and specific. The general application of the 
principle is attainable by going beyond the boundaries of orthodox sources of 
international law. Specifically, this involves taking into account non-binding instruments 
as serviceable tools to inform interpretation. The second and more limited application 
of the principle is through the obligation of due diligence, as acknowledged by ICJ and 
ITLOS decisions.  
The interest in Article 31.3.c VCLT has become more significant following the ICJ 
decision on Oil Platforms in 2003,949 along with a later report by the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on the Fragmentation of International Law (the 
‘Fragmentation Report 2006’).950 The idea of this report is that treaties should not be 
applied and interpreted in a vacuum. The principle of ‘systemic integration’, embodied 
in article 31.3.c, operates like a ‘master key to the house of international law’.951  The 
Court used the rule for the first time in the Oil Platforms case, which was later cited by 
other tribunals. 952  
The principle has two connected and co-dependent aspects, namely, integrative and 
evolutionary. 953 The first aspect promotes harmony among the regimes as much as 
possible,954 while the latter interprets the treaty in light of the normative environment of 
the present day. These two aspects should be taken into account when an external rule 
is being relied upon to interpret a treaty provision. According to the article 31.3.c, the 
external element should meet three criteria to be qualified for application. It should be 
(i) relevant, (ii) any rules of international law and (iii) applicable between the parties.955  
5.2.2.1  ( i )  Relevance 
                                                
949 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 2003. ICJ. 
950 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf  
951  ILC group final report at 211. Para 420. 
952 Salucka award para 254 
953Julian Arato, ‘Constitutional Transformation In The ECTHR: Strasbourg’s Expansive Recourse To 
External Rules Of International Law’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 37.2 (2012), 349 (p. 353). 
954 Fragmentation Report, precautionary principle 414–17.  
955 Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human 
Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology’, in International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer, ed. by Christina Binder and others (Oxford  ; New York: OUP Oxford, 2009), 
p. 679 (p. 695). 
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As per the first element, there are some narrow definitions of the ‘relevance’, which only 
allow external rules that are directly related to the subject matter. 956 However, more 
recent studies seem to display a broader characterisation of the term. According to 
Simma and Kill, ‘It is fair to conclude, that treaty interpreters are free to embrace the 
flexibility inherent in the term ‘relevant’.957  Gardiner also supported this broader view by 
defining relevance: 
As referring to those [rules] touching on the same subject matter as the treaty provision 
or provisions being interpreted or which in any way affect that interpretation.958 
In the same way, Foster conceded that dispute settlement should revolve around the 
terms of investment treaties. The refinements of terms originating from later inter-State 
negotiations and state practice should be made in their public international law 
context.959In order to introduce international law into their interpretation, it is important 
that investment tribunals: 
Took into account the relevant sources of international law and fitted its decision into 
the larger framework of international investment protection, thereby aiming to achieve 
the consistency in arbitral jurisprudence which is expected by users, both investors and 
states, of the system of international investment protection and arbitration. 960  
The Court in Iron Rhine, on the relevance of the environmental law to interpret the treaty 
referred to both binding and nonbinding instruments when stating that: 
The emerging principles, whatever their current status, make reference to conservation, 
management, notions of prevention and of sustainable development, and protection for 
future generations.961 
In doing so, the Court referred to the importance of several environmental instruments 
as an integral part of economic development: 
Importantly, these emerging principles now integrate environmental protection into the 
development process. Environmental law and the law on development stand not as 
alternatives but as mutually reinforcing, integral concepts, which require that where 
development may cause significant harm to the environment there is a duty to prevent, 
                                                
956 Only those rules that are directly applicable to the subject matter of the treaty.Henn-Jüri Uibopuu, 
‘Nterpretation  of  Treaties  in  the  Light  of  International  Law: Art.  31,  Para.  3(c)  of  the  Vienna  
Convention  on  the  Law  of Treaties’, A NNUAIRE  DE   L ’A.A.A., 40.1 (1970), p. 4.  
957 Simma and Kill, p. 696. 
958 Gardiner, p. 260.  
959 Foster, p. 527. 
960 Stephan W. Schill, ‘Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23 
(2010), 401–30 (p. 425). 
961 Iron Reine para 58 
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or at least mitigate, such harm This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now 
become a principle of general international law.962  
The Court also cited the Gabči ́kovo-Nagymaros decision to stress the importance of 
integrating environmental concerns with economic interests. It emphasised that ‘the 
need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly 
expressed in the concept of sustainable development’, and stated the fact that ‘new 
standards given proper weight, not only when states contemplate new activities but also 
when continuing with activities begun in the past’ 963 . The Court considered a 
memorandum of understanding relevant in interpreting the obligation of the parties to 
the treaty, regardless of its nonbinding nature. 
These opinions of the Court and scholars, together with the nature of the precautionary 
principle as a way to enhance monitoring development for their environmental impact 
qualify it as being ‘relevant’ in environment-related investment disputes. When a 
tribunal has to decide whether a disputed measure adopted to allegedly prevent a 
potential environmental harm is discriminatory, unfair, unexpected, indirect 
expropriation and so forth, the precautionary principle becomes the most relevant 
among all the principles.   
5.2.2.2  ( i i )  Rule o f  internat ional  law 
The second element, the ‘rule of international law’, in general seems to have a clear 
scope. Scholars accept that the article enables courts and tribunals to refer to the 
relevant binding rules of international law when interpreting a treaty. 964  Whether 
nonbinding instruments are accepted, however, is still open to debate.965 Most scholars 
agree that the rules of international law mean the traditional sources of international law 
as listed in the Statute of the ICJ at Article 38(1). Namely, these are customary norms, 
treaties and general principles of law.966 This was emphasised by the ILC Fragmentation 
Report, and many scholars agree that judges should be aware of the expansive 
interpretation and ensure that what they apply under this article does, in fact, exist as a 
                                                
962 Iron Reine para 59 
963 Gabc ̌i ́kovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7 at p. 78, para. 140  
964 M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, p. 433 (Nijhoff 2009); 
Gardiner, supra n. 6, at pp. 267-268; McLachlan, supra n. 17, at pp. 290-291; and ILC, Fragmentation of 
International Law, supra n. 5, at secs. 425-426.  
965 Gardiner, supra n. 6, at p. 268.  
966 Fragmentation Report, para 426 ‘rules of law, and not to broader principles or considerations which 
may not be firmly established as rules.’; GARDINER, supra note 23, at 267–68; Simma & Kill, supra note 
20, at 695; McLachlan, supra note 20, at 290–91;  
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rule.967 Some scholars are cautious with regard to the scope of article 31(3)(c) in relation 
to non-binding materials. Specifically, Orakhelashvili argues that article 31(3)(c):  
Covers only established rules of international law, to the exclusion of principles of 
uncertain or doubtful legal status, so-called evolving legal standards, policy factors or 
more generally related notions.968 
However, ECHR makes an example by departing from this approach and ‘marches far 
beyond the border of the list of sources in the ICJ Statute’ by systematically articulating 
a wide range of sources of international law, in addition to the traditional sources.969 The 
most illustrative case is Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, in which the Court had to interpret 
an agreement between a civil service trade union and the Turkish municipality.970  The 
court noted that:  
[W]hen [the Court] considers the object and purpose of the Convention provisions, it 
also takes into account the international law background to the legal question before it. 
Being made up of a set of rules and principles that are accepted by the vast majority of 
States, the common international or domestic law standards of European States reflect 
a reality that the Court cannot disregard when it is called upon to clarify the scope of a 
Convention provision that more conventional means of interpretation have not enabled 
it to establish with a sufficient degree of certainty.971  
 
The Court also confirmed that: 
The consensus emerging from specialised international instruments... may constitute a 
relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the 
Convention in specific cases.972  
Thus, the Court extended its use of article 31.3.c by asserting competence to consider 
the non-binding materials such as observations, recommendations and products of 
committees and organisations. The ECHR has no institutional connection whatsoever 
with these materials however.973 In the same way, when referring to the non-binding 
materials Alvarez avowed that: 
                                                
967 fragmentation 119. Simma kill 695. 
968 A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law p. 366 (OUP 
Press 2008); see also M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
p. 433 (Nijhoff 2009);  
969 Arato, ‘Constitutional Transformation In The ECTHR: Strasbourg’s Expansive Recourse To External 
Rules Of International Law’, p. 376. ‘In General the ECHR has relied on a maximally broad construction 
of VCLT 31(3)(c) to expand the substantive rights of the Convention’. 
970 ECtHR, 12 Nov. 2008, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, Judgement No. 34503/97 . sec 60. 
971 Id. sec. 76. 
972 Id. sec. 85. 
973 European Union recommendations; the European Social Charter, which is not ratified by Turkey; 101-
102 turkey case, also interpretations attributed to this charter by the Charter’s Committee of Independent 
Experts(turkey case 45-51 and 103-105.); the Court adopted the same approach and relied upon non-
binding instruments in other cases as well. For instance: United Nations High Commissioner for 
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Such observations and recommendations, though non-binding in a legal sense, may 
exert a strong compliance-pull from the individual States to whom they are directed, 
especially because they are attached to onerous reporting requirements.974 
Be that as it may, whether the precautionary principle meets the requirement of being a 
rule of international law heavily depends on the approach adopted by tribunals. A close 
analysis of its status as a soft law is warranted to justify the aptness of the principle as a 
rule of international law (therefore allowing it to being applied through 31.3.c). This 
could justify how non-binding instruments could reflect the rule of international law.  
Nonbinding rules of international law 
Due to the complexity and dynamism of contemporary international law-making, legal 
standards may emerge through different instruments, regardless of their nature.975 The 
instruments that generate soft law include, but not limited to, declarations, guidelines, 
resolutions, treaties and recommendations of international organizations. Each 
represents different contexts, significance, degrees of effectiveness and institutional 
settings, as Boyle suggests: 
While the legal effect of these different soft law instruments is not necessarily the same, 
it is characteristic of all of them that they are carefully negotiated, and often carefully 
drafted statements, which are in some cases intended to have some normative 
significance despite their non-binding, non treaty form. There is at least an element of 
good faith commitment, and in many cases, a desire to influence state practice and an 
element of law-making intention and progressive development.976  
Soft law and its applicability has been a subject of vast controversy.977 The orthodox 
classification of the sources of international law is generally cited from article 38 (1) ICJ 
Status. According to them, treaty and customary international law are the primary 
sources with binding nature; the rest is non-binding, to a point that Prosper Weil 
insisted the sublegal (and non-binding) obligations ‘are neither soft law nor hard law: 
                                                                                                                                     
Refugees (UNHCR) guidelines, Council of Europe recommendations and a recommendation of the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention UK: ECtHR, 29 Jan. 2008, Saadi v. The United Kingdom, 
Judgement No. 13229/03, secs. 29-37; in Al-Adsani the Court in its interpretation, reffered to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as to a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia,( UK: ECtHR, 21 Nov. 2001, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Judgement No. 
35763/97.) 
974 Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations As Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, U.S.A., 2006), pp. 
224–29. 
975 Mauro Barelli, ‘The Role Of Soft Law In The International Legal System: The Case Of The United 
Nations Declaration On The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 58 
(2009), 957 (p. 959). 
976 A. E. Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 48.04 (1999), 901–13 . 
977 Andrew T. Guzman and Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. Legal Analyses 171 (2010), p. 
172. Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/695.  
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they are simply not law at all’. 978  On the other hand, many scholars have made 
arguments regarding the development of international law and its sources, and have 
distanced themselves from the traditional classification of its sources. They have also 
highlighted the importance, applicability and benefits of acknowledging soft law among 
the sources as a critical instrument in dispute settlement.979  
With respect to soft law it is important to note that in this study hard law and soft law 
are not used as two opposite terms. As Shelton states, using the term “soft law” is more 
appropriate for the more promotional language of certain treaty provisions than the 
instruments concluded in nonbinding form, since, even if some specific commitments 
are drafted in a general or weak terms, treaties are legally binding.980 In this thesis soft 
law is not used to demonstrate the binary view of international law in which hard law 
and soft law form two ends of a continuum from legal obligation to complete 
freedom.981 Soft law is used to mean nonbinding, which according to Shelton ‘have 
complex and potentially large impact on the development of international law’ but by no 
means this would reduce the normative impact of those norms. 
 
Modern sources of international law are not restricted to the traditional sources as stated 
in Art. 38 ICJ Statute, but include emerging principles of international law, as pointed 
out by several commentators. According to Weiss, traditional international law, which is 
limited to laws between states, is no longer the sole international legal focus. Non-
binding legal instruments concluded by governments and international organizations 
have now become very substantial sources of international law.982 Boyle also argues that:  
the subtlety of the processes by which contemporary international law can be created is 
no longer adequately captured by reference to the orthodox categories of custom and 
treaty. The role of soft law as an element in international law-making is now widely 
appreciated, and its influence throughout international law is evident.983 
 
 Therefore, soft law, as a modern source of international law in addition to the 
traditional sources, could assist tribunals in their decision. In other words, binding and 
                                                
978 Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, American Journal of International 
Law, 77 (1983), 413 (p. 417). 
979 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Soft Law in International Arbitration: Codification and Normativity’, 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 1.2 (2010), 283–99 (p. 15). 
980 Dinah Shelton, ‘Normative  Hierarchiy in International Law’, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 100.2 (2006), 291–323 (p. 319). 
981 Id. 
982 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Rise or the Fall of International Law?’, Fordham Law Review, 69.2 (2000), 345 
(p. 346). ‘These instruments exist in all areas of international law, although they appear to be more 
abundant in human rights, environment, and financial dealings than in trade and national security.’ 
983 A. E. Boyle. Supra 994. 
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non-binding legal norms complement each other in the fabric of international 
investment law. This enriches investment law and allows tribunals to resort to soft law 
instruments in order to shed light on ‘open-textured terms’ in investment treaties.984 
Tribunals have discretion over whether or not to apply it, however in practice soft law 
often influences investment tribunals. According to Hiersh, the application of the soft 
law serves three functions in investment arbitration, interpreting ambiguous provisions, 
filling gaps in existing international law and supporting legal findings arising from other 
sources of investment law.985 Foster also argues that: 
The adjudicatory tradition in public international law is based on the hope that 
international courts and tribunals will be able to determine the actual facts of a case, 
and the expectation that they will apply substantive rules and principles of international 
law to these facts.986  
In fact, the legal significance of soft law instruments not only as interpretative tools that 
might be used to shed light on the vaguely formulated provisions of investment treaties 
but also as potentially creating a source of legal obligation has been recognised by 
numerous investment treaty tribunals.987  
More importantly, legal obligations continue to be associated with ‘greater expectation 
of conforming behaviour and consequences for non-compliance’. It comes as no 
surprise that states have also become concerned about ‘compliance with other forms of 
                                                
984 Moshe Hirsch, ‘Sources of International Investment Law’, in International Investment Law and Soft Law, 
ed. by Andrea K. Bjorklund and August Reinisch (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), p. 38. 
985  Id. p. 31. 
986 Foster 527. 
987 Amongst the cases in which soft law has been relied upon by the tribunals as an interpretative tool or 
as creating a source of obligation. include: Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/1, in which  the tribunal used  the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment 1992 as an interpretative tool; in Grand Rivers Enterprise et al v. USA, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration, award January 2011,tribunal used the  Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, 
Articles 17 & 19 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as interpretative tool to 
shed light on the obligation to afford FET under NAFTA Art. 1105 as including a requirement on the 
Respondent to take “pro-active” steps to consult indigenous investors prior to imposing a measure that 
will impact upon them or their community; In Glamis v. USA, supra 49, tribunal used 1968 UNESCO 
Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works as 
interpretative tool to shed light on the interpretation of FET under NAFTA Art. 1105;  in Deser t  Line  
Projects LLC v . The Republic of Yemen , ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, tribunal used the UNGA Resolution 
1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources adopted in 1962 as interpretative tool to shed 
light on the interpretation of the content FET as including the obligation not to coerce the foreign 
investor; in Biwater v. Tanzania, tribunal used the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in 2002 as tool of interpretation to shed light on the interpretation of FET under the applicable BIT 
and held that access to clean water as a basic human right serves as a limitation of the legitimate 
expectations of the foreign investor; and  in CME v. Czech Republic, tribunal observed that UNGA 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) adopted on 14 December 1962, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States adopted on 12 December 1974 had the effectively undermined the validity of the Hull formula 
on compensation for expropriation as a “generally accepted international standard.” (para. 31).  
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international commitment.’988 States and international institutions have adopted non-
binding legal norms through soft law texts that are political commitments. These can 
later lead to law (custom, treaty or general principle). These soft law instruments, 
although lacking a binding character, are sometimes used to ‘interpret and fill the gaps in 
the law’.989 This role is precisely what this thesis is advocating as the function of 
precautionary principle for investment tribunals, with respect to environment-related 
investment disputes. 
Treaty rules are effective for requiring more serious commitments, but they are not 
necessary more authoritative. Supporting the impact of the soft law, Boyle took the 
example of the Rio Declaration, which intended to develop some new law. He referred to 
its universal support and consensus, and argues that it is not obvious that a treaty with 
the same provision would ‘carry greater weight or achieve its objectives any more 
successfully’.990 He also took the example of the FCCC, adopted at the 1992 Rio 
conference, as a treaty that imposes commitments to the parties but has core articles 
that are very vaguely drafted. Boyle suggested that one could question their binding 
force, but that it is hard to ignore their legal significance. He claimed that these 
principles:  
May lay down parameters which affect the way court decide cases or the way an 
international institution exercises its discretionary powers. They can set limits, or 
provide guidance, or determine how conflicts between other rules or principles will be 
resolved. They may lack the supposedly harder edge of a ‘rule’ or an ‘obligation’, but 
they are certainly not legally irrelevant. As such they constitute a very important form of 
law, which may be ‘soft’, but which should not be confused with ‘non-binding’ law.991 
 By extending this argument to other principles, such as sustainable development and 
the precautionary principle, Boyle argues that those principles should not be seen ‘as 
binding obligations that must be complied with, but as principles, considerations or 
objectives to be taken account of—they may be soft, but they are still law.’992 It is true 
that like many other legal forms, soft law could be abused. In general, however, in the 
                                                
988 D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law’, in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and 
Compliance: the Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (OUP, Oxford 2000) 10. 
989 dina Shelton in international law by evans p.141 
990 A. E. Boyle. Supra 994..p. 904 
991 A. E. Boyle. Supra 994... P.907. he referred to article 3 of the convention and explained that ‘Given 
their explicit role as guidance and their explicitly softer formulation, the ‘principles’ in Article 3 are not 
necessarily binding rules which must be complied with or which entail responsibility for breach if not 
complied with; yet, despite all these limitations they are not legally irrelevant. At the very least Article 3 is 
relevant to interpretation and implementation of the Convention as well as creating expectations 
concerning matters which must be taken into account in good faith in the negotiation of further 
instruments.’  
992 A. E. Boyle. Supra 994. p.908. 
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process of international law-making it has proved to be more helpful than 
‘objectionable’; it is simply ‘another tool in the professional lawyer's armory’. 993 
Moreover, they could provide evidence of existing law, or even determine state practice 
and opinio juris that eventually leads to new customary law.994 Rosalyn Higgins, in the 
context of UN general assembly resolution, said that:  
The passing of binding decisions is not the only way in which the law development 
occurs. Legal consequences can also flow from acts which are not, in the formal sense 
‘binding’.995 
Some scholars even consider soft law to be a more appropriate avenue for law making 
in some cases, due to their flexibility and effectiveness in addressing common problems. 
To achieve this, they do not need to influence conduct in the desired manner’996: 
 New rules of customary law are not necessarily appropriate to the elaboration of 
general principles and could not be created quickly enough; moreover, a treaty 
endorsing the precautionary principle or SD would only bind the parties. A binding 
resolution of the UN Security Council may be possible option, but only where 
questions of international peace and security are at stake. Thus, the consensus 
endorsement by states of a general principle enshrined in a soft law declaration is an 
entirely sensible solution to such law-making challenges.997  
The status of precautionary principle was studied in chapter three, which found that 
although it is gaining more importance in the customary norms of international law, 
from a legal point of view, it is soft law, and therefore is not binding. While one should 
bear in mind that its legal significance and potential effects should not be ‘taken for 
granted’ since it is lacking a binding force, it should also not be ‘dismissed’ simply for 
not being binding.998 This nonbinding character has not diminished the value, legal 
effect and ‘potential universality’ of the principle. Instead, being soft law, it creates a 
favourable condition for international support. Its statue does not diminish its 
applicability, and in fact enhances its universality and its significant legal impact. For 
instance, the ICJ’s decision in Gabcikovo references sustainable development. This shows 
that, although the concept is not a legally binding obligation, it represents a policy goal 
or a principle that can impact the outcome of a dispute. Consequently, the behavior of 
                                                
993 Id. 
994 Alan Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’, in International Law, ed. by Malcolm Evans 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 122–40 (p. 122). 
995 Higgins 1995. P.24 
996 Dinah Shelton, ‘International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in International Law, ed. by Malcolm 
Evans (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 122–40 (p. 169)  
997 Alan Boyle, 2010. p.122. 
998 Mauro Barelli, ‘The Role Of Soft Law In The International Legal System: The Case Of The United 
Nations Declaration On The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 58 
(2009), 957 (p. 959). 
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the state and international organizations can promote significant changes in existing law. 
999 Moreover, the principle represents a policy goal that can influence the outcome of 
litigation and the behaviour of states and organisations.1000 This approach provides a 
close analogy to explain the precautionary principle as a soft law instrument that could 
influence the decision of investment tribunals. It could also influence the expectations 
of foreign investors and the behaviour of host states.  
5.2.2.3   ( i i i )  Appl i cabi l i ty  
Article 31.3.c also requires the external rule to be applicable between the parties. The 
crucial question is whether it requires the parties in the dispute to also be parties to the 
external treaty that is being relied upon for interpretation. 1001 Compared to other 
elements, there is less of a consensus amongst scholars and tribunals on this 
                                                
999 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 222.   
1000 Alan Boyle, supra 997, p. 134. ‘SD can properly claim a normative status as an element of the process 
of judicial reasoning. It is a meta principle, acting upon other rules and principles- a legal concept 
exercising a kind of interstitial normativity, pushing an pulling the boundaries of true primary norms 
when they threaten to overlap or conflict with each other….if the SD is not in the nature of a legal 
obligation it does represent a policy goal or principle that can influence the outcome of litigation and the 
practice of states and international organizations and it may lead to significant changes and developments 
in the existing law. In that important sense, international law appears to require states and international 
bodies to take account of the objective of sustainable development and to establish appropriate process 
for doing so.’ 
1001 Fragmentation Report, supra note 18, ¶ 470; see also GARDINER, supra note 23, at 265 (Gardiner 
feels compelled to emphasize that here, unlike the other elements of VCLT 31(3)(c), there is no hope to 
resolve the ambiguity in this particular element through textual analysis); Simma & Kill, supra note 20, at 
696. Simma and Kill suggest that the notion of ‘applicable’ actually entails three distinct sub-issues. 
Beyond the ques- tion of ‘which parties,’ the term raises the issue of intertemporality—when must the 
rules be applicable, at the conclusion of the treaty or at the time of application/interpretation? Id. at 696. 
And finally, the meaning of applicable ‘as a legal term of art’—does applica- ble mean ‘in force’ or 
‘binding,’ or something more flexible? Id. at 697. I leave these two sub-categories out of the main analysis, 
here, for distinct reasons. First, as to inter- temporality, the issue has basically ceased to be controversial. 
As Simma and Kill them selves recognize, most international courts and tribunals, as well as 
commentators, today recognize the possibility that VCLT 31(3)(c) envisions the possibility of considering 
developments in international law in the interpretation and reinterpretation of a treaty. Id. at 696. It may 
have been generally accepted that treaties were generally static before the conclusion of the Vienna 
Convention. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 
General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1953). However since 1969 the 
presumption has clearly shifted, re- placed by the notion that the parties’ intent, as reflected in the 
terminology employed or the treaty’s object and purpose, should control the issue of whether a treaty is 
susceptible of evolutive interpretation. See most recently, the practice of the ICJ in the last two years, for 
example, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 145, 171–74 (Apr. 20). 
While I leave out the issue of intertemporality because it simply appears no longer controversial, I omit 
the issue of applicability because the analysis would be redundant. Simma and Kill note that on a purely 
textual basis the term may imply more flexibility than ‘in force’ or ‘binding.’ Simma & Kill, supra note 20, 
at 697– 98. Note, however, that they advocate caution, insisting that their comments ‘should not be taken 
as a basis for a liberal doctrine of ‘applicability’ under Article 31(3)(c) without further research.’ Id. at 698. 
Nevertheless, problematizing ‘applicability’ in this way appears to introduce exactly the same ambiguity as 
arises in the interpretation of ‘rules’—i.e. is the term flexible enough to include norms of a softer nature? 
Rather than repeat the analysis for each term, suffice it to say that VCLT 31(3)(c) appears to include 
several terms that could, if interpreted flexibly, permit consideration of soft-law.  
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requirement. 1002 Simma and Kill noted that authors who limit the scope of the article 
failed to address the issue of applicability:  
On a purely textual analysis, the use of the term ‘applicable’ would seem to allow for 
more flexibility than would ‘in force’ or ‘binding’. This analysis lends support to the 
view that a rule can be considered under Article 31(3)(c) if it is ‘at least implicitly 
accepted or tolerated’ by the parties to the treaty being interpreted. 1003 
Again, in this example the ECHR found a way to adopt an even broader approach than 
those intended in scholarly debates. In Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, the Court decided not 
to differentiate ‘between sources of law according to whether or not they have been 
signed or ratified by the respondent State’. Instead, it defined its task under the treaty 
interpretation rules to be ‘searching for common ground among the norms of 
international law’.1004 The Court noted that it is not necessary for the parties to the 
dispute to also be parties to the external instrument that is applied, nor is it necessary 
for the respondent state ‘to have ratified the entire collection of instruments that are 
applicable’.1005 This liberal approach towards article 31.3.c allows a wider range of tools 
to inform the interpretation of the disputed treaty, even if it is not ratified by the 
responding state. The Court asserted that: 
It will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant international instruments denote a 
continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in international law or in the 
domestic law of the majority of member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a 
precise area, that there is common ground in modern societies.1006 
An analysis of the principle of systemic integration and its elements shows that it is 
possible to justify recourse to the non-binding normative environment of a treaty by 
virtue of article 31.3.c. Can this evidence be extrapolated to the interpretation of 
investment treaties, and, in particular, to the interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment or indirect expropriation, when taking into account the precautionary 
principle? A positive answer to this question would be consistent with the concept that, 
where appropriate, rules not strictly related to the treaty in question should be included 
                                                
1002 McLachlan provided four possible solutions to the inconsistencies: a) Require all parties to the 
disputed treaty to also be parties to the external treaty; b) Permit reference to an external treaty if the 
parties to the disputed treaty are also parties to said external treaty; c) Require a finding that the parties to 
the disputed treaty do not match the external treaty, and that the external rule being relied upon, is a 
customary rule of international law; d) Require that the external rule be ‘implicitly accepted or tolerated’ 
by all parties to the disputed treaty, if there was an absence of complete identity between the disputed and 
external treaties Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the 
Vienna Convention’, International and Comperative Law Quarterly, 54 (2005), 279–320 (pp. 314–15). 
1003 Simma and Kill, pp. 696–8. 
1004 Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, para. 78 (2008).  
1005 Id. 
1006 Id. 
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in judicial decisions, giving due regard to the normative environment of 
a treaty.  
According to the orthodox approach, tribunals could look at each case to see whether 
the parties of the treaty are also party to any convention that includes precautionary 
principle. Since there are more than 3000 BITs, this would allow tribunals to see if the 
principle is applicable between the parties. For instance in the case of Bilcon Delaware v. 
Canada, the claimant is American, which is known to be the persistent objector of the 
precautionary principle. In this case, the tribunal might say that although Canada has 
vastly applied the principle, the United States not recognising its existence would 
prevent the tribunal from applying it when interpreting the treaty provision. However, 
under the same approach one might argue that the investors are party to the dispute, 
and that because the principle has been recognised by the investor (by accepting the 
guideline for conducting EIA or as the common industry practice), it could be 
constituted as applicable between the parties. 1007  
The broader approach adopted by the ECHR, which does not require ratification of the 
external instrument could also be used in order to justify the application of 
precautionary principle. The approach suggested by Simma and Kill to allow the 
principle if it is ‘implicitly accepted or tolerated’ by the parties to the treaty, could also 
be used. As mentioned before, this matter is purely case specific, and requires the 
tribunals’ analysis on each case. Nevertheless, the evidence taken from case law of the 
ECHR can, perhaps, not be directly extrapolated to the interpretation of investment 
treaties. That the ECHR uses article 31.3.c does not always mean that this article can be 
relied on under other treaties, so as to interpret those treaties in accordance with non-
binding norms. Gardiner, for instance, suggested that the broad potential attributed by 
the ECHR to article 31.3.c of the VCLT is not to be taken as something that applies 
automatically to treaties in general.1008 
                                                
1007 International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM), which is a CEO- Led organization to improve 
sustainable development performance in the mining and metals industry. It currently accommodates 23 
mining and metals companies as well as 35 national and regional mining associations and global co 
commodity associations to address core sustainable development challenges. It has committed member 
companies to implement and measure their performance against 10 sustainable development principles. 
In most of the specific guidelines, precautionary principle was considered as a tool to achieve one of these 
principles: 2005 Reporting against the ICMM Sustainable Development Principles; good practice guidance 
for mining and biodiversity; 2014 Materials’ Stewardship. 
1008 Gardiner, supra 1008, at p. XXV. See also Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice 1960–1989 SUPPLEMENT, 2010: PARTS NINE AND TEN’, British Yearbook of 
International Law, 81.1 (2011), 13–170 (p. 58). Mark Eugen Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (BRILL, 2009), p. 433., concludes that ‘the term ‘applicable’ leaves no room 
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Nevertheless, the evidence of a legitimate recourse to external, non-binding norms on 
the basis of article 31.3.c can supply investment tribunals with a possible method of 
justification when facing environmental measures that were adopted to prevent a 
potential threat. If the interpretation, according to the object and purpose, does not 
offer an appropriate method for reliance on the precautionary principle, article 31.3.c at 
least provides an opportunity to take into account the environmental concerns of the 
host state.  
Due diligence  
In addition to a relevant rule of international law, investment tribunals could also apply 
the precautionary principle as an inherent part of a state’s due diligence to protect the 
environment. Due diligence (or sufficient diligence) is a concept developed under 
international case law, and is the diligence expected from a government mindful of its 
international obligations. Simply put, it is an expectation of a good government.1009 
Under this obligation, ‘all states are under a duty’ within their jurisdiction, to use their 
powers in such a way as to ‘ensure suitable protection of rights of other states and their 
nationals.’1010 It is a basic rule under international law, and has been used for a long time 
as the ideal scope for its application in the context of environmental protection.1011 
                                                                                                                                     
for doubt: non-binding rules cannot be relied upon’; The main argument here is that the ECHR has the 
character of a constitution which gives effect to moral standards. These standards require a flexible 
approach to treaty interpretation in order to protect them under varying circumstances. Therefore, the 
ECHR opens the door to a more far-reaching approach to treaty interpretation than would be possible 
under treaties that are reciprocal in nature; Thomas Barkhuysen and others, The Execution of Strasbourg and 
Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the National Legal Order (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), pp. 834–35.  
1009  Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Due Diligence in the International Law of Liability’, in Legal Aspects of 
Transfrontier Pollution, ed. by OECD (Paris,France: OECD  Publishing., 1977), p. 369.Dupuy 1977, zotero, 
p.369.; first definition was given by the tribunal in the Alabama Case: ‘under this rule governments are 
required: first, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, 
of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a 
power with which it is at peace; Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its own 
ports and waters as the base of naval operations against the other; Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its 
own ports and waters and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the forgoing 
obligation and duties.’ Alabama claims of the United States of America against Great Britain, Award 14 
September 1872, tribunal of arbitration established by Article I of the Treaty of Washington of 8 May 
1871. (quoted in OECD zotero p. 373).; also in Island of Palmas Case ‘traditional sovereignty involves the 
exclusive right to display the activities of a state. This right has a s corollary a duty: the obligation to 
protect within the territory the rights of other states, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in 
peace and in war, together with the rights which each state may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.’ 
Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States v Netherlands, Award, (1928) II RIAA 829, ICGJ 392 
(PCA 1928), 4th April 1928, Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA], 839. 
1010 OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution (Paris,France: OECD  Publishing., 1977), p. 382. 
1011 Dupuy 1977, supra 1009, p.369. 
1011 OECD 1977, supra 1017, p.382 
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In general, every ‘wrongful act by a state’ gives rise to international responsibility.1012 It 
applies both to positive acts by states contrary to an international obligation, and also an 
omissions to act as required by international law.1013 The use of due diligence only 
concerns the latter however, namely unlawful omission by states.1014 It becomes relevant 
when the ‘passive or insufficiently active’ behaviour of the state falls short of its 
obligation ‘to act’ imposed on it by the rules.1015 Moreover, due diligence is an obligation 
of conduct, and is not enforceable. 
International law is incapable of justifying a general duty to protect the environment 
however, which prevails over other interests. As an alternative, a series of very general 
rules with limited applicability have been adopted as principles; they are limited to 
obligation of conduct. These obligations are limited by due diligence rules, a typical 
obligation of protection 1016 For instance, states have an obligation to prevent 
transboundary environmental harm, under which they have an international duty of 
diligence to ensure that they do not cause such harm. The general obligation of due 
diligence is not a strict requirement to produce a given result, and it varies greatly with 
the circumstances peculiar to each situation. Moreover, states have a responsibility to 
ensure an obligation, rather than a strict liability to take action. In addition, the 
operation of dangerous technologies imposes new responsibilities on states to exercise 
vigilance, irrespective of the extent of their general advantage for the development.1017 
As Pisillo-Mazzeschi states, ‘The duty of prevention is not, of course, an absolute one. 
Whether the state has fulfilled its obligations in this regard is measured  by the rule of 
due diligence’.1018 Thus, ‘it is a flexible test’ that cannot be formulated in precise 
terms.1019 
Dupuy and Vinuales considered ‘due diligence’ as a primary norm when elaborating 
states’ responsibility towards environmental protection. They explained that many 
obligations arising from treaties ‘must be interpreted in the broader context provided by 
                                                
1012 Article 1 of the draft  codification of the law of international responsibility, international law 
commission of the United Nations, ILC Yearbook, 1970, vol.2, p.199. 
1013 Dupuy 1977, supra 1030, p.369. 
1014 Id. 
1015 Id. 
1016 Tarcisio Hardman Reis, Compensation for Environmental Damages under International Law: The Role of the 
International Judge (Kluwer Law International, 2011), pp. 55–57.Reis, p. 55-7 
1017 Dupuy 1977, supra 1030, p.376. 
1018  Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International 
Responsibility of States’, in State Responsibility in International Law, ed. by René Provost 
(Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2002), p. 44. 
1019 Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 44 
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the duty of the due diligence’.1020 This has recently received increasing attention in the 
literature and through jurisprudence. This increase in attention can also be seen from 
the number of international conventions, resolution and reports.1021 However, It is not 
only prevention that has been recognised to be part of the obligation of due diligence. 
Recent decisions by ICJ on Pulp Mills, and also ITLO’s advisory opinion, have 
demonstrated how the precautionary principle, as part of the obligation for due 
diligence, could be relevant for the interpretation of the actions of the states having 
environmental concerns. In other words, precautionary reasoning was applied through 
the wider obligation of due diligence.  
The ILC1022 and the Institute de International (IDI)1023 have also contributed to this 
discourse when describing the states’ responsibility to prevent environmental damages. 
The ILC in particular extensively explained due diligence under the commentary on the 
Article 3 on prevention, and described the obligation of due diligence for prevention of 
environmental harm as: 
The degree of care in question is that expected of a good Government. It should 
possess a legal system and sufficient resources to maintain an adequate administrative 
apparatus to control and monitor the activities.1024 
It is also acknowledged that the obligation is manifested by the reasonable efforts of a 
state to inform itself of the situation and ‘take appropriate measures, in timely fashion to 
address those issues’.1025 To adopt a reasonable and proportional measure it is suggested 
in the ILC Report that, to identify if the measure is ultra hazardous, states may look at: 
Issues such as the size of the operation; its location, special climate conditions, 
materials used in the activity, and whether the conclusions drawn from the application 
                                                
1020 Dupuy and Vinuales, pp. 256–257.s 
1021 For example, article 194, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
articles I and II and article VII, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter; article 2 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer; article 7, paragraph 5, of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities; article 2, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context; and article 2, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Water- courses and International Lakes.  
1022 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, GA Res. 56/82, 
UN Doc. A/RES/56/82 (ILC Prevention Articles) 
1023 Institut de Droit international, Resolution on Environment, on ‘Responsibility and Liability under 
International Law for Environmental Damage’ adopted at the Strasbourg session 1997. ‘When due 
diligence is utilized as a test for engaging responsibility it is appropriate that it be measured in accordance 
with objective standards relating to the conduct to be expected from a good government and detached 
from subjectivity. Generally accepted international rules and standards further provide an objective 
measurement for the due diligence test.’ 
1024 (ILC Prevention Articles) commentary on Article 3, No. 17. 
1025 Id. No. 10. 
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of these factors in a specific case are reasonable, are among the factors to be considered 
in determining the due diligence requirement in each instance.1026 
The Commission, referring to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, designated the 
element of precaution as part of a states responsibility to prevent significant harm. It 
stated that appropriate measures should be taken by way of ‘abundant caution’ even if 
‘full scientific certainty does not exist, to avoid or prevent serious or irreversible 
damage’1027. It further defined the types of harms covered by stating that: 
The degree of harm itself should be foreseeable and the State must know or should 
have known that the given activity has the risk of significant harm. The higher the 
degree of inadmissible harm, the greater would be the duty of care required to prevent 
it.1028 
Referring to the Rio Declaration, the ILC Report explicitly mentioned the precautionary 
principle and its relevance to the duty of prevention in general commentary. Specifically 
it alleged that the precautionary principle ‘constitutes a very general rule of conduct of 
prudence’, which ‘implies the need for States to review their obligations of prevention in 
a continuous manner to keep abreast of the advances in scientific knowledge’.1029  
The prevention of environmental harm, as a duty under due diligence, should be a 
‘continuous effort’ and not a ‘one-time’ action. This reasoning could be applied when 
justifying whether a certain action by the host state violates investment provisions. The 
ILC further explains that as a duty, due diligence continues in respect of monitoring, as 
long as the hazardous activity continues. Furthermore, it will not be terminated after 
granting authorization for the activity.1030 
In its advisory opinion, the ITLOS tribunal explicitly embraced the precautionary 
principle. It confirmed not only that the principle is applicable as a result of being part 
of the ISBA Nodules and Sulphides Regulation, but also as an ‘integral part of the 
general obligation of due diligence’.1031 According to the tribunal, the obligation of due 
diligence comprises of three obligations: the obligation to adopt appropriate measures 
and ensure their enforcement,1032 the obligation to conduct EIA,1033 and the obligation 
to apply the precautionary principle. This applies not only under the applicable 
                                                
1026 Id. 
1027 Id. No. 14. 
1028 Id. No. 18. 
1029 Id. No. 7. 
1030 Id. No. 2. 
1031 ITLOS Seabed Advisory Opinion, supra 776. para 131. 
1032 Id. Paras 115-1120. Referring to the interpretation by the ICJ in Pulp mills and also ILC project on 
prevention. 
1033 Id. Para 145 
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regulation, but also as part of the obligation of due diligence, and perhaps under 
customary international law.1034 This obligation applies: 
In situations where scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential negative 
impact of the activity in question is insufficient but where there are plausible indications 
of potential risks. A sponsoring State would not meet its obligation of due diligence if it 
disregarded those risks. Such disregard would amount to a failure to comply with the 
precautionary approach.1035 
Besides strengthening the status of the precautionary principle in international law, this 
affirmation clarifies how an obligation of due diligence necessarily implies an obligation 
of precaution. Substantiating due diligence as a result of the precautionary principle 
could develop the procedural duties of precaution, the breach of which could trigger 
state responsibility. 1036  This could allow for further development in international 
environmental law. The limitations of such practices should be taken into account 
however, as it requires well defined and accepted standards.1037 
Precaution and due diligence could mutually inform each other. By including the 
precautionary principle in the legal framework of due diligence, the former could 
expand and clarify the duties that are required from the state.1038 If ascertained, this 
collaboration could introduce some certainty concerning the substance of the 
precautionary principle.1039 The argument under this subsection is that, under customary 
international law, states have a duty of due diligence to prevent transboundary 
environmental harm.1040 Furthermore, in environmental treaties where states have an 
obligation to protect certain aspect of the environment, such as biodiversity, climate 
change, waste disposal, etc., states are assumed to have a duty of diligence to ensure that 
the specific aspect of the environment is protected. A decision by the ITLOS tribunal 
recognised the precautionary principle as being relevant to (and embodied in) the state’s 
                                                
1034 Id. paras. 125-135. 
1035 Id. para 131. 
1036 Bénédicte Sage-Fuller, The Precautionary Principle in Marine Environmental Law: With Special Reference to 
High Risk Vessels (Abingdon, Oxon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2013), p. 82. 
1037 Id. 
1038 Id. 
1039 Id. 
1040 The Court in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion confirmed that: ‘the environment is under daily 
threat and that use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment. The Court 
also recognizes that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of 
life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation 
of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond national control is now a part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment. Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, paras. 29- 30 (emphasis added. The Court 
reaffirmed this statement in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary. v. Slovakia.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 53, and 
again in the case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina. v. Uruguay.), 2010 I.C.J. para. 193. 
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obligation of due diligence. It argued that, where applicable, investment tribunals could 
refer to the obligation of due diligence to interpret investment provisions according to 
the precautionary principle. For instance, when interpreting whether revoking an 
investor’s construction licence for protection of the Leatherback Turtles is a violation of 
EET, a tribunal could take into account the state’s obligation to protect that species. 
Furthermore, if the host state is a member of the 2001 Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles1041, and therefore has a duty to ‘ensure protection 
of the sea turtles’,1042 according to the ITLOS and ICJ they have an obligation to ensure 
due diligence. In this instance the obligation is embodied in the duty to ensure that the 
species are protected from future harm. 
Under the theoretical justification, the different avenues that would allow an investment 
tribunal to take into account elements of the precautionary principle also inform its 
interpretation of treaty provisions. This justification first examines interpretation in light 
of the evolved object and purpose of the investment treaty. Secondly, it interprets 
subjects in light of systemic integration (and other rules of international law). Although 
each route has its own limitation, and it is up to the tribunal to decide if a certain rule 
could assist its interpretation, this section has argued that the precautionary principle 
does not need to be binding, or applied in a normative way. On the contrary, the 
principle has the potential to integrate economic development with environmental 
protection by posing certain questions. This would establish a threshold, below which 
economic developments should not be interrupted. This would happen when a host 
state cannot establish through available knowledge, if the targeted activity is a potential 
threat. Almost every activity could have some potential environmental impact, and 
therefore could possibly be stopped; asking appropriate questions would rule out any 
risk that is neither serious nor irreversible. The appropriate questions will vary in each 
case, and it will be up to the tribunals to decide them.  
                                                
1041 An intergovernmental treaty which provides the legal framework for countries in the American 
Continent to take actions in benefit of these species. Other instrument that requires protection of sea 
turtles include:  UN Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or Bonn 
Convention), Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) Protocol, Convention for the Protection and Development of 
the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention) ( both SPAW Protocol and Cartagena 
Convention supported by the UNEP Caribbean Environmental Program,). 
1042 Articles X, IX, XII (4) and XVIII 2001 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles: require parties to ensure protection, monitoring, compliance and also adopting measures to ensure 
protection. 
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5.3  Pract i ca l  Just i f i cat ion  
The importance of the precautionary principle and the ways by which tribunals could 
allow the principle to inform their interpretation were discussed under theoretical 
justification. This section has attempted to briefly explain why tribunals should consider 
this proposal to inform their decisions regarding external rules such as precautionary 
principle.  
The first justification for allowing the application of the precautionary principle is that 
the constitutive instruments of investment tribunals mandate them to apply the 
international law and enable1043 them to determine which rule of law (international or 
domestic) is the most appropriate. Examples of these instruments include the Claims 
Settlement Declaration of the Iran-Us Tribunal,1044 NAFTA1045, ICSID1046, ECT1047, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules1048 and the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce.1049 In several occasions,1050 investment tribunals have referred to the 
nature of the claims in relation to international law.1051  
                                                
1043 Y. Banifatemi, ‘The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Chapter 9)’, in Arbitration Under 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues, Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Oxford University 
Press, 2010. p. 204. 
1044 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration ‘The Tribunal shall 
decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of 
commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable’  And also article 33.1 of the 
rules of procedure ‘The arbitral tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such 
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the arbitral tribunal determines 
to be applicable’. 
1045 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-14, 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993), Article 102.2 ‘The 
Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in 
paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules of international law.’ 
1046 ICSID article 42.1’Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the 
parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.’ 
1047 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 ILM 360 (1995). Article 27.3. g ‘The tribunal shall decide the 
dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law’.  
1048 Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: ‘The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated 
by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.’  
1049 Article 22(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce: ‘The Arbitral 
Tribunal shall decide the merits of the dispute on the basis of the law or rules of law agreed upon by the 
parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law or rules of law which it 
considers to be most appropriate.’  
1050 ‘the Tribunal’s inquiry is governed by the [ICSID] Convention, by the [BIT] and by applicable 
international law.’ Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, award of Feb. 6, 2007, at para. 78.; That consent falls 
under the first sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. . . .The consent must also be deemed 
to comprise a choice for general international law, including customary international law, if and to the 
extent that it comes into play for interpreting and applying the provisions of the [BIT].’ ADC Affiliate Ltd. 
v. Republic of Hungary, award of Oct. 2, 2006, at para. 290; ‘[t]his being a dispute under a BIT, the parties have 
agreed that the merits of the dispute will be decided in accordance with international law.’ MTD Equity 
Sdn Bhd v. Republic of Chile, award of May 25, 2004, supra note 15, at para. 86.; ‘the Tribunal’s inquiry is 
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Investment law has been successfully integrated into public international law. In theory, 
it holds special features that keep debates about sources of international law alive and 
interesting.1052 Investment law is, as portrayed by Tams, only a ‘snapshot’ of a much 
bigger body of international law and is constantly under readjustment.1053 Since there is 
no unified code or legal source for investment law, the substantive investment law is 
built ‘BIT by BIT’. According to Tam, the sources of investment law are evolving, as is 
substantive investment law.1054 This fact has been addressed in several investment 
disputes. For instance, in a dispute against Sri Lanka the tribunal specified that a BIT: 
Is not a self-contained closed legal system limited to provide for substantive material 
rules of direct applicability, but it has to be envisaged within a wider juridical context in 
which rules from other sources are integrated through implied incorporation methods, 
or by direct reference to certain supplementary rules, whether of international law 
character or of domestic law nature.1055 
In another instance, the tribunal in MTD v. Chile emphasised that it ‘had to apply 
international law as a whole to the claim, and not the provisions of the BIT in 
isolation’.1056 By this statement, tribunal established its power and obligation to choose 
an applicable law. 
The relevant sources of law applicable to the procedure of international courts and 
tribunals consist of the constitutive instrument of the relevant tribunal and the rule of 
procedure. In addition, customary international law, the general principles of law and 
the subsidiary sources of international law are also available. The treaty or agreement 
that is the basis of the claim often include gaps and ambiguities, so other sources of 
international law have been used to fill the gaps.1057Accordingly, arbitral tribunals play an 
important role in shaping investment law. Given the dominancy of the treaties in 
                                                                                                                                     
governed by the ICSID Convention, by the BIT and by applicable international law,’ Azurix Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, award of July 14, 2006, at para. 67.; Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine award of Sept. 1, 
2003, , at para. 8.12 and Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, paras. 39-40; ‘whether there has 
been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different questions. Each 
of these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law—in the case of the 
BIT, by international law’ Cf. Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ad hoc committee decision of July 3, 
2002, 6 ICSID, para.96. 
1051 Antonio Parra, ‘Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration’, in Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2007, Arthur W. Rovine (BRILL, 2008), p. 3. 
1052Christian Tams, ‘Conclusion: The Sources of International Investment Law: Concluding Thoughts’, in 
International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations, ed. by Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De 
Brabandere (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 319–31 (p. 332).  
1053 Id. P. 327. 
1054 Id. P. 328 
1055 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (‘AAPL’) v Republic of Sri Lanka (Award) (ICSID, 1990, El-Kosheri 
P, Goldman & Asante) 4 ICSID Rep 247  
1056 MTD award, supra 45. 
1057 C. Brown, ‘The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals’, British Yearbook of International 
Law, 76.1 (2006), 195–244 (p. 205). 
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substantive investment law, Tam suggests that the interpretation of treaty provisions is 
key for tribunals in their role as agents of investment law development.1058 As successful 
agents whose interpretation has been followed, tribunals have ‘clarified the scope of 
vaguely-worded standards of protection and determined the reach of their 
jurisdiction’1059 by interpreting investment treaty provisions in a certain way. So far, they 
have not hesitated to fill the ‘law-making vacuum’.1060 
The second justification for application of external rules to interpret the investment 
treaty provisions is the inherent power of the tribunals. Investment tribunals, like many 
public international arbitral tribunals, do not have full jurisdiction. The extent  of their 
jurisdiction is instead granted to them by the parties. In the case of investment disputes 
therefore, the consent on the part of the host state is an investment treaty. This 
demarcates the extent of the issues that a tribunal is deemed to be competent to decide. 
This does not exclude the laws that a tribunal may apply to determining those issues, 
however.1061 
While the customary international law and the general principles of law are considered 
as the classic sources of law, tribunals have also resorted to a more controversial source: 
namely the ‘inherent power’ of the tribunals. This is claimed to be an extra-statutory 
source; it has its origin in (but is not limited to) the practice of English courts.1062 
Although there is no consensus regarding the source of this power, it is suggested that it 
‘lies in the necessity for international courts to fulfil their judicial functions’. 1063  
Moreover, exercising this power provides a better view for the tribunals to ensure the 
fulfilment of their function, both directly and consequentially. 1064 Jacob followed the 
same line of argument by suggesting that: 
Without such a power the court would have form but lack substance…the judicial basis 
of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to 
fulfill the judicial function of administrating justice according to law in a regular, orderly 
and effective manner.1065  
The investment tribunals, as an international tribunal, could exercise their inherent 
power to employ other sources of international law. In doing so, they could interpret 
                                                
1058 Tams, supra 1059, p. 329. 
1059 Id. P. 326. 
1060Id. P. 327. 
1061 Mclachlan, p. 371. 
1062 Brown, 2005, p. 205. 
1063 Brown, 2005 p. 198. 
1064 Brown, 2005, p. 229. 
1065 IH Jacob, the inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, Current Legal Problems, 1970. P.28. 
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the treaty provisions when they are vague. This practice of relating inherent power to 
the ‘post-adjudication phase’1066 has been applied by other tribunals. It is also suggested 
that ‘International courts might, through the careful exercise of such powers, better 
manage the complex challenges being posed to the administration of international 
justice’.1067 Therefore, ‘functional justification’, as advocated by Brown, could provide an 
appropriate platform for the tribunal to operationalize the precautionary principle. This 
would allow them to interpret the vague provisions of the BITs, such as FET and 
expropriation. 1068 
5.4  Case Evaluat ion  
After preparing a theoretical basis for application of the precautionary principle 
according to the international law, the next step is to operationalize the principle. Two 
awards were used (Chemtura vs. Canada & Bilcon Delaware vs. Canada) to speculate on how 
different the outcome could have been had the tribunals applied the precautionary 
principle on these particular cases. This approach was then used to test the research 
statement.  
The justification for selecting these two cases in particular is fourfold. Firstly they are 
recent disputes and reflect the current challenges in the field of environment-related 
investment case. Secondly, they are both against Canada, and are under NAFTA. Both 
also feature an American foreign investor, which on one hand demonstrates the 
inconsistency in practice and on the other hand provides a diverging view (although not 
on a same matter) based on the same policymaking and legal environment. Thirdly, the 
host state in both cases is a developed country, which highlights the changing pattern in 
the investor-state dispute settlement, and shows how the same powers who pioneered 
the investment protection mechanism are now the subject of its claims. Also, the fact 
that when a mature legal environment like Canada is exposed to such claims, less 
developed governments should be mindful of their exposures. Finally, this selection 
allows for application of the precautionary principle in both scenarios; in one example 
the host state wins and in the other it defeats the dispute. This approach explores 
whether the principle provides an objective tool, which is not simply to justify the 
environmental measure and a deferential method but rather provides the tribunal with a 
double-edged sword. In other words, does it allow them to ask the right questions and 
                                                
1066 Brown, 2005, p. 219. 
1067 Brown, 2005, p. 244. 
1068 Brown, 2005, p. 229. 
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analyse if a measure was genuinely adopted to protect the environment, or whether it 
was arbitrary and hostile in a way that constitutes breach of treaty obligation? Moreover, 
one pending case (Vattenfall vs. Germany) will be examined to speculate on possible 
outcomes if the tribunal apply the principle, and to compare it with a scenario that does 
not feature its application.  
In order to apply the precautionary principle, the precautionary test that was introduced 
through the analytical framework of this study (chapter three and four), will be used.  
What is the chosen level by the tribunal to review the measure adopted by the host 
state? Would the tribunal defer to the capability of the experts and decision makers or it 
decides to conduct a limited (as apposed to de novo) review to determine whether host 
state had acted according to the obligations that it accepted under the relevant 
investment agreement. 
Did the host state have reasonable grounds for concern? How probable is the 
occurrence of the feared threat? What is the gravity of harm had the threat materialised? 
What is the degree of the potential adverse effect by taking into account the geography 
of the project, the length of the harmful activity, cumulative effect, the existence of 
international standards or obligations, fatal effects? How the measure was 
communicated to the investor? Was the investor aware of the legal environment and the 
review process? 
Was the adopted measure effective and proportional to the threat of potential harm? 
5.4.1 Chemtura v. Canada 
The Canadian government was successful in fighting off a Chapter 11 claim by the 
United States chemical manufacturer, Chemtura Corporation. The company contended 
that Canada’s ban on the use of the chemical lindane as a pesticide impaired its 
investment, and claimed approximately $79 million in damages. The tribunal denied 
Chemtura’s expropriation claim under Article 1110, applying the ‘substantial deprivation 
test’. It also rejected the breach of FET under Article 1105. In short, the NAFTA 
tribunal found that the lengthy regulatory process and related decision were acceptable; 
and considering the worldwide treatment of Lindane, Canada was well within reason to 
ban its use as a pesticide. Therefore, investment obligations were not violated. 
Standard Of Review 
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The tribunal acknowledged the fact that its job is not to ‘second-guess the correctness’ 
of the scientific decision-making on whether Lindane was in fact dangerous.1069 This 
point was also argued by the respondent. Nevertheless, in making this statement the 
tribunal did not attempt to grant complete deference, and therefore did not validate 
whatever the measure dictated. Instead it examined the review and the whole process to 
determine if there was an evidence of ‘bad faith’ or ‘disingenuous’ conduct on the part 
of the host state.1070 This approach provides a reasonable authority for the tribunals to 
verify that they have done so in line with their obligation under the relevant investment 
agreement (here the NAFTA) by questioning the good faith and genuineness of their 
conduct. It also allows space for government authorities to decide on the level of 
protection within their territory. 
Reasonable Grounds for Concern 
According to the tribunal there was ‘ample evidence that the use of linden caused genuine 
concerns both in Canada and abroad’. This was taken as the basis and context, against 
which the argument by the claimant had to be assessed. The investor was deprived of a 
phase-out as a punitive measure.1071 Once the tribunal had established the scope of its 
mandate, rather than second-guessing the correctness of the science–based decision-
making process,1072 it turned to the widespread concerns over the use of Lindane, stating 
that:  
‘Irrespective of the state of science, however, the tribunal cannot ignore the fact that lindane 
has raised increasingly serious concerns both in other countries and at the international 
level since 1970s’. 1073 
Accordingly, the tribunal considered the measures to be enough to meet the criteria of 
reasonable concerns that the respondent was aiming to establish. It referred to the list of 
measures that other countries had adopted to restrict the use of Lindane, in addition to 
the relevant international instruments.1074  The tribunal stated that:  
‘This broader factual context is relevant in assessing…whether the special review was a 
result of a trade irritant’1075 
                                                
1069 Chemtura award, supra 80, para 134. 
1070 Id. para. 138. 
1071 Id. para. 184. emphesis added. 
1072 Id. para. 134. 
1073 Id. para. 135 emphesis added. 
1074 Id. para. 136. 
1075 Id. para 137.  
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Thus, the tribunal established ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ by taking into account 
the motives and triggers of the measure, instead of its effect on the investor. It also 
cited the witness statement, which approved the international concerns to be the 
‘reason’ that triggered the review 1076  as a response to domestic and international 
concerns.1077  
This part of the award is of great importance from the point of precaution and the 
framework suggested in this thesis, since it clearly demonstrates that the tribunal’s 
adopted response to review the measure and actions of the host state was based on 
claims made by the investor. In other words, even though it examined the genuineness 
of the measure through the already internationally established concern, the tribunal did 
not presume the argument of a breach of FET. Instead, once reasonable concern was 
ascertained, the tribunal asked the claimant to prove that the respondent had acted in 
bad faith, beyond its mandate. In the end, it confirmed that, considering all the concerns 
that the respondent raised, the investment obligations had not been violated. 
This reasoning by the tribunal suggests that if an investor claims that a review was 
conducted in bad faith, and not based on the state’s mandate and international 
obligations, ‘the burden of proving these facts rests on the claimant’.1078 It emphasises 
the responsibility of the claimant by reminding them that the ‘the standard of proof for 
allegations of bad faith or disingenuous behaviour is a demanding one’.1079 This is what 
the precautionary principle requires; reasonable grounds for concern over potential 
damages should trigger the action, not await conclusive scientific evidence. 
Degree of the Potential Adverse Effect (Significant/Serious/Irreversible) 
According to the explanation provided in chapter three, state practices and international 
instruments provide a threshold for taking precautionary action. This means that when 
there is a reasonable ground for concern the measure is triggered, but not all potential 
harms require the same treatment. In other words, measures should be taken if the 
potential harm is significant, and trivial adverse risks do not trigger precautionary 
measures. The Chemtura tribunal implicitly considered this threshold without referring 
to the principle. Although very subjective, the instrument and state practice provided 
                                                
1076 Id. para 140. 
1077 Id. para 139-142. 
1078 Id. para 137. 
1079 Id. ; see also Bayindir Insaat  Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 
Award (Aug. 27, 2009), para 143. 
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several elements to determine the level of the harm. Examples could include geography, 
the length of the harmful activity, cumulative effect, the existence of international 
standards or obligations, fatal effects etc. For Chemtura, the tribunal recognised some 
of these elements, against which the level of the measure were evaluated. 
Lindane was among the chemicals that have been banned around the world due to their 
‘persistence in the environment, bio-concentration, and bio-magnification ‘ in various 
food chains.1080 In a joint scientific report on Lindane, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), indicated that it could  
‘accumulate in human tissue and had the potential to cause nervous system damage, 
convulsions and in some cases, even death’1081. Moreover, the review showed that 
Lindane is a significant source of toxic waste.1082 Even the EPA, the claimant’s home 
regulator, also approved the adverse effects of Lindane.1083  
Another issue in the review was the occupational exposure risk related to Lindane.1084 
The Pest Management Regulatory agency (PMRA) had significant concerns regarding 
the adequacy of the exposure to workers during seed treatment and handling, which 
warranted suspension of the product.1085 The panel stated in its re-evaluation that 
Lindane is ‘unacceptable’ for registration because it is ‘potentially carcinogenic and that 
available information raises concerns about its neurotoxic and endocrine modulation 
effects’. In addition, it was declared to be ‘a major source of widespread environmental 
pollution’, including ‘long range dispersal by air and water currents to the Arctic’.1086 
To determine the legitimacy of the measure, the tribunal noted the witness statement. 
The witness at the time was the director of PMRA; he stated that the conduct of the 
special review was prompted by ‘commitments undertaken by Canada during the 
negotiation of the Arhus Protocol’. In addition, the tribunal noted his statement 
regarding the pressure coming from other countries to ban Lindane, and acknowledged 
the need of the ban ‘because, of course, their use could contribute to long-range 
transboundary’ impacts. These would expose other countries that had banned it 
before.1087 The tribunal referred to the Arhus protocol on POP  and  the 1979 Convention on 
                                                
1080 Id.  Canada counter-memorial, para. 27. 
1081 Id. para. 28. 
1082 Id. para. 32. 
1083 Id. para. 29. 
1084 Id. para. 50-53. 
1085 Id. para. 30. 
1086 Id. Canada rejoinder memorial, para 67. 
1087 Id. para.139. 
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the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP convention a UN program), which 
restricted the use of Lindane, and reassessed its safety.1088 It also referred to the 
Stockholm Convention on the Persistent Organic Pollutants, under which Lindane was listed as 
one of the chemicals to be eliminated.1089  
 
Communication (Due Process) 
To find out whether the authorities had complied with their obligation of due process, 
the tribunal asked the witnesses if the investor was treated properly. It concluded that 
the communication was ‘sufficient to satisfy the standard of treatment required by 
article 1105 NAFTA’. 1090 It also took into account that after the claimant had challenged 
the decision of the panel, a board of review was appointed.1091 This was considered as 
evidence that the claimant had received fair treatment.1092 Moreover, it observed that as 
a sophisticated registrant, experienced in a highly regulated industry, the claimant could 
not reasonably ignore the practice and the importance of the evaluation of exposure 
risks within such practice. To support this, the tribunal quoted the witness statement 
regarding the familiarity of the claimant with PMRA re-evaluation policy to determine if 
the host state had breached the due process requirement. 
Looking at the way the tribunal highlighted the facts and background to the case 
demonstrates the approach that the tribunal had adopted. For instance, the tribunal 
stated that ‘as a result of the risks associated with the use of Lindane, many steps have 
been taken to restrict the use of Lindane on an international level in the last decades’.1093 
The tribunal also highlighted that the main objective of the responsible agency was to 
review the chemical to ‘prevent unacceptable risks to people and the environment from 
the use of pest control products’.1094 Only after all of these enquiries did the tribunal 
announce that the risk assessment findings warranted regulatory function.1095 
 
                                                
1088  Id. para. 135. 
1089 Id. para. 136. 
1090 Id. para. 182 and 192. 
1091 Id. Canada rejoinder memorial para 64: ‘Bord of review among other things suggested that the panel 
take into account of all mitigation measures proposed by the claimant and the panel engaged in a de novo 
review of the lindane with a new team of scientists, with one exception.’ 
1092 Id. para. Canada rejoinder memorial, Para 57 
1093 Id. Canada rejoinder memorial, para. 8. 
1094 Id. para. 10. 
1095 Id. para. 29 
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Type of measure (proportionality and effectiveness)  
The next questions for the tribunal concerned the type of the measure adopted by the 
tribunal, whether it was a proportionate response and whether it was effective. This 
analysis concluded that the measure was in fact a valid precaution, and thus not a breach 
of FET or expropriatory. Sensitive and more objective questions were posed here to 
determine if the measure was proportional, instead of posing the question in the 
beginning and out of context. 
The disputed measure was the cancellation of the claimant’s registration. The tribunal 
recognised the measure to be legitimate, and did not raise the question of 
proportionality, supposedly because other elements were clear and convincing enough 
that no other test was required. However, to conclude its decision, the tribunal 
considered the context, motive and reasons behind taking the measure, instead of 
merely analysing how the measure impacted the claimant’s business. The tribunal started 
its decision by taking into account all the circumstances. 1096  Therefore, tribunal 
reassessed the cancellation of the registration as a result of compliance with 
international obligation. Tribunal found that the chemical posed serious adverse impacts 
on health and the environment, and therefore ruled that the cancellation was not a 
breach of fair and equitable treatment, and was within the police power of the host 
state. 
5.4.2 Bilcon Delaware v. Canada 
Bilcon Delaware, proposed a mining investment in Nova Scotia, Canada. The initial 
proposal was for 3.9 hectares quarry being built in area of 152-hectare land. A 
conditional permit for query was granted for the 3.9 hectares. However, after the permit 
was granted, it became clear that the investor intended to expand the quarry from 3.9 to 
124 hectares over 50 years. According to federal laws, a Joint Review Panel (JRP) should 
assess any mining proposal larger than 4 hectares. This should consist of federal and 
relevant provincial authorities evaluating the project, which should identify the 
remaining adverse impacts after the mitigation measures, were adopted.  
The panel had the discretion to ask for further information in its mandate, and also 
asked for a letter referring the proposal to the JRP. Accordingly, the panel amended the 
guideline after consulting the community and recognizing their concerns. It then asked 
the investor to address the issues in its EIS, to which the investor did not object. 
                                                
1096 Id. para. 123. 
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However, after the evaluation of the EIS conducted by the investor, the panel 
concluded that the adverse impacts of the project were so serious that they could not be 
mitigated. As a result, they recommended that the proposal should be rejected. The 
authorities therefore rejected the project. The investor then filed a dispute under 
NAFTA arbitration facilities, claiming that the actions of the panel and the authorities 
where in breach of NAFTA provisions, namely FET and National Treatment.  
The tribunal concluded, inter alia, that investors had an expectation to be treated 
according to Canadian laws, that the JPR report had adopted the concept of 
‘community core value’ without prior notice, that the concept was not included in the 
law, and that the panel had exceeded its mandate by making a decision instead of 
identifying the adverse effects of the project after mitigation. The tribunal found that all 
of these measures resulted in a breach of the duty of FET; they were arbitrary, lacked 
due process and did not fulfil the expectation of the claimant.  
Standard Of Review 
Theoretically, the tribunal recognised the regulatory power of the host state, and 
acknowledged that economic development and environmental integrity are not 
necessarily conflicting and can be mutually reinforcing. 1097  It also emphasised the 
discretion of the host state in several instances. Tribunal stressed that states are free 
under NAFTA to determine the level of protection and high environmental 
standards.1098 Even if the laws in place at the time of investment require a project to be 
approved by a public referendum, this is not against NAFTA provisions.1099  
 The tribunal therefore explicitly stated that it was not conducting its own 
environmental assessment in substitution for that of the review panel. They asserted 
that their standard of review would be to examine if the measure had been consistent 
with the laws of Canada in place at the time of investment, ‘including the core evaluative 
standard under the CEAA and the standards of fair notice required by Canadian public 
administrative law’.1100 The tribunal went further by declaring that states are allowed by 
law to assign a mandate to evaluate the project in any institution.1101 More importantly, 
the tribunal recognised the margin of appreciation by stating that: 
                                                
1097 Bilcon award, supra 255, para. 597. 
1098 Id. para. 598. 
1099 Id. para. 599. 
1100 Id. para. 602. 
1101 Id. para. 738. 
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‘Errors, even substantial errors, in applying national laws do not generally, let alone 
automatically, rise to the level of international responsibility vis-à-vis foreign investors. 
The trigger for international responsibility in this particular case was the very specific 
set of facts that were presented, tested and established through an extensive litigation 
process’.1102 
Although it made several statements that its job was not to second-guess the actions of 
the states, and realized a wide margin of appreciation for the state of Canada in its 
award, the tribunal seemed to be relying on the statement made by the claimant, instead 
of investigating the JRP report to find the breach of obligations,. For instance, the main 
claim in the dispute was the concept of ‘community core value’, which was allegedly 
made up by the panel; there was no such thing in Canadian law. Therefore, the tribunal 
took the claim at face value, instead of looking at the whole circumstances, or at least 
the review report, and attempted to interpret the meaning of the concept completely out 
of context. Therefore, it made an assumption about the interpretations that the JPR 
might have meant, instead of looking at the context in which the word was used.1103 
When writing the report the tribunal then concluded that none of the interpretations 
where acceptable as an excuse to use the approach in question.1104 The tribunal could 
have easily understood what the community core value meant by looking at the 
comprehensive amended guideline, which was provided by the JPR after consulting with 
the local community and identifying the concerns based on their mandate to include 
socio economic study. This would have explained to the tribunal the emphasis that the 
panel made on the community, why it was concluded, and also why the panel had 
recommended the rejection of the proposal. This factor alone, to a certain extent, could 
have changed the way the tribunal looked at the report and the measure. 
Reasonable Grounds for Concern: 
The next question that could have been asked was whether the host state, or the 
relevant authorities, had reasonable grounds for concern. The previous question on the 
standard of review was  more general while the second question aims at applying the 
core elements of the precautionary principle. 
Once the authorities realised that the project was designed to take 124 hectares and not 
3.9 hectares, they informed the investor that under the federal law, the proposal should 
be assessed by a JPR. This would take into account the provincial regulations, as the 
                                                
1102 Id. para. 738. 
1103 dissenting opinion by judge McRae.  
1104 Id. 
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proposal was enormously exceeding the tolerable volume of query (4 hectares). The 
authorities then sent for the fishing review and the JPR. After reviewing the proposal, 
the review panel consulted the community and recognised their concerns, within its 
mandate. The gravity and possibility of the potential harm were high enough for the 
panel to conclude that the adverse impacts were too serious, and therefore could not be 
alleviated via mitigating measures.  
If the elements of the precautionary principle were to be applied, these concerns 
regarding the probability or gravity of the adverse effect could have been used to 
confirm reasonable concerns and trigger an action, in this case the rejection of the 
proposal. However, as the precautionary practice dictates, these concerns are necessary 
to trigger, but not enough to justify, precautionary action. Therefore the next question 
for the tribunal would have regarded the level of the adverse effects, since in practice 
not all potential harms can validate action; there has to be a degree of seriousness. 
Degree of the Potential Adverse Effect (Significant/Serious/Irreversible) 
The tribunal could have looked at the proposal for building the quarry, the JPR report 
and the public consultation result based on different criteria to determine if the potential 
harm was significant, serious or irreversible. This could have helped them to determine 
whether the concerns were valid, and whether the potential harm was serious enough to 
justify rejecting the project without requiring mitigation measures. Although deciding on 
the level of concerns is a very-case sensitive process, there are several indicators in 
international documents and state practice that can help to find an answer. 
For instance, in terms of the geography, the potentially impacted area that was proposed 
included 152 hectares, 124 hectares of which was to be used for the quarry. As argued 
by the respondent in a very comprehensive defence for the breach of national 
treatment, compared to other mining projects in the region it encompassed a much 
larger area. This, combined with the proposed length of the project (50 years), could 
justify the worrying behaviour of the Panel. Another element, which was opposed by 
the investor as being irrelevant but which was explicitly part of the guideline was the 
cumulative effect. This was not addressed in the investor’s EIS, despite being considered an 
important element to analyse the hidden adverse impacts of seemingly undamaging 
activities. 
By looking into the documents provided by the respondent, and several references to 
the investor’s proposal and its EIS, the tribunal could have easily assessed the severity of 
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the potential harm. Although this would have been a subjective approach, ticking all of 
the boxes it would have made it easier to decide whether it was a genuine measure, and 
would accordingly require both the claimant and the respondent to reflect on these 
issues. 
Communication (Due Process) 
The next step would have been for the authorities to communicate the measure and the 
action to the investor. The investor’s answer would have determined to a certain extent 
whether the due process had been fulfilled. The Tribunal could then have looked into 
the mandate to find out any further measures available to them, other than 
recommending mitigating measures. Instead, they relied heavily on the claims made by 
the investor. Canada stated in several instances that the letter of referral to the JPR 
included the duty of the panel, and that it had the power to require further information. 
The panel did this in the form of a guideline, after consulting with the community. 
Accordingly, the final guideline emphasized the impact of the project on the 
community, and provided a detailed set of elements and principles to be taken into 
account.  
Type of measure (proportionality and effectiveness)  
The last question in this regard would have been to look into the measure itself. In this 
case the proposal for the investment was rejected, based on the EIS. The panel further 
suggested that a moratorium be put in place until studies had been conducted on the 
resilience of the particular location. This, in the opinion of the tribunal, was a zoning 
decision. The panel would then have decided the effectiveness and proportionality of 
the measure after considering all the elements. 
The analysis above is not intended to predict the outcome, or to claim that if the 
tribunal had exercised the ‘precautionary test’ the result would have been different. It 
focuses instead on asking the right questions, and taking into account the whole 
circumstances surrounding the matter. Depending on the answers, the tribunal could still 
remain convinced that the measure was not justified, but the approach would have at 
least provided an objective test. Such a test could then have been considered by other 
NAFTA states, or other countries who might be taking environmental decisions, who 
were looking for the criteria that their legitimate decision-making would be assessed on.  
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5.4.3 Vattenfall v. Germany 
A few months after the Fukushima disaster, Germany passed a number of laws aimed 
towards changing energy policy and deactivating the 11th amendment to the Atomic Energy 
Act (in which it extended the lifespan of the nuclear plants from eight to fourteen years). 
In 2011 the German Parliament decided to abandon the use of nuclear energy by the 
year 2022.1105 Although the disaster was the main trigger for this nuclear phase-out, the 
debate over use of nuclear power in Germany had been going on long before. The 
disputed measure is the immediate closure of the oldest power plants, which have not 
been in use since 2007, and the gradual closure of other plants by 2020. The two nuclear 
power plants subject to this dispute were not operational at the time of the decision.1106 
The importance of the public opposition regarding the use of nuclear energy has also 
hardened Germany’s nuclear stance. 
As a result, Vattenfall filed an investor-state dispute under the ECT in 2012, claiming 
over €3.7 billion in compensation because of the nuclear phase out. According to 
Vattenfall’s financial report for 2011, the damages from the nuclear phase out amounted 
to €1.5 billion in 2011 alone1107. This amount then increased due to additional costs for 
past and future losses and claims, reaching a number that has since been reported to be 
between $4.6 billion (around €4.1), (half of Germany’s development budget aid1108)1109 
and $6 billion (around €5.3).1110  
It is not possible to foresee at this stage what standard of review the relevant tribunal 
will adopt. However, if this case is not settled like the first Vattenfall case, and instead 
                                                
1105 Nathalie Bernasconi- Osterwalder and Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Background: Nuclear Phase-Out – 
Investment Treaties – Investor-State Arbitration – Investment Protection Standards’, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development, 2013, p. 2 <http://www.iisd.org/publications/state-play-vattenfall-v-germany-
ii-leaving-german-public-dark> [accessed 19 January 2015].; The Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic 
Energy Act (13. AtGA ̈ndG v. 31.07.2011, BGBl I S. 1704 (No. 43)) came into effect on August 6, 2011.  
1106  PowerShift (2012) Der deutsche Atomausstieg auf dem Prüfstand eines internationalen 
Investitionsschiedsgerichts? Hintergründe zum neuen Streitfall Vattenfall gegen Deutschland (II), 
October, quoted in: ‘Legal vultures: Law firms driving demand for investment arbitration’, Corporate 
Europe Observatory (CEO) November 2012, available at: 
<http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2012/11/chapter-3-legal-vultures-law-firms-driving-demand-
investment-arbitration#footnote86_726qt8p>. 
1107 {Citation}Bernasconi- Osterwalder & Hoffmann, 2012. 
1108 German newspaper Die Zeit reports that the compensation claimed would be higher than €4 
billion—half of Germany’s annual development aid budget—and indicates that €2.2 million were 
earmarked in Germany’s federal budget to cover legal expenses with the Vattenfall II proceedings in 2014 
(Pinzler, Uchatius, & Kohlberg, 2014)  quoted in: sconi- Osterwalder & Hoffmann, 2012 
1109  Swedes want €4.7 billion for nuclear shutdown, The Local, 15/10/2014, 
http://www.thelocal.de/20141015/vattenfall--want-47-billion-for-german-nuclear-shutdown. 
1110 Alexander Hellemans, Vattenfall Seeks $6 Billion in Compensation for German Nuclear Phase-Out 
IEEE spectrum, 12/11/2014, <http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/nuclear/swedish-energy-
giant-vattenfall-nets-billions-for-nuclear-phaseout>. 
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reaches the merit phase, the tribunal could, by asking the right questions from the 
claimant and respondent, to use this opportunity to adopt a more objective approach 
towards the disputed measure to determine its genuineness. None of the party 
submissions or orders issued by the tribunal have been published on the website to date, 
nor have the parties to the dispute made them public. Perhaps a fresh look through the 
precautionary lens could be an opportunity for the tribunal to systematically take into 
consideration what needs to be asked when an environmental measure is disputed. 
Standard of review 
In selecting its method of review, the tribunal could choose to look at the whole process 
that caused a decision to be made. This includes reviewing the measure, the background, 
and the reports that pushed the authorities to adopt the measure. Background 
information and reports could include public consultation, scientific reports, and NGO 
reports, among other things. Essentially, authorities should be able to demonstrate a 
basis for reasonable concerns other than mere fear of nuclear disaster, even if the measure 
has been triggered by a disaster. They should be able to justify its genuineness before 
the investment tribunal. The tribunal should look into the background of the measure 
or ask the respondent to provide these documents, rather than moving straight to the 
effect of the measure on the investor. In this way, the tribunal would not only 
objectively evaluate the intention behind the measure, but would also send a signal to 
the state to move beyond the blanket defence of police power and prepare to justify 
their measure.  
Firstly, according to the explanation of the precautionary principle in chapter three, the 
burden of proof will be on the investor for demonstrating the harmlessness if the host 
state can establish a reasonable ground for concern (one that it is not a trivial risk based 
on fear from what happened in Fukushima). 
Reasonable ground for Concern 
As mentioned previously, Germany had to prove that there was a reasonable concern to 
health and/or the environment, and that having a nuclear power plant would impose a 
risk. These concerns included, the age of the installation, the concerns of the public, and 
the impact of the power plants on the environment. In addition, supervision, no matter 
how strong, could not alleviate these concerns. Most of the government actions could 
be regarded as public policy, apart from corruption. Even the green party can promise 
certain measures to people genuinely, for though it has political motives, it still serves a 
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public interest. Nevertheless, by providing reasonable grounds for concern, tribunals 
would be able to look at the real reasons for said concern. They can ascertain if the 
measure is serving a mere political purpose, or if it is actually a concern about adverse 
impacts. 
It is worth noting that some argue that the Fukushima disaster was preventable.1111 
Firstly, there was insufficient evidence of large tsunamis. Secondly, inadequate computer 
modeling led to the underestimation of the tsunami, as indicated by the report. Thirdly, 
the supervisory agency (NISA)1112 failed to review the simulations conducted by the 
operating company. Considering what went wrong in Fukushima, Germany might need 
to go beyond the fear of having the same disaster in Germany, since according to expert 
reports, the nuclear plants in Fukushima did not follow the best practice regarding the 
estimation for tsunami that in Chile and later changed by the incident in France in xxx. 
Therefore, the loss was partly due to not taking signals seriously, whereas Europe is well 
within the best practice. Additionally, the blame was partly placed on the supervisory 
agency in Japan. If Germany wants to use the precautionary principle it has to fulfil the 
criteria, instead of relying on the blanket defense of ‘police power’. 
Potential adverse harm 
To determine the degree of potential harm, the tribunal could take into account: the 
background provided by the government, the geography that might be impacted, the 
length of the activity or the nuclear plans that might remain active according to the life 
expansion program. Furthermore, regarding international obligations, one might 
consider the European energy policy or the budget aid. All of these questions, in 
addition to the due process and proportionality and effectiveness that were discussed in 
previous cases, are extremely fact-sensitive, and depend highly on the submissions of 
both parties. Therefore, it would be difficult to speculate on possible defences in detail. 
However, the questions that were suggested as the framework for application of the 
‘precautionary test’ could in any event objectively direct the tribunals. Consequently, this 
would also help the parties to know what their duty and rights are under the investment 
treaties that they have signed, in relation to environment-related matters. 
 
                                                
1111 James m. Acton and Mark Hibbs, ‘Why Fukushima Was preventable’, Nuclear Policy, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, March 2012. Available at: 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/fukushima.pdf>. 
1112 Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency. 
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5.5  Conclus ion 
This chapter aimed to operationalize the precautionary principle through three steps. 
The first section analysed article 31 VCLT on treaty interpretation and argued that 
tribunals could use the precautionary principle to interpret FET and regulatory 
expropriation. According to article 31.3.c, this would require the introduction of 
international law into the interpretation. They could also consider the evolving object 
and purpose of the investment treaties and apply the precautionary principle according 
to article 31.1, as the recent practice in environmental regulation. This is part of the 
objective of achieving sustainable development in modern investment law. 
The second step discussed the empowerment of the tribunals to use international law. 
Additionally, soft law was taken into account as a modern source of international law 
when applying the precautionary principle. As such, the constitutive elements of the 
tribunals enables them to apply international law. The vague language of the investment 
treaties necessitates the tribunals to fill in the gaps, and the inherent power of the tribunals 
qualifies them to choose applicable law to apply to the facts of the dispute. 
Finally, the practical segment of this thesis was to exemplify how the claimed 
‘precautionary test’ could answer the question of this thesis. Namely, the question was: 
to what extent could the precautionary principle assist investment tribunals in making a 
balanced decision for environment-related investment disputes? 
The simple answer to this question is that the precautionary principle, as it is, could 
equip the investment tribunal with a tool to ask the right questions. This, however, does 
not mean that this tool alone can address all issues in this area. Instead, it can direct the 
tribunal to ask the right questions, allowing it to comprehend in an objective way 
whether the disputed measure has been adopted for genuine environmental purposes. 
This is done in a systematic way that is based on a set of questions that are extracted 
from international instruments, state practice and jurisprudence. 
This method could serve several objectives. Firstly, adopting an objective test could 
send a signal to the states to provide an answer to the questions in their defence. This 
would also let the investors know how to prepare their claim when they face an 
environmental measure. If properly applied, it could, bring predictability to the players, 
and as a result would bring consistency to the investment system.  
Secondly, the precautionary principle is a double-edged sword that proved to be a 
balancing tool, as opposed to other methods such as the margin of appreciation and 
cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, it specifically tests for environment-related cases, as 
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opposed to more general methods such as police power and proportionality. It tilts the 
balance in such a way that it could work as a blind test without bias towards any party. 
This is because it only considers the peculiarities of the environmental regulation and 
the ultimate goal of achieving Sustainable development by providing a benchmark. If 
the measure cannot stand the test, it is very likely that it could be constitute as a breach 
of investment treaty provision even if it is for genuine environmental purposes. 
Finally, this test would allow the tribunal to play a more active role in dispute resolution, 
rather than deferring to the sovereign power of the states or protecting the rights of the 
investors. Several methods have been suggested to overcome the legitimacy crisis of the 
investment regime. These include establishing an appeal mechanism, renegotiating BITs 
and including some provisions for recognition of the public policies. Ultimately, 
however, tribunals hold the power to interpret these inevitably vague and broad 
provisions. Therefore, arming the tribunals with appropriate tools in each field could 
allow the system to overcome the panic regarding inconsistent decisions and unsatisfied 
stakeholders. 
Once again the message of this thesis is not to claim that the PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLEis the answer, but rather that it is the right question. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
 
Throughout the analysis of this thesis, the main goal was to provide a coherent and 
complete picture of the role of investment tribunals in accommodating environmental 
concerns into investment disputes. To better present the environmental elements in 
such disputes, this thesis focused on measures that had been adopted by host states due 
to fear of future harm to the environment. For this purpose, the precautionary principle 
was selected as a principle of international environmental law; it specifically provides a 
guideline for states to take action when protecting the environment from threats of 
harm. Therefore, the application of this principle permeated the analysis of this thesis.  
Chapter two began with an introduction to the problem of inconsistency in the 
investor-state dispute settlement, particularly in those cases consisting of an 
environmental component. In addition, it signified the necessity to address 
environmental issues in a systematic way, and demonstrated the different approaches 
adopted by the tribunals. Specifically, it looked at how diverse interpretations of the 
treaty provisions (FET and regulatory expropriation in particular), and the treatment of 
the environmental motives behind disputed measures, can impinge on the outcome of 
disputes. For this reason, the relevant jurisprudence was taken into consideration. It was 
only through this approach that a true understanding of inconsistency in environment-
related investment dispute settlement was made possible. The analysis of some of the 
most important jurisprudence revealed that, in general, three different approaches were 
adopted. The first approach consisted of decisions where environmental concerns 
where deemed irrelevant to justify a violation of investment treaty provisions. This type 
of attitude argued to be less likely to be adopted, as awareness towards sustainable 
development has improved, and there is less doubt over the importance of 
environmental protection. Nevertheless, the current predicament is: to what extent 
could environmental concerns influence a tribunal’s reasoning when deciding upon 
investment treaty violation? Accordingly, the second type of approach concerned 
decisions where the importance of environmental concerns as the trigger behind the 
states’ policies was acknowledged, but did not impact the interpretation of the 
investment provisions. This category has resulted in decisions in which environmental 
protection is praised and referred to, without having any impact in the final 
interpretation of investment treaty violation. In the last type, tribunals looked into 
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decisions where the tribunal took into account environmental elements and allowed 
these concerns to influence their interpretation of the investment treaty provisions. 
However, as much as the latter category has been essential in making a footprint to 
enable synergy between environmental concerns and investment protection, it was hard 
to extract a systemic and objective benchmark from these decisions. This made it 
difficult to demonstrate a pattern in environment-related investment disputes. 
The second chapter concluded by providing a non-exhaustive list of elements that had 
seemingly persuaded tribunals to find violations in investment treaty provision. These 
elements included scientific proof, public opposition, investors’ expectation from a 
state’s environmental policies and so forth. It was also argued that tribunals should 
move beyond the mere acknowledgment of the importance of environmental 
protection, and should now consider these concerns in their interpretation of treaty 
standards. To achieve this goal, tribunals should take into account the peculiarities of 
environmental regulation, and the constant changes in monitoring mechanisms. This 
would enable them to adjust with changes and respond to the threats of environmental 
harm. 
The issues in environment-related investment disputes using the precautionary principle 
cannot be addressed by merely identifying the principle’s content within international 
environmental law. The background of its emergence as a mechanism for environmental 
protection is as important as its content and elements. Therefore, the first section of 
chapter three was devoted to an analysis of the issue of environmental regulation, and 
the difficulties of the early mechanisms of protection. The discussions on the 
peculiarities of environmental issues, and the limitation of science in addressing the 
issues, demonstrated the complexity of the matter. A mechanism was introduced as a 
result, which allowed states to act if they could establish that there was a serious or 
irreversible harm to the environment, without having to wait for science to become 
conclusive. Nonetheless, the debate on the precautionary principle revealed that there is 
disagreement among scholars with respect to its applicability and status, both under 
international law ain in addressing environmental problems. Having mentioned the main 
criticisms, it was argued that the precautionary principle, according to the international 
environmental instruments, contains certain elements that could prove its applicability. 
Moreover, regarding the status of the principle, it was suggested that to fulfil its task 
(monitoring environmentally sensitive activities to prevent future harms), the 
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precautionary principle does not necessarily need to be a binding principle. It was 
argued that, being a soft law instrument under international law, the precautionary 
principle is capable of providing a guideline for decision makers and consequently the 
dispute settlement bodies when recognising the urge to prevent environmental harm. 
This conclusion was reinforced by explaining two functions of the principle, namely, 
procedural and substantive. 
While the procedural function of the precautionary principle deals with the allocation of 
the burden of proof, the substantive role of the principle centres on interpretation. The 
interpretative capacity of the precautionary principle means it is able to inform the 
interpretation and evaluation of actions that have been allegedly adopted to prevent 
future environmental harm. This function was explored by analysing different dispute 
settlement institutions in which the application of the principle had been discussed. 
Therefore, the jurisprudence on the precautionary principle, as a demonstration of its 
interpretative function, was discussed in a separate chapter (Chapter 4). 
Since any approach to discuss the jurisprudence on the precautionary principle requires 
an analysis of various cases under several institutions, therefore, one chapter was 
devoted to look into the decisions in the ECJ, ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and the ECHR. The 
caveat was that the case analysis under this chapter, at the end, does not provide a 
single, all-encompassing formula for the application of the principle. However, despite 
the different characteristics of each institution, and the varying position of the 
precautionary principle in each and every one of them, this chapter aimed to 
demonstrate the practicality of the principle and its applicability as a guiding instrument 
in the hands of the tribunals. Chapters three and four concluded the evaluation of the 
precautionary principle. A synthesis of both chapters recommended a precautionary 
test, based on which investment tribunals could assess whether the disputed policy to 
protect the environment from a future harm fits well within the benchmark that 
environmental law has developed. The test comprises of several questions designed to 
address the main elements of the principle, as established by various international 
instruments. The main questions are:  
• Which Standard of Review is being adopted? 
• Are there reasonable grounds for concern? 
• What is the degree of the potential adverse effects (seriousness, severity, 
irreversibility)? 
• How were the measure and concerns were communicated? 
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• What type of measure was adopted? 
   The precautionary test provides a background for the measure (through questions two 
to four), instead of evaluating the measure out of the context. Therefore, as much as the 
effectiveness and proportionality of a measure are crucial to decide if it has violated 
investment provisions, the test could walk the tribunal through a set of important facts, 
recognized under environmental law, to assist them in understanding the motives 
behind an environment-related policy. Moreover, compressing all those elements into a 
set of questions would improve the practicality of the test by asking direct questions 
instead of listing some terms that would, again, call for interpretation. Therefore, the 
format of the test raises the chance of it becoming a benchmark to be applied by 
subsequent tribunals. In any case, enough room should be left for the specifics of each 
case. The precautionary test provided in this thesis that it is not exhaustive and could 
accommodate as many specific questions as a case might require. Once again, the 
cardinal point here is to encourage the tribunals to understand what triggered each 
measure, and what is at stake, before deciding based on comparing the volume of loss 
that was imposed on the investor and the restrictive measure. 
Before operationalizing the precautionary principle, chapter five focused on more 
‘systemic considerations’, and explored how the principle could be applied by 
investment tribunals to identify if a violation of an investment treaty had occurred. To 
this effect, chapter five explored the treaty interpretation methods under Article 31 of 
the VCLT. This allowed it to balance the obligations of the states under investment 
treaties with their concerns over environmental protection. In doing so, two different 
paths were explored to evaluate how the precautionary principle could assist investment 
tribunals in their interpretation according to the international law interpretation 
mechanisms, namely: evolutionary interpretation and systemic interpretation.  
To advocate an evolutionary interpretation of the investment treaty provisions, it was 
argued that the vague meaning of these provisions, specifically the FET and regulatory 
expropriation, required tribunals to perform a gap-filing function when lacuna existed in 
the applicable law. In this context, the precautionary principle, as a soft law instrument 
under international law, can inform the interpretation and application of the binding 
text of investment treaties and their provisions. Therefore, it can shape the outcome of 
the decisions. An evolutionary interpretation begins with looking at the text of the treaty 
and its ordinary meaning in the light of the original object and purpose of the treaty 
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aaccording to Article 31.1 VCLT. This article raises two critical matters: the object and 
purpose of an investment treaty and the principle of contemporaneity. It was concluded 
that in light of the fact that sustainable development is the underlying long-term 
purpose of most recent investment treaties, the broad terms employed in investment 
treaties, such as fair and equitable treatment or indirect expropriation, must be 
interpreted in accordance with their current object, and with the purpose of the 
applicable treaty existing at the time its application.  
The precautionary principle is one of the most crucial components of sustainable 
development, and in light of the current object and purpose of the investment treaties, 
could be relevant in interpreting treaty provisions,. However, one should be cautious in 
conducting an evolutionary interpretation, which draws its legitimacy from a style of 
interpretation that appears to be reasonably faithful to the authoritative text.  
The second suggested path is the principle of systemic integration. Being based on 
Article 31.3.c of the VCLT, this principle could function in two different ways to apply 
the precautionary principle: general and specific. The general application of the principle 
is attainable by going beyond the boundaries of orthodox sources of international law. 
Specifically, this involves taking into account non-binding instruments as serviceable 
tools to inform interpretation. The second and more limited application of the principle 
is through the obligation of due diligence, as acknowledged by the ICJ and ITLOS 
tribunals. 
For a general application of the precautionary principle, the general requirements for 
qualifying a rule for its application under the article 31.3.c were analysed: being relevant, 
being a rule of international law and being applicable between the parties. Among these 
elements, being a rule of international law might appear to be problematic, as the 
principle is a soft law instrument. It was argued that, soft law, as a modern source of 
international law, could assist tribunals in their decisions. These soft law instruments, 
although lacking a binding character, are sometimes used to ‘interpret and fill the gaps in 
the law’. This issue has also been recognised by numerous investment treaty tribunals. 
This practice is precisely what this thesis is advocating as a function of the precautionary 
principle for investment tribunals, with respect to environment-related investment 
disputes. 
In addition to a general application of the precautionary principle through Article 31.3.c, 
investment tribunals could also apply the precautionary principle in some limited 
situations as an inherent part of a state’s due diligence to protect the environment. It is 
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limited and specific due to the fact that there is no general obligation under international 
law to protect the environment by attaching a general obligation of due diligence to a 
state’s responsibility. Therefore, where states have an obligation to protect a certain 
aspect of the environment, such as biodiversity, climate change, waste disposal, etc., 
they are assumed to have a duty of diligence to ensure that the specific aspect of the 
environment is protected. A decision by the ITLOS tribunal recognised the 
precautionary principle as being relevant to (and embodied in) the state’s obligation of 
due diligence. The tribunal argued that, where applicable, investment tribunals could 
refer to the obligation of due diligence in interpreting treaty provisions according to the 
precautionary principle. 
Besides strengthening the status of the precautionary principle in international law, this 
affirmation also clarifies how an obligation of due diligence necessarily implies an 
obligation of precaution. Substantiating due diligence as a result of the precautionary 
principle could develop the procedural duties of precaution, the breach of which could 
trigger a state’s responsibility. This could allow for further development in international 
environmental law. 
The outcome of the theoretical justification for applying the precautionary principle was 
that it does not need to be binding, or to be applied in a normative way. On the 
contrary, the principle has the potential to integrate economic development with 
environmental protection by posing certain questions. In the final section, the 
principle’s scope of application was put to the test. For this purpose, the precautionary 
principle was experimented with two different disputes, both under the same treaty and 
against the same host state, to speculate as to what differences it could have made. In 
addition, a pending case was also added to the experiment to provide a hypothetical 
scenario if the test had been applied. 
The issue around which this chapter revolved was whether the precautionary principle 
could be used to review a disputed state policy and determine whether the measure in 
question was intended to protect the environment, rather than being a protectionist 
attempt to interrupt the investment of the claimant. This chapter proved that the 
principle could assist investment tribunals in taking into account the environmental 
concerns that triggered the measure. It also demonstrated the principle’s ability to 
provide a benchmark, against which the measure could be assessed. Therefore, it 
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functions as a double-edged sword that can objectively accommodate the interests of 
both sides of a dispute. 
This chapter did not ultimately prescribe which method is best suited to applying the 
precautionary principle. The main purpose of this research was instead to introduce the 
principle as a way of thinking, and as a perception that has solid legal foundations and is 
technically applicable through the means of treaty interpretation. Therefore, under this 
study, which method the tribunal believes to be appropriate is not vital, as long as it 
incorporates the precautionary test as an objective method. In doing so, tribunals could 
set a footprint for future arbitrators in settling environment-related investment disputes, 
which would fulfil the main objective of this thesis. 
As a final conclusion, according to the author of this thesis, the precautionary principle 
integrates the whole of international law in terms of interpreting environmental 
concerns and investment obligations. It also facilitates unity in fragmentation. In this 
way, the present thesis as a whole conforms to Plato’s metaphor. Since knowledge is the 
way out of the ‘cave’, this thesis has striven to release the investment tribunals (‘the 
captive’) from the ‘chains’ of an incomplete understanding of environmental concerns, 
that so far have bound ‘the captive’ and forced him to gaze at shadows on the wall, 
without really comprehending the true nature behind them. 
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